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Printed in Luxembourg FOREWORD 
In  1986  the  European  Parliament  commissioned  a  research  study  from  the 
Trans  Europe an  Policy  Studies  Association  (  TEPSA)  on  the  subject:  Beyond 
Traditional  Parliamentarism:  The  European  Parliament  in  the  Community  System. 
13  individual  papers  were  submitted  to  Parliament,  which  were  drawn  together 
on  behalf  of  TEPSA  by  the  Institut  fur  Europaische  Politik  in  a  Summary 
Report.  These  documents  were  discussed at  a  Symposium  held  in  Strasbourg  on 
17  and  18  November  1988. 
The  present  Research  and  Documentation  Paper  contains  the  Summary 
Report,  and  also  the  speeches  made  at  the  plenary sittings of  the  Symposium  on 
17  and  18  November.  The  speeches  are  based  on  the official  interpretation of 
the  proceedings  and  therefore  speeches  not  made  in  English  are  slightly 
reduced  in  length;  editing  has  been  limited  to  the  avoidance  of  repetition 
and  the  achievement  of  clarity. 
A companion  version  of  this document  will  be  published  in  French.  A 
Later document,  in all  languages,  will  include  a  summary  of  the discussions  in 
the  working  groups  of  the  Symposium. 
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- 7-1.  INTRODUCTION:  THE  CHANCES  AND  CHALLENGES  OF  1989 
AND  1992 
In  June  1989  the  European  Parliament  (EP)  will  be  directly 
elected  for  the  third  time.  In  regard  to  this  institution 
Euro-Parliamentarians  and  voters  largely have  been  and still 
are  oriented  to  national  parliamentary  experience1.  But  in 
terms  of  competences  and  political  influence  the  European 
Parliament  is  obviously  different  from  national  parliaments 
and  - what  is of crucial  importance  in  this context  - the  EC 
system  cannot  be  compared  with  national  political  systems. 
Therefore  a  new  way  of  thinking  is needed. 
In  order  to  seek  a  new  understanding  of  a  parliament  in  a 
supranational  context  the  Trans-European  Policy  Studies 
Assocation  (TEPSA)  and its various member  institutes2 decided 
in  1986  to start a  research project  "Beyond Traditional  Par-
liamentarism:  The  European  Parliament  in  the  Community  Sy-
stem".  The  research is focussed  on  four  questions: 
1.  Are  there  differences  between,  and  common  basic  charac-
teristics,  of  national  parliaments  and  the  European 
Parliament?  And  if so:  How  have  they evolved? 
2.  What  new  concepts  can  be  identified  for  the  European 
Parliament in the Community  framework? 
3.  How  can  the  activities  of  the  European  Parliament  since 
1979  be  interpreted  in the light of  these  new  parliamen-
tary concepts? 
4.  What-are the European Parliament's strategies and options 
ahead? 
This  joint report  by  the  general  rapporteurs of  the  project 
is intended  to stimulate discussion on  the institutional and 
political role of the European Parliament in the  Community. 
- 8  -In  the  ~resent  situation  of  the  Community  an  intensified 
discussion  on  institutional matters  is  extremely  n~cessary: 
European  elections  seem  to  be  beco:ninq  "normal"  t?vents 
for  politicians,  party  activists  and  voters.  The  question 
is  open  if  the  EP  is  content  with  the  achieved  d~gree cf 
ltnor:nality"  both  in  tarms  of  ca:npaigninq,  ~cbilizing and 
voters  turn-out  and  in  terms  ot  its institutional  role 
in  the  Com~unity.  European  election  cam~aigns could  be 
chances  to  propagate  the  institutional  aims  of  the  insti-
tution  to  be  voted  for. 
In  July  1987  the  "Single  European  Act"  ca.rr.e  into  force. 
9y  this first  substantial  reform  of  the  EC  treaties,  the 
powers  of  the  EP  were  =nlarqed  in  the  fields  of  legisla-
tion  and  treaty-making  (accessions  and  associations  to 
the  community).  The  li~ited  experience  we  have  to  date 
with  these  new  powers  indicate  that  the~  may  change 
substantially  the  ima(Je  of  thtt  E:P  frorn  a  "forum"  towards 
a  responsible  partner  in  the  decision-making  process. 
The  envisaq~d completion  of  the  internal  market  in  l992 
opens  new  frontiers  for  the  Co~munity future  and  in 
particular  a  ne~d for  enhanced  deeision  making  at  EC-
level.  The  acc:eptea  target  "1992
11  could  be  linked  ¥~ith 
a  call  for  further  institutional reforms.  The  EP  should 
be  in  the  centre  of  a  new  reform  process. 
Thus  the  time  is ripe  for  a  qcneral  debate  on  tha  institutiQ-
nal  position ot  the  EP  and  the  chances  for  ~n enhanced  rola. 
This  role  must  be  adequate  to  tha  political system  in  which 
it has  to  function.  A clear  idea  of  the  present  role  and 
~ossible future  developments  ot  the  EP  ~ay qive  voters  and 
parlia~entarians orientation and  ~ay  contribut~ to  a  bett~r 
understanding of  chis  institution. 
The  central message  of  this  report  is the  plea  for  an  adequate 
parliamentary  rol~ concept  for  the  EP  beyond  traditional 
parliamentarism.  The  structures of  the  EC  system with its 
qrowinq  interlocking  and  int~rference  between  the  member 
states  and  the  Community  and  the  predominant  intluenee  o! 
- 9-national  governments  and  administrations  havQ  so  prevented 
the  EP  from  becoming  a  '' 1 c:gi s 1 at  ure"  ( 1 i ka  the  t:s  congress} 
or  a  dominant  actor  in  thtt  "gubernative"  (like  the  G~rr..an 
Bund~stag)  that  can  ~lact and  dis~iss  the  government.  A role 
as  a  "!oru:n  ..  (like  the  Parliamentary  Assembly  of  the  Council 
of  Europe)  -even  if  so~a  other  ingredients  ware  added-
see~s  to  be  unsatisfactory  for  the  dir~ctly elected  E?. 
Owinq  to  the  structures  of  th~  EC  system  we  propose  that  tl)~ 
Et>  should  follow  a  "co-pl~yer-concect"  in  the  Comzr.unity  9ame 
with  its  variety  of  more  or  less  important  national  and 
European  actors.  The  EP  ~ust be  acceptad  within  the  se~sitive 
decision-making  process  as  an  important  co-play~r whose 
assent  is  necessary  to  all  important  d~cisions.  It  shou:d  at 
first  concentrate  on  s~lected  ~~ans  to  increase  its influ-
ence  in  important  political fields.  The  Sinql~ European  Act 
points  out  that  way:  Since July  1987  the  EP  has  to  give  its 
assent  to  treaties ot  association  and  accession.  Moreover,  its 
involvement  in  legislation  was  strengthened.  In  the  last 
cha~car  o~  this  report  proposals  for  further  institutional 
reforms  in  this  line  ean  be  found.  These  proposals  do  not 
t!xcluae  tht:  necessity of  a  ••grand  design"  contin1Jing  the 
approach  of  the  Draft Treaty establishing  the  European  Union 
of  1984.  Such  ~  project  ~ay  qive  orientations  for  voters, 
Community  institutions  and  national authorities. 
The  c~rm  rtco·player"  tor  the description  o!  the  EP's  role 
may  provoke  some  criticism  for  boing  not  "serious"  enough. 
aut  it  explains  the  necessity  (~ore  than  alternatives  like 
"partner")  that  the  EP  has  to  take  part  in  the  "Community 
play",  that  there  are  certain  bindin~ rules  in  the  game  an4 
that  con~licts  are  possible.  A parliamentary  role  o!  "co-
player"  has  certain facets  like  ~o-d~cidor,  co-laqislator, 
co-articulator ana  co-controller. 
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L" .  ••  t..; .. Of  coursd,  the  EP's  institutional  role  today  partly  can  be 
described  as  a  "co-player"  as  well,  but  there  are  certain 
important  fields  of  the  EC  system  where  it  is  totally  or 
~artly excluded  from  decision-~akinq:  the  agricultural  or 
trade  policy,  the  European  Monetary  System,  activities  in  the 
11r.'li:<ed  areas"  like  the  Europ€-an  Development  Fund  or  instru-
ments  in  the  intergovernmental  cooperation  field,  like  EUREKA. 
The  concept  for  the  EP  as  a  "co-player"  implies  that  in  th.: 
long  run  it  ~ay effectively  in  one  way  or  the  other  influence 
decisions  on  all  those  reatters=  it should  not  do~inate those 
deeision-making  processes.  but  should  seek  to  share  the 
power  with  the  Council. 
This  concept  cakes  into  consid~ration that  th~ legitimacy  of 
the  EC  system  derives  both  from  a  national  and  a  European 
source.  The  national  one  is  represenced  by  the  European 
Council,  th~ Council  and  the  various  bodies  with  representa-
tives  of  the  ~emb~r states,  the  EC  source  is  represented  by 
the  European  Parliament  and  the  Com~ission.  For  important 
decisions,  th~ assent  of  repres~ntatives of  both  is necessary, 
otherwise  ''the  qar::e  will  not  go  on".  Of  cours.a,  such  a  parlia-
!'!'.entary  concept  as  "eo-player  ..  requires :najor  learning process 
trom  the  EC-citizens,  who  are  oriented on  their national 
parliamentary experience. 
2.  STARTING  POINT:  '!,HE  VOTERS  AND  THE  TRADITIONAL 
PARLIAMENTARY  HERITAGE 
The  introduction  of direct  European  elections  in  1979  was 
acco~paniad - besides  the  f~elin; of  curiosity for  somethin; 
new  - by  ditferent,  partly diverginq  hopes  and  fears3.  Expec-
tations  were  focussed  in  four  directions: 
(1)  Direct European  elections would  lead  to  a  higher degree 
of 4emocratization  and  legitimaQy  in  the  Community,  by 
strengthening  the  EP  directly  and  thus  strenqthenin~ 
- 11  -indirectly  the  influence  of  the  vor.ers  on  Community 
leQislation. 
{2)  Secondly,  direct  European  elections  would  have  ~ositive 
effects  on  the  inteqration o!  th~  diver~ing forces  in  the 
EC.  The  interest  ana  engagement  of  the  European  party 
tederations  and  of  the  pressure  groups  at  the  EC  level 
would  become  stronger.  National  cleavages  would  be  re-
placed  at  least  in  part  by  political/ideoloqical clea-
vages. 
(3)  Thirdly,  the  voters  expected  from  a  directly elected 
European  Parlia~ent  a  positive  i~pact on  the  efficiency 
of  the  decision-making  process.  The  Council  being  abso-
lutely  predominant  in  this  process,  had  often been  seen 
decision  makin9  blocked  by  its  commitment  ~o unanimity. 
A  strenqthen~d  Parliament  - voting  by  majority  - could 
lead  the  way  out  of  the  EC's  "decision-making  trap"".  At 
the  same  time  direct  al~ctions to  the  EP  would  increase 
the  "learning capacity''  of  tht~  EC-system  by  an  enhanced 
pressure  on  the political parties  to  reaet  to  new  challan-
qes. 
(4)  Finally it was  expected  in  some  o!  the  member  countries 
that  the  introduction of  general  elections  in  the  long 
run  as  is  the  case  in  all  EC-member  countries  would 
provide  the  mechanisms  for  a  peaceful  chanoe  o~ political 
power  in  the  Com~unity. 
All  these  expectations  were  in~luenced by  perceptions  of  what 
the  role  ot  a  pa:liament  should  be  on  the  basis  of  national 
experi~nce.  In  fact,  however.  there  is not  one  perception  of 
that  role,  but  several,  in  vi~w of  difterences  between  natio-
nal  traditions,  between  current  pr~ctices ana  between  conflic-
ting political ideas.  What  the  member  states clearly have  in 
common,  however,  is  a  commitment  to  what  they  see  as  a  parlia-
mentary  form  of  qovernment,  thouoh  that  form  may  be  qualified 
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~  '"'~  t  •• b~ other  vital constitutional  alements  (as  by  the  role  of 
the  French  President  or  by  the  Ger~an  F~deral  system)~.  There 
~xists  a  plenitude  of  conceptions  r~Qarding  ~he  natttra  of 
and  the  basic  requirements  for  parliaments: 
Starting  from  a  constitutional  point  of  vi~w,  parlia~ents 
may  be  described  as  elective  bodies  with  some  share  of 
govern~nce and  majority  consent.  They  came  to  be  under-
stood  prirearily  in  ter~s  of  the  exercise  o~  for~al, 
constitutionally quaranteed  powers  such  as  reprensenta-
tive,  d~liberate,  legislative,  executiva,appointing  and 
electoral  powers' . 
Citizens,  qroups  and  organizations  outside  Parlia~ent 
articula~ed a  profile  of  ~xpectations what  a  parliament 
should  be.  Essential  attributes  in  those  expressions  are 
responsiveness,  representativeness  and  the  ability  to 
react  on  new  challenges  by  majority  consent7 • 
Th~ self-concept  of  parlia~entarians  ~ay have  relevance 
for  the political  aims  of  the  institution.  Here  the  hold 
on  government  power  is  seen  as  essential.  Only  the  oppo-
sition is interested in an  openly  debated  stronq  scrutinq 
and  control' . 
Academic  conceptions  of  parliament  started  from  the 
crueial question  conccrninq  the  basic  requirements  of  a 
representative.  Nowadays  the  academic  debate  at least  in 
social science  is centered around  the  functions  a  parlia-
ment  should  perform  in  the  political system. 
Going  back  as  far  as  the  Enqlisb commentator,  Walter  Bagehot, 
writing  in  1867',  many  stu~ents have  described  the  role  o! 
parliaments  in  terms  of  the  performance  of  various  funetions 
in relation to qovernment  and  societyso.  In  a  symposium  that 
was  organized  by  the  EP  in  1974  Klaus  von  Beyme  arqued  that 
a  distinction can  be  drawn  between  six principal  tunctions 
- 13 -of Parliaments in the input and  output sectors of  the politi-
cal  systema11: 
The  representation and  articulation function; 
the  communication  function; 
the  controlling function; 
the  function  of  participation  in  the  appointment  and 
dismissal of  the executive; 
the  legislative function; 
the recruiting function. 
The  emphasis that is placed by  th~ national parliaments them-
selves and  by  observers  on  these  individual functions  and  on 
the  use  of  the  traditional  powers  in  Western  Europe  (and 
elsewhere)  has  been  profoundly  affected  in  the  past  by  four 
major  developments: 
1.  Constitutional  limitation  on  the  national  assembly, 
designed  variously  to  provide  for  a  greater  degree  of 
horizontal  (betw~en national/regional level) and vertical 
(between  different  institutions  representing  the  legis-
lative  I  executive  power  and  the  jurisdiction)  separa-
tion  of  powers,  to  allow  direct  consultation  of  the 
people and to recognize the rights of regional assemblies. 
2.  The  growth of highly organized political parties, capable 
of  dominating  the  electoral  process  and  the  procedures 
of the assembly,  as well as acting as a  vital element  in 
·the pE'OCess  of government-formation. 
3.  The increasing need for governments to take account of the 
demands of strong econ011ic and social interests inside and 
outside parliament altogether. 
4.  The  emergence of an  interuational di  ..  nsioa limiting the 
capacity of national parliaments to perform their tradi-
tional  role.  Part of  this  fourth  factor is, of course, 
- 14  -th~  establish~~nt  and  evolution  of  t~~  European  Co~~unity 
with  supranational  powers. 
Many  developments  in  European  society  and  politics  must  lead 
us,  th~re~ore,  to  question  the  realism  in  c~rrent circumstan-
ces  of  traditional  conceptions  of  parliament  at  least  in 
some  of  the  member  states.  Even  advocat~s  of  parliamentarisrn 
may  abandon  or  at  least  ~edify substantially  the  traditional 
~odel.  The  national  experience  is  even  less  h~lpful tor  under-
standin~ and  quidin~ the  Eu~opean  Parliament,  due  co  the 
fact  that  this  institution does  not  form  part  ot  a  political 
order  identical  to  a  nation state.  To  the  extent  that  th~ 
development  o!  the  EC  system  has  not  followed  the  traditional 
lines  of  nation states,  co~parisons  o!  the  EP's  rcl~ and 
!unctions  with  those  traditionally  belonqing  to  national 
parliaments  can  therefore  be  =isleading.  Such  comp~risons 
can  cause  frustration  and  an  increasing  lack  of  interest  in 
the  work  o~  the  European  Parlia~ent  and  in  Europe:~  el~c­
tions.  At  the  same  time  they  ~ay urge  the  EP  to  develop  in 
directions  that  mi~ht not  be  suitable  to  the  political  system 
in  which  it has  to  function,  havinq  in  mind,  however,  that 
this  system is developinq  too. 
This  leads  to  the question  of  what  kinds  of  model  exist,  if 
any,  tor  understanding  and  explaininq  the  Euro~ean ?arlia-
ment  - what it is,  what  it does,  how  it relates  to  the  wider 
issues of  European  inteqration  and  to  traditional  ideas  of 
parliamentarism.  Obviously  those  models  depend  first  and 
foremost  on  the  understanding  and  perception of  the  EC  itself. 
3 •  THE  INTERLOC~ED  EC  SYSTEM  AND  THE  INSTITUTIONAL 
ROLE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
3.1  The  con1titutional system of  the  EC 
The  EC-system  - as  it is discussed here  - includes  the  Commu-
nity in  the  sense  of  the  treaties  as  well  as  other  common 
activities,  closely linked to  the  Comm~nity,  such  as  the 
~uropean Political Cooperation  (EPC)  and  the  European  Monetary 
- 15  -System  (EMS).  One  o~  the  most  striking charactoristics  of 
the  EC  system  is  its  dynamism,  e.g.  its  abili~y to  react  on 
new  chall~nqes in  ~  pragmatic,  but  often  suboptimal  ~ay.  The 
binding  character  of  the  Community  law  and  the  positive  role 
ot  the  C~urt of  Justice  in  evolving  and  concretizing  that 
law  is  of  crucial  im~~rtance in  thi$  context  as  well. 
If  we  hav~  a  closer  look  at  the  structur~s of  the  EC  system, 
we  can  see  chat  th~ra is  a  qrowin;  interdependence  and  inter-
ference  between  the  EC  and  its  rn~~ber  states  in  nearly  all 
!ields of  political activity.  But  d=spite  those  evolutions 
the  Europ~an  Co~~unity has  not  d•!veloped  - as  much  as  sorr.e 
had  thouqht  into  a  supra-national  system  in  which  th~ 
Commissio~,  by  technical  er.pertisc,  would  exclusively  run  the 
com~unity  business'~.  The  Co~mission  h~s not  bacome  a  strong 
community  Govern~ent.  The  Europuan  Co~~unity  has  ncith~r 
d~veloped into  a  pure  fed~ral  sysia~ alonq  classical  models. 
in  which  a  tederal  government  (•  the  EC  Co~~ission),  guid~d 
and  controlled  by  two  chambers  of  parliament  C 2  the  European 
Parli~ment and  the  Council),  would  be  responsible  fer  the 
Community's  policies  independently  of  the  coexisting  though 
weakened  nation states,  nor  has  it fallen  back  into  a  tradi-
tional  international orqanisation,  in  which  only  qovernments 
decide,  and  do  so  by  unanimity. 
Th~ interactions between  EC  institutions  have  developed  in  a 
way  which  does  not  qualify  th~  Community  tor  this  kind  of 
traditional caeeqorisation.  The  European  Co~munity since  the 
oeqinning of  the  seventies  can  instead  be  characterised  by 
three general  trends: 
(A)  The  scope  of  aetivities of  the  EC  has  constantly been 
broadened,  so  that  more  and  more  topics  of  national  interest 
are,  in  one  or  the  other  of  tha  means  described,  b~inq inte-
qrated  into  the  Community  or  into  mechanisms  which  are  closely 
linked  to  the  Community  - like  European  Political Coopera-
tion  or  European  Monetary  System. 
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has  not  been  matched  by  a  transfer  of  exclusive  sovereign-
ties/competence&  to  the  Community.  Although  articles of  the 
EEC  treaties  (especially  Art.  100  and  235)  have  been  used 
more often in the last decade,  there-has been no  major radical 
change  in  the  formal  division  of  competences  between  member 
countries  and  the  Community.  The  EC  treaties  provided  the 
space  for  political action,  but  in  some  fields  (e.g.  the 
transport  policy)  there  were  little attempts  to  occupy  it. 
Even  the  Single  European  Act  with  its  new  priorities  in 
certain  fields  (environment,  research  and  technology,  EPC) 
included only  a  limited shift of competences  from  the member 
states towards  the Ec13. 
(C)  What  has  been  witnessed,  however,  is  a  considerable 
increase  of  "interlocking"  between  na tiona!  and  Community 
actors:  ministers  and  civil  servants  of  member  countries 
have  grown  more  and  more  accustomed  to  solving  problems 
together with  the Comaunity  or among  themselves.  The  charac-
teristics  of  the  constitutional  evolution  of  the  Community 
in  the last one  and  a  half decades  have  been  not  a  transfer 
of  sovereignty  but  a  pooling  of  sovereignties  among  member 
states and  the Community.  Member  states have  incr~ased their 
participation  in  and  control  of,  Community  activities,  not 
because they have reduced the importance of the Community,  but 
because they have increased the relevance of the Community for 
their own  national policiesJ  from  the Heads  of Government  to 
the  desk officer  in  aany  ministries  the  understandinq  of 
some  kind  of  common  problem-solving  in  the !C  framework  has 
increased.  The  completion of  the  internal market  in 1992  may 
turn  out  as  a  mobilizing  factor  in  those  developments.  The 
mutual  interdependence will  increase,  but  at  the  same  time 
new  frontiers  may  be  built  up  by  the  new  possibility of 
"opting out" for environmental or health reasons14. 
In many  sectors EC  policies exist parallel to separate natio-
nal. policies.  In  the area of external relations,  the inter-
- 17 -locked  character of  European  policy making  alao can  be  seen, 
especially  with  the  so-called  mixed  treaties  (more  than  100 
up.to  1987),  in  which  agreements  with  third  countries  are 
concluded  in such  a  way  that Community  competences  (as deter-
ained by the EC  treaties) and  those of member states are "poo-
led"  1 5.  The  negotiation  procedures  are  - in  these  cases  -
quite  complex,  but  they  have  become  on  the  EC  side  to  be  a 
normal  procedure of decision making. 
The interlocked system can  be  understood as a  specific way  in 
which  the  Western  European  nation states try to tackle prob-
lems of interdependence among  "welfare" and  "service
11  states. 
As  governments  are  elected  to  provide  their  citizens  with 
certain services  and  goods  they realize,  in the situation of 
mutual interdependencies,  that only joint decision-making can 
I 
help  to  reduce  some  of  their common  problems.  The  EC  offers 
certain  possibilities  of  assisting  the  solution  of  such 
problems. 
The  attitudes of  national  politicians  towards  the  Community,· 
however,  were and still are conflicting: On  the one hand,  they 
realize  the  necessity  of  joint  European  actions  to  solve 
existing problems  in fields  such as  foreign policy,  monetary 
policy,  environmental protection etc. On  the other hand,  they 
did  not  accept  the  transfer of  competen·ces  from  national  to 
Community  level._ They  have  preferred  ad  hoc-procedures  and 
interim-regulations,  they have pooled national and  EC  instru-
ments  and  they  have  used  traditional  Community  channels  to 
achieve their aims.  In all cases of exclusive !C competences 
they  have  increased  the capacity of member  states to control 
Community  activities,  as  has  been  documented  in  particular 
by  various  committees  of  national  experts who  influence  the 
Commission's  executive  power16.  The  existing  complexity  of 
the EC-system in terms of the division of competences  between 
the Community and the member  states can be seen in the follow-
ing  Graph  1  (see next page). 
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Graph 1:  Instruments  in the EC  systern and  the :Ji  vision of car;:etences  t:e~ 
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Beinq  usetul,  the  Comnunity  has  shown  a  hiqh  degree  o~  dyna-
mism  and  stability,  in  spite  of  all crises  and  blockages. 
The  European  Community  has  not  become  obsolete  but  evolved 
its areas  of  activity  and  its  institutional set-up,  though 
not  always  in  the  direction  or  at.  the  speed  some  of  its 
toundin9  fathers  wanted it to. 
To  the viability  and stability of  the  EC  system  one  has  to  ~dd 
the  cumbersome  and  - to  a  larqe degree  - undemocratic  deci-
sion-making  process.  Although  the  Community  takus  many  deci-
sion~that  directly  or  indirectly  affect  citizens  in  the 
member  stat~s,  those  officially r&sponsible  for  th~ decisions 
have little,  if any,  dirac:  responsibility  to  the  citizens 
themselves,  who  have  little  direct  means  o~  influencin9 or 
controlling the  making  o~  decisions  at  an  EC  level.  Since 
1979  the  European  Parliament  has  been  directly elected and 
is  playing  a  certain,  though  limitud role.  The  important 
- 19 -decisions,  however,  are  still  mainly  pre-formulated  and 
controlled  by  the  national  administrations,  quite  often 
without  any  direct parliamentary decision  and  open  political 
debate  as  is  customary  in  national  decision-making.  The 
consensus on important political matters  the  EC  system prima-
rily  is  betveen  national  and  European  administrations  and 
leading political circles, thus reducing the role for national 
parliaments  and  the  European  Parliament.  Only  step  by  step 
the  EP  has  gained  some  influence  on  the  decision-making 
processes.  Those  procedures  are  not  only  lengthy,  but  they 
normally  lead to decisions vhich are  "suboptimal",  i.e.  they 
do  not  represent  efficient solutions  for  the Community,  but 
reflect short term package deals  between  national  positions. 
European Parliamentarians therefore do quite often categorize 
the Community  system as  "undemocratic"  and  "inefficient". 
It is  traditional  to  start an  analysis  of  the  EP  in  the 
structure of governanee  of  the  Community  by  underlining  the 
existing  democratic  deficit in  EC  decision-making17.  Accor-
ding  to  this  "orthodox"  view  the  directly  elected  European 
Parliament  is  the  only  (or  at  least  the  principal)  reposi-
tory of  legitimacy and  democracy  in the  Community  structure. 
But  in  spite of  this democratic .quality its powers  are weak 
and  the  decision-making  process  as  a  whole  is  inefficient. 
MEPs  and  obs-ervers  have  often  claimed  that  both  facets  of 
the malaise could be corrected by  more  use of majority voting 
in  the Council,  combined  necessarily  with  a  significant 
increase in the legislative and control powers of Parliament. 
From other perspectives  such conclusions  are at least. dispu-
table.  Of  course,  no mod-ern  polity aspiring to democracy  can 
govern  itself  today  like the  Greek  Polis  or  the  New  Enqland 
town.  Representative  (parliamentary)  democracy  has  replaced 
direct participation. Nonetheless,  one yardstick of democracy 
should  be  the  closeness,  responsiveness,  representativeness 
and  accountability  of  the  governors  to  the  governed.  There 
are  two  normative  requirements  for  representative political 
- 20  -syste~s  in  the  W~st:  The  qovern~ent  ~ust fulfil  democratic 
~or~s  and  v~lues  and  - at  the  sa~e  ti~e  - it  ~ust enjoy 
lagiti~acy,  both  in  a  formal  (legal)  and  in  a  social  (~~piri­
cal)  sense.-
In  the  prQcass  of  integration  between  independent  states  ac 
a  regional  l~vel  there  will  as  a  rulu  initially be  a  diminu-
tion  of  dc~ocracy in  the  newly  int~grated body  in  comparison 
to  the  o:d  s~aller  politi~s.  The  reason  for  this  is  the  fact 
that  the  controlling  influence  of  the  voters  in  the  inteqrated 
Community  nor~ally  is  less  close  than  in  the  former  entity. 
Sut  nev~rth~l~ss the  citizens  may  opt  for  and  forreally  lugi-
ti~ize  this  int~grative  process  because  of  th~ possible 
gains.  By  aqqreqatinq  the  national  resources  the  total  welf~re 
of  citizens  may  be  enhanced  despit~  the  loss  of  the  more  irnm~­
diat~  influ~nce on  their  qovern~ent policies.  Indeed,  such 
governrr.ental  policies  rnay  well  have  be~n  little more  than 
symbolic  in  those  policy areas  wher~  a  broader  geoqraphical 
approach  is necessary  to  deal  with  a  problem. 
The  open  question  which  remains  is it the  ~inority will 
accept  majority decisions  in  the  ~nlarged integrated polity. 
There  is  no  theoretical  answer  dufininq  tha  boundaries  of 
the  polity within  which  the  majority  principlu  should  be 
applied.  The  acc~ptance is  determined  by  lonq-ter~ factors 
such  as  political continuity,  social,  cultural  and  lingui-
stic aftinity,  a  shared  history  and  a  sense  of  common  purposes 
at  least within certain spheres.  Puople  accept  the  majorita-
rian  principl~  of  de~ocracy  within  a  polity  to  which  th~y 
see  themselves  celonqin;.  As  lon9  as  this  social  legitirn~cy 
is  not  attributed  to  the  Community  in all member  states,  the 
v~to right ot  national  gov~rnments  in  the  Council  may  be 
seen  in  thos~  reluctant  countries  as  the  sinQle  ana  most 
leQitimizinq element  in  the  Community.  But  the  political  and 
the  economic  cost  of  this  instrument  are obviously hiqh,  as 
well  as  its democratic  cost when  a  minority  can  continually 
trustrate a  majority  in this  way. 
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cannot  nec~ssarily solve  th~  lcqiti~acy  ~roblem  at  once  and 
by  itscl!.  To  chis  end,  an  ~nhanced social  l~giti~ation o! 
th~  Co~~unity  see~s  co  be  n~cassary.  with  a  stronger  feelinq 
of  belongi~Q to  Co~munity and  ~ccepting its decisions  in  all 
its  n1e~be~ states.  The  Parliam=nt  inself  could  contribute  to 
achieve  this  aim. 
3.2  The  institutional role  of  the  EP  within  the  EC-system 
The  EP's  (legal)  ~owers  and  (political)  ~orrns  of  influence 
can  be  ~xpress~d in  three  categoriestA: 
1.  Decisional  powers  enable  the  ?arlia~ent to  intluance  th~ 
outcome  of  a  decision  making  p:·<)Ct:ss  by  legal  4neans.  On 
the  eve  ot  tho  third  Europ~an  elections  three  ~ai~ 
decisional  powers  are  at  the  dispos3l  of  the  EP: 
the  power  to  force  the  Commission's  resiqnaeio~ by 
passinq  a  motion  of  censure, 
the  power  to  adopt  (or  raj~ct)  the  budget  (including 
its marqin  for  manoeuvre  to  add  expenditure  and  to 
allocate  expenditure  within  the  non-compulsory 
sector  and  to  qive  discharge  in  respect  of  the 
audited accounts)  and 
the  power  to  qive its assent  to,  or  refusa.  tr~ati~s 
o~ association  and  aeeession. 
2.  Participatory powers  guarantee  on  a  legal  base  tha  in-
volvement  of  the  EP  in  decision-~akinq procedures  without 
givinq  it  the  possibility  to  "dominate"  the  outcome. 
This  ineludes  primarily  the  EP's  consultation  in  the 
"normal"  Comn1unity  legislation.  The  EP's  strengthent~a 
leqislativa power  within  the  cooperation procedure  accor-
ding  to  article  149  (2)  should also be  classified as 
participatory:  The  !P  may  influenc~ the  procedures,  but 
in  the  end  the  Council  will  always  have  (by  majority or 
by  unanimity)  the  last  word.  Accordin9  to article lJS 
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tiaca  proposals  for  a  unifor~  European  ~lectoral pro-
cedure.  Moreover  it has  aained  the  right  to  appeal  th~ 
Court  of  Justice. 
3.  Political  means  of  influence  ref~r  to  those  possibilities 
for  the  EP  to  intluence decisions  that  are  not  based  on 
the  EC  treaties,  but  on  the  representative  I  deliberate 
powers  ot  the  EP,  inter-institutional  agreements  or  the 
EP's  internal  rul=s  of  procedure  and  its plenitude  of 
contacts  with  national  an.d  EC  'actors  (
11corridor  poli-
tics").  This  includes  tha  infor~al  information  o!  the  EP 
on  the  negotiation of  trade  and  association-treaties  by 
Council  and  Commission  ("Luns  - Westerterp-procedure"). 
the  conciliation procedure  tor  i~portant legal  acts  with 
major  tinancial  impact,  the  budqetary  conc:i~iation  (''tri-
logue"),  the  right  to  put  questions  to  the  Council  and 
to  the  Foreiqn Ministers,  the  riqht  to  set-up  committees 
of  inquiries  ana  the  right  to  pass  resolutions  and  to 
send delegations  and  fact  findinq  missions  to  third 
countries. 
Decisional  and  participatory  powers  are  limited  to  those 
~atters which  are  legally  based  on  the  EC-treaties.  Other 
fields  of  activity in  the  EC-system,  which  are  not  or  ar~ only 
partly within  the  competence  o~  the  Community,  can  only  be  in-
fluenced  by  the  EPs  weak  (political)  ~eans of  influence. 
This  ~artly expl4ins  the  tensions  between  the  growing  it\ter-
loekinq  character  of  the  EC  syst~m and  the  !P"s  clai~ for  an 
enhaneed  role in this  system.  To  expr~ss it  clearly:  The  EP 
has  no  chance  ot  influencinq  by  legal  ~ethods organs  such  as 
EUREKA  the  interqovernmental  aqreement  of  19  European  states 
on  intensified  cooperation  in  the  field  of  research  and 
technoloqy,  which  are  based  on  national  competences  only 
unless  the  Community  is involved as  such. 
The  patterns of  interaction between  the  Community  institutions 
are different accordinq  to  treaty rules,  policy sectors  and 
political  constellations,  but  there  are  also  some  common 
- 23  - ...  :  .. -. features  {see  Scheme  2  on  the  !ollowing  page).  At  the  tor~.al 
beginninq  of  aach  process,  the  Co~rnission puts  forward  propo-
sals  for  aither  Corn~unity legislative  acts.  for  the  Co~munity 
budget  or  tor  agrae~ents  and  treaties  with  third  countries. 
The  process  normally  ends  with  a  d~cision of  the  Council 
~hich - in  most  casas  - has  at  least  to  consult  the  EP  and 
the  Econo~ic and  Social  Council. 
In  the  budQetary  process,  the  Europe~n  Parliament  plays  a 
crucial  role,  as  it is,  together  with  the  Council,  the  bud-
getary  authority  of  th~  Corn~unity' q.  The  Parliamentarians 
can,  up  to  a  certain limit,  increase  and  alter  the  non-obli-
gatory  expenditures  which  are  about  20  to  30  \  of  the  EC 
budget,  and  can  bloek  the  whole  budget. 
In  legislative acts,  the  Co~rnission's  ~~oposal is  comrnunicatad 
to  the  Parliament,  which  gives  its opinion,  and  to  the  Council 
who  in  the  end  will  take  a  decision  - or will fail  to  do  so. 
After  the  Sin~le  Euro~ean  ~~t which  came  into  force  on  1 
July  1987,  the  Parliament  possesses  new  powers  in  the  area 
of  legislative acts.  Within  the  new  "cooperation procedure", 
two  reaainqs  are  envisaged20 •  Atter  the  Parliament  has  given 
its opinion,  the  Council  decides  on  a  common  position,  if 
approvinq  the  Commission's  position  by  qualified majority. 
This  common  position is  sent  back  to  P~rliament which  if it 
either aorees  or  takes  no  decision  at  all.  allows  the  eommon 
position  to  be  "rat if  i e cl''  by  the  Council .  However ,  i f  t hr.! 
Parliament,  by  the  ~bsolute  ~ajority of  its component  ~embers. 
amends  the  common  position  of  the  Council,  the  Commission 
will  re-examine  the  proposal  and it can  - on  its own  de~ision 
- submit  a  revised proposal  within  a  month's  time.  Th~ Council 
can  then  adopt  the  new  Commission  proposal  by  a  qualified 
majority  and/or  ean  amend  it unanimously  includinq  those 
amendments  by  the  European  Parliament  which  the  Commission 
has  not  taken  up. 
The  European  Parliament  can  also reject  the Council's  common 
position,  aoain  by  an  absolute  majo~·ity  of  its component 
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explanations members,  and  in  this  case  the  Council  can  only  pass  the 
legislation by  unanimous  vote.  If  the Council does  not decide 
within three months after the Parliament's rejection or amend-
ments,  the  Commission  proposal  is  classified  as  not  being 
adopted;  if  the  Commission  wishes  to  pursue  the  policy  in 
question,  it has  to start the whole  process again. 
The  positive  effects  of  these  reforms  will  depend  on  the 
political will of  the  institutions to change  the  unsatisfac-
tory situation: 
a)  If  the  Council  sticks  to its unanimity  rule  - in  spite 
of  the possibilities of qualified  majorities  - then  the 
second  reading of  the  European  Parliament looses  much  of 
its  point.  However,  the  possibility of  "opting  out" 
according to article 100  a  (4)  may  facilitate the use of 
m~jority voting. 
b)  For  the  European  Parliament  the  new  procedure· opens. new 
possibilities of increasing its influence, but it is also 
a  considerable  challenge.  The  Parliament vill  have  to 
organize itself in  a  way  which  allows it to  adopt  posi-
tions with the necessary majority and to become  a  "relia-
ble"  partner in coalition building. 
c)  The  Commission's  role  is not  weakened  but strengthened, 
especially  in  the  case  of  amendments  put  forward  by 
Parliament,  which may  call for difficult decisions by the 
Commission,  either to  take up  the positions of  the Euro-
pean  Parliament  (which  can  dismiss  the  Commiss~on  by  a 
vote of non-confidence),  or  to  t~ke into account  a  majo-
rity in the Council which still has  the final word.  There 
will  be  more  pressure  on  the  Commission  from  both  the 
Council  and  the  EP  to persuade it to  take up  their posi-
tions. 
This  strengthened  role  of  the  European  Parliament  has  no 
equivalent  in  the  area  of  concluding  trade  and  cooperation 
- 26  -agreements or treaties between  the Community  and  third coun-
tries  (except  association  agreements,  see  below),  or  other 
organizations;  in  policy-making  for  external  relations,  the 
European  Parliament and  its relevant committees  are  informed 
about  the ongoing negotiation  process.  Though  the  Parliament 
may  pursue direct contacts through its delegations to parlia-
ments  in many  countries of  the  world,  it,  however,  does  not 
play  any constitutional role. 
However,  the Single European Act has introduced two exceptions 
to  the  weak  position  of  the  European  Parliament  in  this 
field:  association agreements  and  treaties  of  accession  now 
require  the assent of  the European Parliament  by  an absolute 
majority  of  its  component  members21.  This  applies  also  to 
any amendments  to association agreement and  related financial 
protocols,  etc.22. 
From  this  analysis,  the  conclusion  can  be  drawn  that  the 
restricted  position of  the  EP  in  the  EC  system  results  at 
least from  two facta:  On  the one hand parliamentary competen-
ces vis-a-vis "traditional" EC  policies remain unsatisfactory, 
but here it has  sometimes real decisional  powers,  especially 
in  the  budgetary  field.  On  the  other  hand,  many  activities 
of  the  EC  system  are  not  based  on  EC  competences.  On  the 
base  of  le9al  powers  the  EP  as  a  Community  institution  has 
no  possibility  to decide  on  those matters.  As  long as  there 
is  no  transfer  of  competences  from  the  national  to  the  EC 
level  this  situation will  remain  the  same.  The  introduction 
of  the  Sinqle  European  Act  in July  1987  has  proved  that  the 
EC  system is open  to limited institutional changes. 
The EP  itself has reacted in different ways  to this challenge: 
Since the introduction of direct elections,  a  rapid  increase 
in all parliamentary activities can be detected.  The  attempts 
of  the  EP  to  change  the  existing  EC  system  and  by  this  to 
enhance  its  own  role  have  been  of  major  importance.  The 
adoption  of  the  "Draft  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
- 27-Union"  can  be  rated  as  a  cornerstone  in  this field.  Openings 
for  parliamentary  role  concepts  according  to  traditional 
experience,  however,  are quite  limited. 
3.3  Concepts  for the EuroPean  Parl1&88Dt 
Concepts - as models - are constructions to help us  understand 
complex  realities.  They  serve  for  analysis  (positive  theory) 
and for programmatic strategies (normative theories). They are 
not necessarily  immediate goals  for  strategies as  they  might 
not coincide with  the interests of the actors. 
To  construct concepts is not  an artificial and  useless exer-
cise:  in  some  way  or  an  other  everybody  has  his/her  own  -
perhaps  implicit or incomplete - {pre)conceptions. To  present 
concepts  helps  to  make  common  ideas  combining  experiences, 
assumptions and academic knowledge, clearer and easier to dis-
cuss.  Thus concepts on the European Parliament should help to 
identify normal  patterns of  perceiving the  EP, 
analyse  the  empirical  performance  and  tendencies of  the 
European Parliament, 
construct  a  desirable  and  possible  future  role  for  the 
European Parliament - being aware  that the actors  inside 
and  outside  might  not  be  interested  in using  these  con-
cepts  as  a  yardstick  for  their  strategies.  They  might 
have different goals. 
In order  to identify concepts  for  the European  Parliament we 
can  use  a  set of  three different  fields of activity  (•func-
tions)  for  the European Parliament as  a  starting point23.  The 
type of  the concept will depend  on which fields of activitiy 
(or  parts of it)  and  which parliamentary  powers  are  used  by 
or attributed to the EP.  The  catalogue includes: 
- 28  -(a)  activities  to  shape  policies  within  the  given  (EC)  system 
such  as 
taking  initiatives, 
concluding  bindinq decisions  <including  traditional  func-
tions  such  as: 
leqislative, 
elective, 
budg~tary, 
treaty  ~aking powers, 
control1ing  policy- implur:1er.tat.ion; 
(b)  activities  to  develop  the  EC  system2 •  such  as 
enlarging  the  scope  of  activities  of  the  EC  syste~, 
shifting  the  division  of  cornpetenc~s  ~ithin the  EC  syst~~. 
refo~:\ing  the  institutio:1~l  set-·.q.)  of  the  EC  syste:n  to 
~ak~ it more  ~fficient  ~nd da=ocratic: 
(c)  activities  of  interacting with  the  "constituency"~,  sue:--. 
as 
artic~lation of  concerns  and  expr~ssions of  grievances, 
aqqr~gation of  interests  and  information  of  the  public, 
refl=ction support  for/opposition  to particlar  ~~asur~s. 
By  combining  certain fields  ot  activities with  the  pow~rs of 
parliareent  which  we  have  id~ntitied in  tha  second  chapter  of 
this  report  we  can  identify  the  following  concepts  (se~ 
Scheme  J): 
In  t~a  forum  concept  parlia:nents  are  "debatinq  societies" 
articulatinq interests  ~nd leadinq  to  initiatives.  The 
p«rliam~nt is  a  seismographic  arnpli~ier of  voices  in  so-
ciety.  Elactions  guarantee  that  th~ voices  ar~ represen-
tative  and  are  heard  as  th.a  "will"  of  thu  ~eople.  In  this 
model  the  r~presentative/deliberato power  is accentuated. 
An  example  for  such  a  "forum"  is the  Parliamentary  Assem-
bly ot  the  Council  ot  Europe. 
- 29-Scheme  3:  The eapha•is of different fields of activities 
in  various  concepts  (.odela)  for  the  European 
Parliuaent 
eoneepia 
powers 
a)  to  shape  polieiee 
1nit1at1Te 
decision makins 
- le~ialation 
- election 
- oudget 
- treaty mu1ns 
ooa-;rol of 
iaplemeatation 
b)  developins the 
aye  tea 
scope  eDlar!eaeat 
ehi!~ ot eoapeteaces 
inatitutioaal retoras 
c)  uteraotioa 
articulation ot COD.C8rll!l 
agsresation ot interest  I 
aobilizat;ion 
applicabiltiy to the 
European Parliament  as 
it stands  to date 
"!orum 
concept" 
IX 
X 
XX 
high,  but 
unsatisfactory 
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X 
XX 
.1. 
l. 
(I) 
(X) 
(X) 
(X) 
X 
(X) 
limited 
"~'bernati~ 
coacept"  (l 
electing tl 
overnment 
X 
X 
XX 
(X) 
(X) 
X 
XX 
very  limited In  th~  concept  of  a  leqislature  tha  parliament  is  th~ 
legisl~tive branch  of  the  govern~ental system.  The  Par-
lin~~nt is  an  identity distinct  fro~  ch~  axecutive  branch 
and  the  administration.  Elections  are  selections  of 
p~ogrnmmes  and/or  political  actors.  In  this  ~odel  the 
legislative  power  of  tha  parlia~ent is  of  crucial  i~por­
tance.  The  US  Congress  can  be  classified as  such  a 
"leqislature". 
In  the  "gubernative"  concept  in  which  the  parliament  is 
electing  the  government:  the  majority  of  the  ~arliarncnt, 
the  gov~rn~~nt  ~nd the  ad~inistration  for~  so~e kind  of 
unity.  The  parliament  is  not  acting  as  a  unit  but  as  th~ 
constitutional  place  where  tha  govarn~ent  is  elected. 
General  elections  are  competitions  hetween  persons  ~nd 
parti~s.  In  this  ~odel  the  executive  pow~r to  select  th~ 
executive  authority dominates  all  the  other  powers,  and 
usually  (but  not  always}  lead  to  the  do~ination of  ~arlia­
:nent  by  the  executive.  The  "gubernative  concept"  can  be 
attributed  to  the  Ger~an Bundestag. 
Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  European  Parliament  has  not  so 
far  the  power  to  elecc  a  European  qovernment  and  possessad 
v~ry  li~ited  legislative  powers,  parliamentary  concepts 
such  as  "gubernative"  and_  .. lc::Qislatur~i''  have  by  definition 
to  be  understood  as  dynamic.  To  r~alize such  concepts  the 
EC-syste~ needs  to  b~  transformed  to  a  hiqher  dagrec  o~ 
inteqration,  qiving  the  EP  -at  least partly  the  opportunity 
to  follow  the  lines  of  (traditional}  national  parliaments. 
These  developments  should  not  necessarily  repeat  the  models 
ot  the  EC-member  states.  Swiss  democracy  with  its various 
forms  of  direct  an4  indirect participation  by  the  citizens 
in the  political proeess21 ,  or  th~ us-system with  the  prev~i­
linq element  of  "ehacks  and  balances"  between  the  main  ~eli­
tical  authorities  are  interestinq  examples  ot  differ~nt 
concepts~'.  The  swiss  and  tho  US  systems  are  eharacterized  by 
th~ tar-reaehinq  independence  of  Parliament  from  the  govern-
- 31  -~2nt,  b~t  in  both  syst~~s  r~presentativ~ assemblies  have  a 
strong  rcl~  to  play. 
The  experience  of  the  EP's  ":Jraft  Treaty  Establishinq  the 
European  Union"  of  14  February  19S4  demonstrated  once  again 
the  stable character  of  the  EC-syste~,  which  proved  to  ba 
highly  resistant  to  major  constitutional  changes28 •  The 
preference  of  the  predominant  nation~l governments  with  the 
exception  of  Italy  - and  perhaps  Spain  - for  pragmatic  ''ste~ 
by  step"  decisions  will  ~ake a  rapid  transformation  of  the 
EC  into  a  "European  Union"  with  a  strong parliament diffi-
cult. 
Step  by  step  chanqes  in  th~  institut!onal  balance  of  the 
EC-systcm,  ho~ever,  are  possible.  The  history  ot  the  last 
decad~ has  shown  for  example  that  the  political  .influ~nce of 
the  Com~ission  depends  largely  on  the  personality of  its 
President.  A stronq  person~lity  like  Jacques  Delors  with 
European  experience,  a  national  backing  and  elear political 
concepts  may  ~nh~nee  the  prestiqe  ana  the  influence  o~ his 
instit~tion as  such.  On  the  oth~r hand  one  has  witness~d a 
re~arkable renationalisation within  the  Council.  That  could 
render  all pro  european  evolutions  n1or~ difficult.  An  analysis 
o~  the  EP's  institutional role  since  the  first  European  elec-
tions  in  197~ demonstrates  that  there  have  been  no  "big  lt::aps
11 
towards  a  parlia~ane in  traditional  terms  as  described  above. 
Nevertheless  the  EP's  institutional  ~volution in  the  last 
decade  has  be~n of  ~ajor irportance. 
4.  THE  PERFORMANCE  OF  TH!  EP  SINCE  1979 
4.1  Overview:  The  phases  o~ the  EP's  priorities 
The  introduction of  direct  elections generally was  seen  as  an 
important  turning point  in  th~ history of  the  European  Parlia-
ment.  The  newly  elected members  vigorously  sought  a  stren~­
thened political weight  in  th~ decision-making  process  of  the 
- 32  -Community.  The  internal  organs  of  Parliament  were  reformed. 
The_increase of  the EP's activities in all fields was  remark-
able:  After  1979  the  number  of  own  initiative  reports  was 
regularly  higher  than  the  number  of  reports  on  proposals  of 
the  Commission.  Priority  in  own-initiative  reports  has  been 
given besides.to traditional Comminity  matters  in  particular 
to  subjects  of  "high  politics",  like  human  rights,  South-
Africa or the future of  Western  Europe.  Written questions  to 
the Commission  have  risen from  1003  in  1978  to  2671  in  i986, 
to  the  Council  from  132  to  195  and  to  the  Foreign Ministers 
from  20  to  157.  The  budgetary  procedure  was  frequently  per-
ceived  as  an opportunity to define political priorities. 
In  the first electoral  term  (1979-84)  the  Parliament  showed 
a  great  deal  of vitality in raising  important  issues  facing 
West  European  society.  To  some  extent,  it functioned  as  a 
mirror, an amplifier of interest, an initiator and a  permanent 
commentator.  Some  observers  criticised,  however;  the  fact 
that it was  too  much  concerned with  "world affairs",  such as 
questions. of human rights and development problems, neglecting 
its  "home-work  ••  in  the  field  of  legislation  on  tradi  tiona! 
Community  matters. 
This  interest  of  MEPs  in matters  of  "high  politics"  can  be 
explained on the one  hand  by  the media's  readiness  to report 
on  those  questions.  On  the other  hand  it can  be  interpreted 
as quite understandable reaction of politicians in concentra-
ting on  those  fields of activity where  they could  influence 
the political process  (or at least the media),  leaving aside 
all the areas that were clearly dominated  and occupied by  the 
national governments. 
In  general  the  first electoral  period  (1979-1984)  can  be 
characterized by  five major  trends: 
The  first two years after the  1979 election were devoted 
to  a  process  of  self-discovery.  The  rules  of  procedure 
- 33  -were  revised.  The  political  majorities  often  changed. 
The  fact  that  the  EP  rejected  the  EC  budget  for  1980  can 
be  rated  as  an  early  attempt  with  limited  success  to 
demonstrate its strengthened  political weight.  Not until 
1981  did  the  EP  start  to  tackle  "sensitive"  matters, 
such  as  the  institutional reform,  security questions,  or 
social  problems. 
Within the Parliament no coherent and consistent minority 
and  majority  coalitions  were  established,  though  there 
is  a  slight majority  for  the  centre-right parties.  Only 
on  highly  political  issues  was  this  majority  decisive. 
Normally other cleavages  (e.g.  agricultural against non-
agricultural)  predominated. 
The  EP  devoted  a  major  part  of  its working  capacity  to 
relatively "new" fields of the EC-system, like develop~ent 
and  environmental policy or human  rights.  In  "old areas" 
like agricultural or trade policy it gave its opinions and 
started  new  initiatives  - with little impact  on  politi-
cal decisions. 
Regularly the Parliament demonstrated in those cases where 
it had decisional  powers,  its ability to act in an effi-
cient way  and its responsiveness to the underlying  prob-
lems.  Its use of  the  budgetary  procedures  in  particular 
revealed  the  EP's  capacity  for  aqqregatinq  diverging 
interests. 
In  the  second  half  of  the  first electoral  term  system 
development  became  one  of  the  major  working  fields  of 
the  EP.  A  Committee  on  Institutional  Affairs  was  esta-
blished.  The  EP  followed  a  double  strategy:  On  the  one 
hand it tried to revise the EC-system within the existing 
structures  by  a  series  of  reports29.  On  the  other  hand 
it voted for  the "Draft Treaty establishing the European 
Union"lO  giving by this the voters a  legitimated concep-
- 34  -tion  for  the  future of  the  Community.  The  aim  of  leading 
parliamentarians  to  mobilize  the  voters  behind  this 
"European Constitution"  in  the  second  electoral campaign 
failed  however.  But nevertheless the Draft Treaty project 
caused  important pressure for  institutional reforms. 
At  the  beginning  of  its seoood  electoral  tera  (1984-89)  the 
EP  was  able  to start its work  more  immediately  than  in 1979. 
The  majority of  the  "old
11  MEP's  were  re-elected31.  The  staff 
had  become  used  to  the  working  conditions  of  the  directly 
elected  EP.  The  interest of  the public  in the work  of  the  EP 
slowly became stronger, but remained limited. Thus  "normal! ty" 
began for  the EP.  But this "normality" did not prevent impor-
tant evolutions: 
The  "Single  European  Act",  which  came  into  force  in  1  July 
1987,  can  be. seen  as  the  third  major  turning  point  in  the 
history  of  the  EP  alongside  the  acknowledgement of  the  EP's 
budgetary  powers  in  1970/75  and  the  introduction  of  direct 
elections  in  1979.  Though  iri  the  negotiating  process  many 
parliamentarians  had  reservations  about  the  reform  in  form 
of  the  Act  - bearing  in mind  their own  Draft-Treaty  project 
- it has  turned out to be an opportunity for a  closer involve-
ment of the EP  in the EC  decision makinq  process aimed at the 
completion of the internal market. 
The  demanding  requirements  of  the  new  cooperation  procedure 
laid  down  in  the  new  article 149  (2)  of  the  EEC-treaty  led 
to an important revision of the EP' s  rules of procedure32.  The 
limited experience to date with this new  cooperation procedure 
and  the  new  rules of  procedure  indicates,  however,  that  the 
EP  in  the  second  half of its second electoral  term  is goinq 
to  emphasize  its work  as  a  legislature,  markedly  reducinq 
other  activities~ 
Detailed  analysis  indicates that since  1979  the  performance 
of the EP  in its various fields of activity - to influence the 
- 35  -existing EC  policies, to develop the EC  system and  to interact 
'With  the  voters  - has  been  heterogeneous.  Some  areas  (or 
parts of  them)  have  been highlighted to a  greater degree than 
others according to the priorities of the EP  and the structure 
of  the  EC  ~ystem. 
4.2  Policy-aaking 
As  described  above,  the  institutional  system  set  up  by  the 
EEC  Treaty does not assign to the European Parliament the full 
range of  powers  enjoyed  by  the  parliaments in typical Western 
European  systems of government.  But nevertheless,  the  EP  has 
used  its  existing  competences  to  shape  policies  within  the 
given  EC  system,  especially 
- by acting as an articulator and  transmitter of  ideas, 
- by  influencing the legislative and  the  budgetary  process 
and 
by  scrutinizing the other political actors. 
The  EP  has  from  the outset sought  to  exploit and  extend  its 
consultative powers to the maximum  in the legislative process 
and  to  this  end  has  been  supported  in  part  by  the  other 
institutions,  especially  by  the  Court  of  Justice  and  the 
Commission.  It has  also sought  to play  a  role  in  initiating 
Community  action  and  has  usually  had  a  good  response  from 
the  Commission,  which  now  submits  written  reports  to  the 
Parliament every  six  months  as  its response  to  "own  initia-
tive resolu-tions"  .The Parliament has sometimes been criticized 
for  devoting  its attention  to  issues  on  which  it has  no 
legal  influence  (human  rights,  foreign  policy,  security 
policy  ••• ).  On  the  other  hand,  exactly  this  variety  of 
subjects  serves  as  an  indicator  of  its  valuable  role  as  a 
"forum"  and  a  "moral  tribune"  in the Community. 
The  EP's  actual  impact  in  the  legislative procedure  is ex-
tremely  hard  to  judge.  The  EP  haa  no  decisional  powers  in 
- 36  -legislation,  but  "hidden  impact"  may  be  as  important  as 
visible  impact.  Commission  proposals  for  example  may  already 
have.been strongly influenced by  the EP  before they have  been 
formally proposed,  though  the EP's formal  powers  of influence 
over  the  initiation of  legislation are non-existent. 
The  conciliation  procedure  on  legislation  with  significant 
budgetary impact has proved to be a  failure33. The opportunity 
for  the  EP  to  enter  into  a  dialogue  with  the  Council  is  no 
compensation for the lack of bargaining power, and the Council 
has  the final  say.  Therefore  the  EP's  influence  has  depended 
on  its capacity  to  mobilize allies by  presenting  convincing 
political concepts. In doing so,  the EP  has been more  success-
ful  in  "dynamic"  and  "moral"  policy fields  like  development 
policy  and  questions  of  human  rights  than  in  "tradi  tiona!" 
EC  matters  like agricultural or  trade policies. 
One  field where  the  European Parliament has  developed  consi-
derable  powers  is that of  the Community  budget.  Parliament's 
budgetary  powers  have  been  frequently  analysed  elsewhere34. 
They  have  not  been  formally modified  in  any  substantial  way 
in the recent past,  but have  been  limited  by  the  reaching of 
the ceiling on  Community  rev-enue.  The  1983,  1984,  1985,  1 987 
and  1988  budgets  were  at or above  the ceiling,  placing  them 
in  the  realm  of  national  governments  (rather  than  of  the 
Council  and  European  Parliament)  as  regards  the  fixing  of 
the  maximum  level  of  expenditure.  The  focus  of  the  budget 
debate  has  therefore  been  on  the  need  for  new  revenue,  the 
forms  this could  take,  and  ways  of controlling  expenditure, 
notably on agriculture.  If anything,  there is a  greater risk 
of  Parliament's  powers  being  cut  back  in  practice  rather 
than in them  being extended. 
Sharpened  conflict  between  Parliament  and  Council  in  this 
situation  has  meant  that  each  of  the  four  years  since  the 
1984  elections will  have  started without  an  agreed  budget 
- 37  -{provisional  twelfths).  Disput~s for  che  first  ~i~e  r~sulted 
in  a  Court  rulinq  in  1986  and  could  do  so  again  in  1988. 
The  annual  budgetary  procedure  is  also  an  important  guida  to 
the  political  priorities  of  the  EP.  In  the  debate  held  in 
December  of  each  y~ar on  th~  adoption  of  th~ budget  for  the 
following  financial  y~ar,  thd  general  rapporteur  sets  out 
th=  EP's  priorities  in  the  fjnancial  sphere.  Since  1979  un~~­
ployment,  social  and  regional  policy,  energy  and  development 
("hunger  in  the  world'')  have  featured  reqularly. 
Ther~  can  be  no  mistaking  the  efforts  made  by  ~embers  to 
convert  their  political  aims  into  Community  practice,  the 
outcome,  however.  often  turned  out  r.o  be  unsatisfactory.  The 
analysis  of  the  budgetary  proceduras  since  1979  shows  that 
in  fact  it proved  possible  to  achieve  increases.  in  ~xpendi­
tures  on  the  areas  elassified as  priorities  - social,  regio-
nal  and  development  policy.  But  in  q~neral it  can  be  seen 
that  the  EP's  ~uccess~s  in  the  bud7etary  field,  although 
undeniable,  have  been  relatively  li~it~d.  Although  th&  EP 
could  increase  the  share  o!  non-compulsory  expenditures  in 
the  bud9et  from  16  in  1979  to  about  28  per  eent  in  1988  the 
bulk  of  the  Community  expendttures  were  taken  by  the  aqricul-
tural  policy,  on  which  the  EP  has  little influence. 
There  was  and  still is  a  controversy  over  the  obvious  aim  of 
~any  MEPs  to  compvnsate  for  the  EP's  lack  of  legislative 
powers  by  exploitinq its  budgetary  powers.  With  some  ~inor 
~xceptions  ("aetions  ponctut:lles")  the  Commission  has  regular-
ly refused  to disburse  budqet  appropriations  voted  by  the  Par-
liament  for  which  the  Couneil  has  not  provided  a  leqal basis. 
The  institutions'  conflictin~ viewpoints  were  brouqht  somewhat 
closer  by  the  joint declaration of  th~ !P,  Council  and  Commis-
sion of  30  June  1982  according  to  which  the  Council  expresse4 
a  certain  readiness  to  provide  a  legal  basis  for  such  new 
appropriationals.  Notwithstandinq  such  real  successes  the 
limits  of  the  EP•s  bud;etary powers  have  become  obvious. 
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.  - I'Jnr The  right  to  ask  questions  has  considerable  significance  as 
a  political  instrument  for  scrutiny  and  - as  we  have  seen 
above  - is  being  used  increasingly  often  by  the  MEPs.  This 
right  serves  t~o main  purposes:  firstly,  it enables politi-
cal  scrutiny  to  be  exercised  on  the  bodies  concerned,  and 
secondly it is designed  to  draw  their attention  to taportant 
fields of activities,  and  thus  to spur  them  to  take  the  ini-
tiative. 
The  EP  has  also  strengthened  its  co-operation  with  other 
control  authorities,  especially  with  the  European  Court  of 
Auditors.  In  1983  for  the  first  time  in  its history it took 
legal  proceedings  against  the  Council  for  neglecting  its 
Treaty  obligations  with  regard  to  transport  policy36.  In 
December  1987  it used  this  instrument  for  the  second  time 
following  the  Council's  failure  to  present  a  draft  for  the 
1988  budget  in  time.  In February/March  1988  it contested  the 
legal  base of  a  directive on  radioactivity in  food·stuff37. 
The  presence  of  individual  members  of  the  Commission  in  the 
plenary and at Committee meetings is now  a  routine event.  The 
most striking trend of the last few  years has been the increa-
sing  presence  at  Committees  of  Council  ministers  from  the 
country  currently  holding  the  Presidency.  Furthermore,  the 
Head  of  Government  of  the  country  holding  the  Presidency 
normally  reports  to  the  EP  plenary  on  the  results  of  the 
latest meeting  of  the  European  Council.  Thus,  although  all 
political actors  in  the  EC  system  are  affected  by  the  EP's 
controlling activities the  EP  has differing opportunities  to 
force  others  to  abandon  activities  which  have  come  under 
criticism.  Specialization  within  the  EP's  committees  has 
been  enhanced,  special committees of  enqiry have  been estab-
lished (e.g. on the disposal of agricultural stocks and on the 
transport of  hazardous waste within the Community). 
- 39  -4.3  Syatea  develo~nt and  syste. change 
One  of  the  most distinctive features  of  the  European  Parlia-
ment  as  compared  to national  parliaments  is that it does  not 
regard itself as part of a  completed  institutional system but 
as  part  of  one  which  is  evolving  into  something  different, 
and  in  which  it must  itself  play  a  major  role  in  order  to 
bring about  such  an  evolution. 
The  most striking example of Parliament's attempts  to reform 
the  Community  System  was  its  proposal  for  a  new  Treaty  on 
European  Union.  This  profound  revision  of  the  EC-Treaties 
which  was  often characterized as  a  "constitution for  Europe" 
has  been  sufficiently  analysed  elsewhere38.  It  led  to  the 
adoption  of  the  Single  European  Act  which  fell  far  short  of 
Parliament's  demands.  Nevertheless,  the  Single  European  Act 
was  the  first  systematic  attempt  to  overhaul  the  Community 
treaties· and  contained a  number  of useful elements. 
The  Draft  Treaty  on  European  Union  is  also  significant  in 
that it lays down  a  marker for Parliament's targets as regards 
the  future  direction  of  European  integration.  Three  major 
objectives can be distinguished: 
extending  the  competences  of  the  Community  to  new  areas 
of responsibility 
increasing the efficiency of  the  Community's  institutio-
nal  system  by  increasing majority  voting  in  the  Council 
and  strengthening the autonomous  executive  powers of the 
Commission 
increasing  democracy  by  strengthening  the  EP's  powers, 
notably by providing for co-decision on Community legisla-
tion  and  a  vote  of  confidence  on  the  appointment  of  the 
Commission. 
These objectives can also be found in many of the "small step" 
institutional  initiatives  that  have  been  launched  - on  oc-
- 40  -casion with success - by the European Parliament.  These "small 
step" developments  have  arisen  in a  number  of ways: 
1.  By  using  the ordinary legislative and  budgetary  procedu-
res  of  the  Community  to  extend  Community  competence  to 
new  areas.  Of  particular  note  is  the  use  by  Parliament 
of  its  budgetary  powers  to  create  new  budgetary  lines 
which  have  led  to  the  Community  becoming active  in areas 
such as education, youth exchanges, new  forms of research, 
etc.  A certain recognition of this practice can  be  found 
in  the  1982  Joint  Declaration  by  Parliament,  Commission 
and  Council  on  the  budgetary  procedure39. 
2.  Using  own  initiative reports  by  Parliament  to  press  for 
extension  of  Community  competence  (e.g.  on  security)  or 
for  modification  to  Community  institutional  procedures. 
Of  particular  importance  here  is  the  series  of  insti  tu,-
tional reports adopted by the Political Affair$ Committee 
in  the early  1980s,  which  led to a  number  of concessions 
by  the other institutions. 
3.  Making use of the Court of Justice, in particular through 
the  isoglucose ruling,  but also by itself going  to Court 
(e.g.  transport case,  comitology case). 
4.  Responding to initiatives by others, notably the Genscher-
Colombo  proposals,  some  aspects of which Parliament  sup-
ported,  which  eventually  led  in  the  Solemn  Declaration 
of Stuttgart to some useful undertakings  (e.g. on involv-
ing Parliament in the appointment of  the Commission). 
s.  Creating new  procedures unilaterally or with the agreement 
of  other  institutions  (e.g.  vote of  confidence  on  a  new 
Commission). 
Of  course,  the  very  existence  of  Parliament  has  helped  to 
prevent the degeneration of the Community  into a  purely tech-
- 41  -nical  dialogue  between  Commission  officials  and  national 
civil  servants.  Parliament  has  kept  the  issue  of  European 
Union  alive.  Without  it, the  Community  might  have  a  politi-
cal visibility between  summit  meetings  not  much  greater  than 
the  OECD. 
As  mentioned  above,  in  its second electoral  term  the  compe-
tences  of  the  EP  were  strengthened  by  the  Single  European 
Aet:  The  EP  turned  its mind  to  the  new  challenges  and  the 
first experiences with  the  new  procedure of cooperation have 
revealed its ability to act successfully within the new  frame-
work. 
4.4  Relations with the voters 
Interaction  between  the Parliamentarians  and  their voters  is 
an  important  field of activity as  the  development  of  the  EP 
will  largely depend  on its capacity to  articulat~ the  inter-
ests  of  voters  and  pressure  groups,  to  aggregate  different 
positions  and  to mobilize political forces  for  the  goals  of 
the  EP.  Of  major interest in this field are 
the direct contacts  between  the  MEPs  and  the voters, 
contacts  between  MEPs  and  lobbyists, 
the media  coverage of  the EP, 
the development of party  federations  and 
the relationship between the EP  and national parliaments. 
On  the  average,  one  MEP  has  to  represent  about  600.000  EC 
cit~zens. This  mere  fact  demonstrates  that  it is  almost 
impossible  for  European  Parliamentarians  to  have  a  face-to-
face  contact  with  all  their  voters  on  a  regular  basis.  Al-
though  MEPs  regularly attend meetings with voters,  the Euro-
Barometer has  found out that 65  per cent of the EC  population 
are  of  the  opinion  that  members  are  too  remote  from  their 
needs and  problems40.  This may  be  due to the fact,  that MEPs 
are  engaged  too much  in the  "closed circle",  leaving  insuf-
ficient time to be devoted to their electorate.  Nevertheless 
- 42  -more  and  more  people  have  had  some  kind  of  direct  contact 
with  the  Parliament.  The  number  of visitors  to  the  EP,  espe-
cially from  West  Germany,  is increasing constantly. The  number 
of  petitions also increases regularly41. 
In  fact  MEPs  tend  to  develop  regular  contacts  with  local 
authorities in their area, with local employers,  trade unions, 
associations  and  non-governmental  organizations,  churches, 
local  press and  political activists. 
Members  of  the  Parliament  (and  also  its staff)  obtain  an 
increasing amount  of  information from  lobbyists.  Brussels is 
becoming  increasingly  interesting for  the  various  lobbyists 
based  there,  and  some  of  them  are  specialists  in  following 
the European Parliament, attending most or all of Parliament •  s 
sessions  in  Strasbourg  and  also  those  committee  meetings  in 
Brussels  which  are  open  to  the  public  (an  increasing  number 
of  committees,  Environment,  Economic  Committee  etc.  have 
opened  their doors). 
Since  access  to  the  Parliament  is rather open  it is  practi-
cally impossible to measure the increase in lobbying activity 
since  1979.  Nevertheless it is clear to all involved  that it 
has  increased greatly.  During  sessions,  some  200  passes  are 
issued every day  to visitors other than members  of the public 
in visitors groups,  staff of other institutions,  members  and 
their assistants,  etc.  Of  these  200,  it is  estimated  that 
some  150  per day are  lobbyists.  Missions  of  third countries 
to  the  EEC  are often  present at Strasbourg plenaries  to  put 
the  point of view of their countries. 
In all the parliamentary work,  media  coverage is useful,  but 
not neccessarily indispensable. As  a  remote Parliament, diffi-
cult  to  cover  for  most  local,  regional  and  even  national 
newspapers,  and  not  even  holding  its plenary  sessions  in 
Brussels where the European press corps is based, the European 
Parliament is clearly at a  disadvantage  in this  respect.  To 
- 43  -an  extent it has  tried  to compensate  by  providing  good  faci-
lities for  journalists  (e.g.  equipment  for  television compa-
nies,  vri  tten  circulars  and  staff  members  to  brief  journa-
lists).  This  has  reversed  the  trend  of  the  first  fev  years 
following  the  1979  elections,  vhich  saw· a  decline  in  press 
coverage.  Since  1 982  there  has  been  a  higher  presence  of 
journalists and a  steady rise in radio and especially in tele-
vision  coverage  (see  Table  5).  Inevitably  the  bulk of  press 
attention  has  come  from  the  Brussels  press  corps,  which  is 
specialized in European Community affairs. Attempts to supple-
ment  this  (through  the  national  information  offices  of  the 
parliament,  through bringing out national and regional journa-
lists to Strasbourg, etc.) have met with limited success. Much 
more  could  be  done  in  "marketing",  not  just  Parliament's 
general  positions,  but  its specific  positions  on  matters  of 
interest to  regional or specialized  media. 
The  hope  expressed on  the  eve of  the first  eur~pean election 
that the formation of European party federationswould help to 
further the democratic process by  linking the electorate with 
the  European  parliamentarians  has  not  been  fulfilled42.  The 
party federations remained weak  and  have  had little influence 
on  international  discussions  and  on  the  development  of  the 
national  parties.  They  have  not  yet  developed  into a  direct 
political  base  for  MEPs.  The  weakness  of  the  trans-national 
infrastructure has  not  helped  the  EP's  capacity  to mobilize 
the  voters.  Nevertheless,  these  groupings  have  provided  a 
forum  for  multilateral  contacts  between  MEPs  and  national 
party leaders.  This has  allowed  for  a  certain degree of  "mo-
bilization11  such  as  at  the  pre-summits  organized  by  some 
groupings before certain important European Council meetings. 
They  also by virtue of neqotiating common  manifestos for  the 
European elections, put pressure on national parties to deve-
lop their European policies. 
Despite  the  fact  that  national  parliaments  became  more  and 
more aware of _the  qroving interdependence in the EC  fra.mework, 
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 the  ralacionshi?  betwe~n  th(~  EP  and  nation~l  parlia~ents has 
also  noc  develo~ed as  exp~cted 13 •  Th~ra  h~s  b~~n  so~e  i~prove­
~ents:  EP  committe~s havu  ~~t several  times  wi~h  co~mittees 
o~  national  parliaments.  In  oelqium.  in  Ger~.any  and  since  1986 
in  the  Netherlands  the  national  parli~rnents  have  installed 
new  structures  to  ~nsure  b~tter  coop~ration with  ~he  EP,  ~nd 
the  administrations  of  nearly  ~11  w~starn European  parliaments 
have  cooperated  intensively  on  a  regular  basis.  In  general, 
however,  the  links  between  traditional  parliaments  and  the  EP 
started slowly:  at  first it was  the  EP  itself which  was  saar-
chinq  for  contact,  but  national  parlia~ents were  slow  to 
r~act.  Es~ecially the  parliamentary  treatment  of  the  "Draft 
Treaty  ..  within  some  national  parliaments  can  be  rated  as  a 
case  study  for  :-nissing  national  support,  though  tho  political 
actors  :.::  $0!"".~  others  ware  very  suppol:·tive. 
Owinq  to  li:~ited  ~edia  cov~r.aqe  ~nd other  negative  factors, 
such  as  the  co~plexity of  t~~ :ssues  debated,  little  person~­
lisation  in  tho  EP  and  la~quaqe  p~oble~s.  th~  EP  has  not 
been  successtul  in  ~obilizi~g the  ~l~~~orata  towards  its  ai~s. 
Obviously it  was  not  able  to  ~xploi~  th~ potential  o~  sup-
port  that  exists  in  the  Cc~munity.  Major  progress  has  also 
been  hindered  by  the  fact  that  rathar  than  concentratinq  on 
a  few  selected issues,  the  EP  •  es~ecially in  its first  el~ct­
oral  term  - has  been  too  scattered in its activities.  It has 
lacked  ~lear policy strategies  which  would  have  been  under-
standable  to  the  public.  Even  th~  ·•craft  Treaty"  was  not 
supported  vigorously  by  all  MEP's.In  addition,  the  time 
pressure within  the  EP  and  the  Co~munity systarn,  the  need  to 
travel  between  the  three  Euro~ean capitals  and  the  electorate 
and  the  multitude  o~  national  and  "euro~ean" obliqations 
could  have  caused  the  result  that  the  EP  might  be  seen  as 
having  be~ome too  much  of  a  "closed circle·•. 
4.5  The  EP  at  the  "torum plus"  level 
If one  seeks  to  express  the  evolution of  the  EP  since its 
tirst direct election in terms  of  one  formula,  the  combination 
- 46  -
'7 of functions actually pursued would  appear  to be  close  to  the 
forum  concept with  some  elements  of  the  legislature concept; 
the ·attempts  of  the  EP  to  function  as  a  "constituante"  (the 
Spinelli initiative), by which  the EP  would turn into a  "clas-
sical" parliament with full legislative and executive/electo-
ral powers,  have  failed  so far.  But it was  an  achievement  of 
the EP  that institutional reforms constantly remained  a  major 
issue  on  the  agenda  of  the  Community  institutions.  Part  of 
that  "forum  plus  concept"  is  also  the  EP's  comprehensive 
view  of  all  European  affairs.  In  this  respect,  it may  be 
compared  with  the  European Council. 
.... 
The  evolution to and  the stability of the "forum concept
11  are 
due to the mutually. reinforcing characteristics and tendencies 
of  the  EC  system  in general  and  the  EP  itself.  These  may  be 
summarized as weak  powers of the EP  and  an internal diversity 
of the EP  as well as the quality of the EC  as an "interlocking 
system"  as  d-escribed  in  chapter  3, in  which  decisions  are 
made  mainly  by  consensus  in a  "labyrinth" of administrative 
committees  and  working  groups.  Those  reinforcing  factors 
could lock the EP  into a  vicious circle of powerlessness with 
four  major  elements: 
low  reputation  11111!!;~:------
weak  decisional  low  participation 
competence  a  at direct elections 
I 
~~ 
.J  limited legitimation bonus  l 
""1  r 
The  "Vedel-report"  of  1972  has  already  analysed  in  detail 
how  the  institutional  position of  the  European  Parliament 
could  be  strengthened44.  The  recommendations of  this report 
- 47  -aimed  at  two  directions:  direct elections  and  an  enlargement 
of  the  EP's  competences.  Both  elements  are  necessary  now  as 
before. 
In an  interlcck~d system parliamentary influence - if measured 
in  terms  of  traditional  functions  - has  so  far  proved  to  be 
generally  weak  (as  is  the  case  with  national  parliaments  in 
the EC),  the growing tendency of interlocking European policy 
in  combination  with  the  limited  decisional  powers  of  the  EP 
(and  its internal diversity)  have  even  increased  the  loss  of 
overall  parliamentary  influence.  Neither  the  national  par-
liaments  nor  the  European  Parliament  have  been  willing  or 
able to mobilize popular political support in order to change 
the  basic characteristics of  the  system. 
If we  assume  that this  interlocking system  has  a  strong  ten-
dency  towards  stability and  at  the  same  time  towards  ineffi-
ciency  - the  governments  have  moved  the  EC  into a 
11decision-
making  trap"45  - the  call  for  reform  will  be  constant  but 
results will only be gradual. Measured by traditional criteria 
the EP  will be  trapped in a  "marginal" position, fighting for 
some  kind  of reputation and  influence. 
Starting  from  this analysis  the  Single  European  Act  has  not 
basically altered this situation.  The  new  cooperation proce-
dure  can  increase  the  "nuisance"  (negative)  powers  of  the 
EP.  Only occasionally will it make  the  EP  a  full  and  produc-
tive partner in the EC  decision-making system.  But, neverthe-
less, the EP  has recognized  new  opportunities and has streng-
thened its functions as a  legislature. The limited experience 
we  have  with  the  new  procedure  of  cooperation  has  revealed 
the dominant  interest of the  EP  to act as a  responsible part-
ner  in the  decision-making process. 
S.  COHCLUSIOHS  ARD SftATEGIES POR !1m PO'l1JR2:  PROII  '1'BB  •roROII 
PLus•  MODEL  !0 mB •co-PLAYER-CORCBPr• 
- 48  -The  analysis  of  the  EP's  position  in  the  EC  system  reveals 
that the expectations of the voters of  1979  to elect a  strong 
decision-making  parliament  have  not  come  true.  There  is  a 
real  danger  that  the  participation  in  future-European  elec-
tions will  be  far  lo~er than  in  1979/84.  The  decision-making 
process  is  - nowadays  as  before  - cumbersome  (even  if  the 
long-term  impact  of  the  Single  European  Act  must  await  a 
detailed evaluation)  and its democratic legitimation is weak. 
The  EP's existing capacity for  innovation and  integration of 
diverging  interests  is not  exploited  to  a  sufficient degree 
in  the  EC  system. 
At  the  same  time  the  positive effects of general elections -
the  mechanism  for  peaceful  changes of  political  power  by 
selection  between  clear-cut alternatives,  the  pressure  on 
traditional  parties  to  t:eact  to  new  political  challenges  -
are  not  available  to  the  EC  system.  Therefore  the· "learning 
capacity" of the EC  system, its ability to react in new  situa-
tions,  is low. 
In the present stage of the EC  system,  where the EC  exercises 
powers  by  means  of overlapping political structure' based  on 
national systems,  the traditional conception of parliamentary 
government  as  this  has  evolved  in  the  member  states  cannot 
be  applied without  adaptation.  The  growing  interdependence 
and interference between the member  states and  the EC  require 
for  democratic  reasons  a  strong  parliamentary  influence  on 
both  the national  and  the  European  level.  The  EP  so  far  has 
'  difficulties  to  act  on  both  levels.  National  governments, 
who  are  actors  on  both  Community  and  national  level  remain 
dominant  up to now.  But despite all these constraints it has 
been able to contribute  to the  functioning  of  the  EC  system 
fn at least three positive ways: 
The  Parliament  has  ahovn  a  great  deal of  vitality  in 
raising important issues facing West  European society. 
- 49-It has concentrated efficiently on  supervising the execu-
tive authority and: 
It has  articulated the  EC  citizens concerns  and  grievan-
ces. 
Obviously  the  EP  finds  itself in a  dilemma:  Its present weak 
institutional  position,  combined  with  its  claims  for  far-
reaching  changes  of  the  EQ  system  are  forcing  it towards  a 
dangerous  ridge-walk  in its information  policy vis-a-vis  the 
voters: 
On  the one hand, it must give proof of its political right 
to  exist  as  it stands  today.  Therefore  it should  make 
use  of  its  existing  instruments  and  competences  in  the 
best  possible way.  The  "grey  zones"  of  the  treaties  and 
the  new  procedures  of  the  Single  European  Act  must  be 
exploited. The voters should be convinced that ·the present 
EP  is able to play an important role within the  EC  system 
by initiating new  activities, by scrutinizing and by arti-
culating the will of the  people. 
On  the  other  hand,  an  EP  strategy  should  encompass  the 
goal of European Union,  includinq not only enhanced powers 
for the EP,  but also greater efficiency both of EC  instru-
ments and of EC  government. The voters should be convinced 
that the present role of  the  EP  is inadequate. 
This essential dilemma of the EP  may  offer  two different op-
tions as  to how  it should  present itself to its voters: 
(a)  To  accept  its present  role as  a  "forum•  including  some 
additional  ingredients  and  to  explain  this  concept  to  the 
voters as an adequate  form  of parliamentary participation in 
a  complex  interlocked  system  of  national  consensus.  It may 
underline its positive contributions in the fields of initia-
tive,  control  and  articulation and  it may  thus  offer  its 
- 50  -electors a  realistic yardstick by  which to assess its limited, 
but  nevertheless  important  role.  If,  however,  it  were  to 
stress its real  impact within  the  given political system  the 
argument  for  mobilization  towards  a  change  of  its  own  role 
in the EC-system might  be  weakened:  if the status quo  affords 
"enough"  influence why  then  reform  the  system  ••• ?Or: 
(b)  To  work as effectively as possible within the interlocking 
system,  but at the same  time to develop its role in the direc-
tion of an  "institutional co-player",  whose  assent is neces-
sary  for  all  important  decisions  in  the  framework  in  which 
it has  to  function.  This  implies  that  the  EP  gradually  ac-
quires  more  influence at  EC  level,  but  it will  not  have  an 
overall  decision-making  capacity  akin  to  that  of  national 
parliaments.  At  the  same  time  the  EP  must  seek  closer  links 
to national decision makers,  in view of the fact that,  in the 
interlocked EC-system, national and EC-instruments are increa-
singly pooled. 
The  risks  of  a  "dual  strategy"  combining  both  elements  are 
obvious:  If it stresses  too  much  its present  role  and  func-
tions  in  a  positive  way,  there  will  be  no  pressure  for  a 
system  change.  If  it emphasizes  clearly  its  demand  for  a 
European  Union  with  an  enhanced  role  for  itself,  there  is 
the danger that the voters will be  frustrated if the foreseen 
"saut  qualitatif"  is  not  achieved.  Thus,  the  clarification 
of both the present and  the future  role is equally important. 
However,  these  options  are  neither  clear-cut  alternatives 
nor  mutually  reinforcing  •. There  may  be  negative  effects  in 
pursuing  both  options:  in  terms  of  time  and  organizational 
resources as well as in terms of impact both cannot be pursued 
in a  balanced way.  From  the point of view of the voters, cer-
tain inconsistencies might  be  predominant:  if stressing the 
necessity of institutional changes according to the option (b) 
the  voter  might  be  or  soon  get  frustrated  by  the  lack  of 
apparent  progress  overlooking,  however,  some  real  though 
- 51  -limited  impacts  on  conc~ete  polici~s.  The  vision  and  its 
yardsticks  - created  by  the  EP  itself  - falls  back  on  the  EP 
- devaluing  a  different  ki~d of  performanc~. 
Let  us  therefore  take  leave  tro~ the  classical  parliamentarism 
~odel devaluing  traditional  functions  and  emphasizing  the 
~ossible functions  of  a  ~arlia~ent in  an  interlockinq  syste~. 
The  EP  woul~ assume  functions  which  in  national  systems  are 
exercised  partly  by  other  social  agents  (such  as  the  press  and 
certain lobbies).  Furthermore  it would  strive  systematically 
to  win  elements  of  co-decisional  power  in order  to  ensure 
i  t s  accept  an  c: e  as  an  o b 1  i q a tory  " co-p  1 aye  r ''  in  the  dec is  ion-
rnakinq  proeess  of  the  EC-system.  To  propaqate  such  a  concapt 
of  the  EP  as  a  "institutional  co-player"  implies  that  the 
Parliamentarians  should  reduce  parts  of  their  ambitions  and 
that  the  electorate  should  vote  for  a  body  wit~ a  limited,  but 
increasinq  impact.  Thus  to  change  the  paradigm  by  taking 
into  aecount  the  characteristics  of  the  EC  system  seems  a 
"logic:al"  deduction. 
The  EP  must  be  accepted  within  the  sensitive decision  makinq 
process  as  a  more  important  "co-playet·''  whose  assent  is  nor-
mally  necessary  to all  irnportant  decisions.  It should  not 
se~k all-embracing decision  makinq  powers  sueh  as  those  exer-
cised by  some  "qubernatorial"  parliaments  in  the  !':\ember  st.ates 
,  but  look rather  tor seleeted  elements  ot 
11real"  powet·  and 
influence  in  different  fields.  Tha  acknowl~dgement of  the 
EP's  budg~tary powers  in  1970/75  ana  the  new  regulations 
within  the  Sinqle  European  Act  ~oint  that  wa~:  Since  July 
1987  the  EP's  assent  is  required  for  treaties  of  association 
and  accession  and  it 11as  str~ngthen~d its participatory powers 
in  the  field of  legislation.  To  dat~  the  principal  powers 
~xercised by  the  EP  have  been  negative  (blockinq)  powers, 
which  may  project its public  image  in  a  negative  sense.  In 
the  tuturo  it should  also  ask  for  "positive"  powers  which 
permit  it to  influence  poliey making  within  the  EC-system  in 
a  eonstruetive  way.  Proposals  for  such  developments  eould  be: 
- 52  -A.  In  the field of legislation 
The  application  of  the  new  cooperation  procedure  to all 
cases  where  the  Council  decides  by  majority  voting.  The 
EP  could  add  weight  to  this  demand  by  pointing  to  the 
fact  that the cooperation  procedure is applied  primarily 
to  legal  acts  in  connection  with  the  completion  of  the 
internal market. After 1992 the application of the coope-
ration procedure,  therefore, will  be reduced to a  smaller 
number  of cases. 
The  application  of  a  conciliation  procedure  (comparable 
to  the  budgetary  trialogue  or  according  to  the  German 
"Vermi ttlungsausschu8"  model)  to  all  cases  where  the 
cooperation procedure applies  in order  to enable  compro-
mises  to  be  negotiated  before  blockages arise. 
The  reform  of  the  conciliation  procedure  of  March  1975 
in  two  ways:  (a)  Council  and  EP  both  have  to accept  the 
outcome  and  (b)  the field of application is broadened  to 
all important matters. 
In  the  long  run  the  EP  should  ask  for  the  right  of  co-
decision in legislation (perhaps in the beginning limited 
to fields like environmental policy or research and tech-
nology), which means  in practice that both the EP  and  the 
Council  have  to  agree  on  important  legislation.  Accor-
ding  to  the  interlocking character  of  the  EC-system  not 
all the existing  instruments  within  that  framework  will 
be included in the EP's legislative powers. 
B.  rn the budgetary field 
Making  appropriate  use  of  the  transfer  of  money  into 
budgetary head no. 100 ("preliminary appropriations") with 
clear conditions for  the release of this money; 
continuing the strategy of increasing the non-compulsory 
part of the budget; 
using  the  right  of  granting  a  discharge  to  Commission 
- 53  -for controlling the spending of money  in order to exercise 
political supervision and  in  the  long  run 
to  remove  the  distinction  between  compulsory  and  non-
compulsory  expenditures; 
ccntin~a to develop new  areas of Community  activities  by 
creating  new  budgetary lines. 
c.  Selection of the executive authority 
The  EP  should strive for  strengthend co-decinional  powers  in 
the appointments 
of  a  new  Commission  (or at least of its president), 
of  the  members  of the Court of Justice and 
of  the  members  of  the Court of Auditors, 
of the heads of agencies  (e.g. Berlin vocational training 
institute,  European  University Institute  ••• ). 
D. Relations with the voters and the political infrastructure 
Concentration of the EP's activities on clear priorities, 
as has  already been started (e.g.  within each  parliamen-
tary  session  there  should  be  on  one  day  priority given 
to a  major subject); 
personalization  of  the  EP's  work  by  hiqhlighteninq  of 
actin9  -MEP's  (President,  rapporteurs,  President  of  a 
Committee)J 
strengthening  its character  as  an  "ombudsman"  for  the 
voters' qrievances(more emphasis on petitions, questions, 
personal help etc.); 
stronqer linkaqe  to national parliaments  and  parties; 
introduction  of  a  uniform  electoral  system  with  direct 
influence of  the voters in the selection of candidates. 
- 54  -E.  Internal  workinq  structures 
Tight~ninq up  of  the  EP's  internal  workinq  ~ethods in 
ord~r  to  take  more  advancaqe  of  tha  use  of  its cornpetences 
and  political  means  of  influence; 
strengthening  th~  int~rnal political  leadarship  and  the 
steering capacity  of  the  EP; 
continuing  the  trend  of  a  Qreater  professionalism in  its 
work. 
The  political  acceptance  of  such  a  concapt  as  "institutional 
co-player"  within  and  outside  the  Parliament  requires  so~e 
educative  initiatives.  With  a  realistic  long-ter~ aim  as  the 
conc.:pt  o~  the  EP  as  an  institutional  "co-player",  however, 
the  vicious  circl~ of  powerlessness  ~~ay  be  broken  and  the 
voters  nay  be  more  attracted  to  the  EP. 
The  !uture role  concept  and  functions  of  the  European  Parlia-
ment  depend  largely  on  the  development  ot  the  European  Commu-
nity  as  a  political  entity.  These  overall developments  can 
only  b~  influenced  to  a  li~ited extent  by  the  EP.  Three  diffe-
rent directions ot  evolution are  possible: 
•  Evolution  towards  a  federal  system 
The  Community  is interpreted  as  a  federal  state  in  the  making: 
This  eoncept  requires  an  institutional sat-up  that is  com-
parable  to  the  national  syste~s with  a  parliament  according 
to  the  .. qubernative"  or  the  "leqislature..  concepts  as  de-
scribed  above.  National  parliamentary  concupts  and  tradi-
tions  may  be  trans~erred  to  the  EC-system,  thouQh  possibly 
in  an  altered form. 
*  Evolution  towards  an  inter~overnmental system 
Accordin~ to  this scenario  the  Community  will  develop  into 
interqovernmentalism.  It  is primarily  seen  as  an  instrument 
- 55  - ,,.. 
l.. helping  the  member  states  to  increase  the  welfare  of  their 
citizens.  In  this  case,  the  national  governments  are  the 
most  important  actors.  They  decide  on  an  ad-hoc  basis  on 
matters of common  interest.  The  EC  does  not need a  democratic 
legitimation of its own.  On  the  contrary  the  national  right 
of veto can  be  interpreted as  a  central  legitimating element 
of  the  EC  decision- making  process.  In  this scenario  the  EP 
can  only  fulfil  the  "forum  concept"  which  is  comparable  to 
the  the  consultative  role  of  the  Parliamentary  Assembly  of 
the Council  of Europe. 
~  Continuous interlocking 
The  interpretation of the Community  as an interlocking system 
of national and Community  instruments  leads  to a  very complex 
system of  institutional checks  and  balances.  There is a  cer-
tain requirement for democratic legitimation of the decision-
-making  process,  both  on  the  national  and  on.the  European 
level. For reasons of efficiency the "national" and  the "Euro-
pean"  point  of  view  must  be  represented.  The  parliament  can 
play  a  stronger  role  than  the  "forum  concept",  but  it will 
have difficulties to follow  the  "gubernative" or the  "legis-
lature concept
11  in full. 
According  to  type  A of evolution  (EC  as  a  "pre-federal poli-
tical system)  there exists a  considerable democratic deficit 
with  regard  to  the  EC-system.  The  capacity  of  the  national 
governmen-ts  to decide on  important political problems  of  the 
present  is  hampered  by  the  growing  necessity  to  cooperate 
and  to  coordinate  their  own  activities  with  those  of  their 
EC-partners.  For the national parliaments it is nearly impos-
sible to guarantee a  democratic control of the European acti-
vities of  their governments  coordinated in a  European  frame-
work.  The  question  is  whether  this  practice  infringes  upon 
the national constitutions, owing to the fact that nearly all 
of .them  stipulate in one  way  or the other  that the  exercise 
of  political  power  must  refer to the  political will  of  the 
- 56  -c i t i zen  s ·•  z •  The  a c t i vi  t i e s  of  both  E  u r o p ~ an  and  nat  i 0 n a 1  b u-
r~aucracies are  naither  eff~ctivcly controlled by  a  national 
nor  by  the  European  ?arliament. 
Opinion  polls  indicate  that  the  id~a of  European  inteQration 
is  regularly  supported  by  rr.ore  than  two  thirds  of  the  EC-citi-
z~nsJ~.  The  support  is  relatively  high  in  Italy,  the  Nether-
lands,  Belgium,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  France  and 
Luxembour~  (more  than  70  %}  ,  whilst  in  Denmark  tha  anti-~ar­
ket~ers are  in  a  strong  position.  In  December  1985,  th~ 
proposition  that  the  EP  primarily  should  strive  tor  a  European 
Union  with  a  Euro~ean  ~overnment responsible  to  the  EP  was 
supported  by  57  % of  the  EC-citi?.ens,  15  % were  against  such 
a  proposal  and  28  % qave  no  r~plyl 1 •  Th~ attitudes varied 
widely  between  the  dif~erent countries. 
Despite  the  overall  support  for  ~urther European  Inteqration, 
the  damocraeic  deeicit of  th~  EC  is hardly  ever articulated 
in  the  public  opinion  of  the  EC·councries.  The  activities of 
.. those  in  Brussels"  in  fact  are  often  criticized.,  but  in 
general  the  involve~ent of  national  politicians  is  seen  as  a 
compensatinq  ~actor to  the  predominant  political  weiqht  oe 
the  EC-bureaucracy.  For  many  o!  the  people  the  problem  of 
the  democratic deficit of  th~  EC  ~ay be  5  purely  academic  one. 
If  a  national minister  is leqitimated  to  act  at  the  national 
level,  why  should he  not  act  with  the  sa~e laqitirnation  at 
the  !C-level?  As  long  as  unanimity  is  necessary  for  institu-
tional  retorms,  comprehensive  proj~cts,  like  the  EP's  Dratt 
Treaty,  will  hardly  be  accept~d by  the  political actors  and 
th~ citizens  in all  the  twelve  ~~~b~r eountries of  the  EC. 
Within  the  evolution  according  tu  model  B  ("EC  as  a  pure 
instrument  of  the  nation states'')  a  European  Parliament  with 
ambitious  institutional  aims  is  a  disturbing  factor  in  an 
intar;overnmental  system  based  on  the  concordance  of  the 
national  actors.  From  their point of view  the  best solution 
of  the  existin9 problems  ~ould be  the  replacement  of  direct 
- 57 -
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..-,~. European elections by  the system of delegation, as used before 
1979.  In  such  a  scenario  the  perceived  positive  functions  of 
general elections  (mechanism  for  a  peaceful  change  of  power, 
enforcement of the system's learning capacity) do not operate. 
If elections on  the regional  (• Lander)  level are already of 
a  secondary  importance,  European  elections  for  a  parliament 
with  little decision-making  capacity  might  even  become  of 
tertiary rank  - not even  important as test elections for  the 
national  level49.  Mobilisation of  the  electors  would  become 
even  more  difficult. 
For those who  expect for the EC  system a  continuous interlock-
ing  between  national and  Community  instruments  the  claim for 
democracy  and effectiveness exists both  on  a  national and  an 
EC-level.  The  national  bureaucracies  and  governments  are 
able  to  act at  both  levels,  whilst  the  links  between  the 
national parliaments and the European Parliament are unsatis-
factory.  National  governments  and  bureaucracies are  predomi-
nant,  markedly  reducing  the 'powers  and  the  influence of both 
the  national  parliaments  and  the  European  Parliament.  From 
the EP's  point of view it is important  that further develop-
ments of the Community  system are directed  towards  a  streng-
thening  of  Community  instruments  and  to  an  enhancement  of 
its own  role rather than  towards an  improvement  in the degree 
of bureaucratic and  governmental  co-ordination. 
The  reasons  for  the  plea  for  a  strengthened  role  of  the 
European  Parliament  are  twofold:  The  first  is  the  existing 
democratic  deficit,  the  second  the  lack  of  effectiveness. 
For reasons of efficiency the Community  needs  an  institution 
which  represents  the  Community  position.  National  govern-
ments  and  bureaucracies  (as  well  as  national  parliaments) 
take  care  primarily of  national  interests while  compromises 
between  them  may  be  sufficient  for  a  continuous  muddling-
through,  long-term solutions of existing problems call for  a 
strong representation of Community  interests. A strengthened 
European  Parliament  (in  combination  with  the  Commission) 
- 58 -could  thus  in  the  lonQ  run  increase  th~ afficiancy  of  tha 
EC-systerr.. 
The  futur~ strategy  of  the  EP  ~use  ~atch the  role  concept  it 
wishes  to  adopt.  This  strat~gy call$  for  so~e step  by  step 
changes  in  the  EC  system particularly  by  shifts  o!  co~pet~n­
ces  to  Com~unity level  and  equivalent  increases  in  the  pow~rs 
of  the  European  Parliament.  This  implies  in  the  pr~sant situa-
tion  a  ~ajor effort  by  the  EP  to  ~obilise forces  in  favour 
of  refer~.  A stronqsr  internal  lead~rship  in  the  EP  and  a 
greater  degree  of  consistency  in  the  parliamentary  work  are 
preconditions  ~or  the  success  o!  such  ~  strateoy. 
In  any  case  tha  EP  should  base  its  strat~QY on  a  dyna~ic view 
or  its  role,  not  just  an  ~xtrapolation of  axperience  up  to 
now.  Because  in  the  EC  system  both  the  me~ber se,tes  and  the 
Co~J~unity are  of  crucial  i~port~nce,  such  a  strataqy  implies 
a  set  of  fine-tuned  steps  with  a  limited  appeal  to  the  voters. 
!t  m=ans  ::tOrt!  ''lobbyinq''  activiti+=s  "at  hotr.c:"  and  in  the 
labyrinth of  the  Brussels  ~achinery.  The  EP  (and  each  par-
liamentarian)  would  ne~d ~ore  expertis~  to  instal  a  "counter-
bureaucracy".  The  EP  would  need  to  pursue  its  work  in  the 
present  decentralized  fashion,  but  ba  able  to mobilize  th~ 
whole  of  its machinery  at crucial points. 
Setw~en 1986  and  1992  the  Com~unity will  be  devotinq  itself 
co  primarily  completinq  the  internal  ~arket,  monetary  inte-
gration  and  to  retor~inq  th~ structural  funds  (reqional  fund, 
social  fund,  inteQrated Mediterranean  programmes).  In  1992 
the  tiree  will  be  ripe  for  major  institutional  r~for~s and 
the  re~nforcement  ot  the  EP's  powers  should be  the  central 
element  in this drive  for  such  reforms. 
For  the  enhancement  of  the  EP's  role  the  support  of  powertul 
al1i¥a is  of  crucial  i~portance.  The  EP  should  consider  an 
order  o~ priorities in its cultivation of  allies  among  govern-
ments,  parliaments,  parties,  the  Commission,  economic  and 
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or  facilitate  inte~ration in  ~atters of  interest  ~o  key  ~e~ner 
states.  It  ~ay be  able  to  show  that  ~n  enhance~~nt of  its 
role  is  necessary  if  memoer  states  are  to  achieve  their  objec-
tives.  The  electors  must  be  aware  t::lt  the  EP 's  ''European" 
position  on  crucial  problems  o~  the  Co~~unity.  Ca~paigns  for 
European  elections  and  EP  debates  will  provid~ excellent 
opportunities  for  thus  engaginq  che  interest  of  European 
citizens  in  their  Parliament. 
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Professor  Jacques  VANDAMME,  Chairman  of  TEPSA: 
Lord  Plumb,  Presidents of  the  national  parliaments,  Excellencies,  Ladies  and 
Gentlemen, 
I  would  like  to  express  my  feelings  of gratitude  towards  the  European 
Parliament  for  the  invitation to this  Symposium,  which  has  made  it possible  to 
discuss  the  outcome  of  the  study  of  the  Trans-European  Policy Studies 
Association  on  the  theme,  'Beyond  traditional  parliamentarism:  the  European 
Parliament  in  the  Community  system•.  As  you  all  know,  this  is not  the  first 
occasion  on  which  TEPSA  has  held  a  discussion  on  this  issue.  We  had  an 
important  conference  here  in  October  1984  after the  second  direct election of 
the  European  Parliament  on  the  strategy of  the  newly-elected  Parliament. 
Mr  Pflimlin  pronounced  the  closing  speech  at that  event.  Last  year  another 
gathering  in  Strasbourg debated the  theme  'A  new  role  for  the  European 
Parliament'. 
This  is  however  the first  time  that  TEPSA  has  been  so  deeply  involved  in  a 
study  commissioned  by  the  European  Parliament  itself, which  is to be  discussed 
by  such  a  broad  spectrum of  representatives of national  parliaments  and  of  the 
European  Parliament.  I  would  like therefore to express  my  thanks  to  the 
President of the  Parliament  for making  this possible.  You  did  not  hesitate, 
Mr  President,  to  run  the  risk of turning to academic  circles, which  are 
sometimes  inclined to consider problems  from  a  too  theoretical  point of  view. 
But  I  do  believe that  in the  case of  TEPSA  this  risk  is much  less great, 
because  we  ar•  in the first  place policy-oriented academics,  which  means  that 
we  are conscious of the political constraints.  Secondly,  because  we  are 
convinced of the  ne~essity of the  reinforcement  of  the  European  Parliament  in 
the  Community  system,  and  also that this  reinforcement  can  perhaps  happen 
through  a  new  conceptual  approach  to the  role of  the  parliamentary function  at 
European  level. 
Our  network  of institutes  located  in almost  all countries of the  Community  has 
two  objectives:  to promote  research,  and  to encourage  thinking which  can  lay 
down  guidelines to  be  followed  on  the  road  to  European  integration.  For  this 
reason  the  conclusions of our  studies  are  always  discussed at  the  final  stage 
- 66  -with  the  decision  makers,  in  this  case  with  Members  of  the  European  Parliament 
itself.  I  am  sure  that  this  dialogue  will  be  fruitful  for  the 
representatives  both  of  the  academic  world  and  of  the  citizens of  Europe. 
Thank  you  Mr  President,  I  invite  you  to  take  the  floor. 
Lord  PLUMB,  President  of  the  European  Parliament: 
Mr  President,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
First  of all,  may  I  on  behalf of  all  my  colleagues  in  the  Parliament  welcome 
you  here  to  Strasbourg.  It's not  easy  during  the  course  of this particular 
week  - a  very  busy  week  when  we're  dealing  with  important  reports  - to  make 
the  facilities  available  for  a  very  important  conference  like this.  But  it is 
an  opportunity where  the  Members  of  the  European  Parliament  and  yourselves  can 
meet  and  get  together,  and  many  of  my  colleagues  will  undoubtedly  be  joining 
you  from  time  to  time  during  the  course  of the  day.  They  naturally are 
divided  in  themselves  as  to  whether  they  should  be  in  the  hemicycle  voting or 
debating  or  whether  they  should  be  at  the  TEPSA  Conference,  but  politicians 
are very  good  at  dividing themselves  into three or  four  parts and  therefore  I 
am  hopeful  that  you  will  have  the  opportunity of meeting  with  many  of them. 
I  am  very  honoured,  Mr  Chairman,  to  make  the first  keynote  address  of the day 
to  this particular symposium  because  it gives  me  a  great  pleasure  to welcome 
so  many  distinguished guests  to this House.  Presidents of the parliaments  of 
the  Member  States from  both  the  North  and  the  South  of  the  Community  are 
present;  and  I, of course, naturally extend  a  very  warm  welcome  to  Mr  Louis 
JUNG,  the  President of the  Parliamentary Assembly  of  the  Council  of  Europe. 
Vice-President  Andriessen  will  be  with  you  fairly shortly from  the  Commission, 
and  I  am  naturally also pleased to welcome  all the  academic  experts  who  are 
representing the  Trans-European  Policy Studies  Association and  the specialist 
journalists from  all the  Member  States of the  Community. 
It was,  Mr  President,  as  you  rightly reminded  us,  my  predecessor President 
Pflimlin  who  won  the  agreement  of the Bureau  of  the  Parliament  to the 
launching of the  research  project  whose  culmination is this  Symposium  today. 
I  pay  tribute to  his  wisdom  and  foresight,  as  I  so  often do  on  so  many  issues, 
in  providing us  with  an  indispensable basis of expert  papers  which  will  be 
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entrusted  the  conception  and  the  execution  of  the  research  project  to  TEPSA 
under  its President  Professor  Vandamme  and  I  am  glad  to  say  that  our 
confidence  has  been  fully  justified by  reading  the  very  excellent  papers  that 
have  been  prepared  for  us.  This  symposium  therefore  will  provide  us  with  a 
very  important  contribution  to  the  understanding  of  the  Parliament  on  the  eve 
of  the  third  European  elections  in  ,989. 
Almost  two  years  ago,  speaking  immediately  after  my  election to the  Presidency 
in  January  ,987,  I  said that  "The  spirit and  the  motive  force  of  this 
Parliament  spring  from  the  sturdy  rock  of democratic  legitimacy".  I  also  at 
that  time  emphasized  that  this  Parliament  has  a  perfect  right  - indeed  it  has 
a  responsibility and  a  duty- to  point  the  way  forward  for  the  European 
Community  as  a  whole. 
Mr  President,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  in  the  absence  of  the full  range  of powers 
enjoyed  by  most  national  parliaments,  the  European  Parliament  has  been 
remarkably  innovative  in  making  use  of  the  powers  it has  and  in  achieving  new 
responsibilities  and  stronger  influence.  This  increase  in ·political  and 
institutional  power  follows  no  well-laid plan; it's not  the  stuff of  plot  or 
conspiracy;  it is  rather the most  natural  development  that  could  be  envisaged 
for  any  democratic  assembly. 
Of  course  this  is a  Parliament  with  a  difference.  It's a  multi-national 
Parliament:  it's the  world's  first experiment  in  trans-national democracy  -
and  it works.  It works  just as  a  parliament  should,  albeit  in nine  languages 
with  eight different political groups  with  twelve  nationalities and  with  three 
different meeting  pla~es.  It is not  always  easy  to achieve  public  recognition 
for  the work  that  I  and  my  colleagues  have  done  over  the past  few  years,  but 
we  must  always  rememb~ that, no  matter  how  frustrating it is when  our  work 
isn't reported,  the  Press  must  play quite an  independent  role  and  they must 
follow  the objective of  satisfying their readers  and  not  always  satisfying the 
politicians. 
In  the  last  few  years  I  have  seen  a  very big increase  in the  knowledge  of the 
general  public  about  the European  Community  and  about  its institutions.  There 
is a  much  bigger awareness  of the  European  Parliament  in particular, and  much 
- 68  -of  this  is  due  to  the  publicity surrounding  the  1992  programme.  It  is dawning 
on  many  that  the  Parliament  has  an  enormous  responsibility  for  monitoring,  and 
in  some  cases  blocking,  but  in  many  cases  contributing  positively to  the 
various  proposals  of  the  Commission  which  relate  to  the  achievement  of  the 
Singl~ Market.  The  Parliament  is  reasonably  content  for  the  moment  with  the 
Single  European  Act,  although  we  criticized it heavily  when  it was  proposed 
and  decided  upon,  we  are  living with  it and  we  are  using  it to  our  advantage 
much  better than  many  others  thought. 
I  don't  particularly  like the  use  of  the word  'power'.  I  prefer to  use  the 
word  'responsibility'.  The  European  Parliament  has  increased its 
responsibilities  in  the  past  few  years  to  the distinct  advantage  of  the 
European  Community  as  a  whole.  It  is  not  therefore a  question of  powers  but  a 
question of  responsibilities  and  in the  same  way  I  am  not  particularly happy 
with  the  use  of  the  word  'sovereignty',  especially  in  national  circles.  The 
word  I  prefer to use  is  'accountability'  and  the  constitutional debate  which 
is  now  going  on  in  various degrees  between  the national  and  the  European 
competence  for  legislation is,  in  my  opinion,  more  a  debate about 
accountability than  it is a  debate  about  sovereignty. 
The  vast  majority of  Community  legislation belongs  to a  decision-making 
structure that  is not  fully democratic  in the  sense that the directly elected 
Parliament  still doesn't  have  sufficient  influence on  such  legislation.  The 
Parliament's major  future  task,  I  believe,  is to  secure  public  and 
institutional approval  to extend  the doctrine of  public  accountability to all 
European  Community  legislation.  This  I  believe would  go  a  very  long  way  to 
removing  well-founded  fears  about  so-called faceless  bureaucrats  and  about 
undemocratic  decision-making  centred  in Brussels.  The  Single  Act  has  started 
to help us  to correct this democratic  deficit.  This  has  been,  is, and  will  be 
the mission of the  European  Parliament. 
I  would  claim  that  since the elections of  1984 it has  made  great  strides 
towards  fulfilling this particular mission  and  I  hope  this  symposium  will  help 
to  record  the many  achievements  of  Parliament  in  this particular respect. 
Parliament  has  become  the main  force  pushing  towards  European  integration and 
this  role  has  been  generously  acknowledged  by  President  Delors.  In  the words 
of  the  summary  report  prepared  by  TEPSA  it is now  a  'co-player'  with  the other 
- 69  -Community  institutions,  that  it is  to  say  it shares  equally  with  them  - not  in 
all  but  in  many  respects- the  responsibility  for  shaping  and  for  overseeing 
the  implementation  of  legislative proposals.  It  was  Parliament  which  for  many 
years  pressed  for  A People's  Europe  which  now,  perhaps  all  too  slowly,  is 
heing  adopted  by  the  Council  of  Ministers. 
Parliament  also  shares  now  with  the  Commission  the  very  difficult  task  of 
representing  the  Community  abroad.  While  on  the one  hand  the  Commission  has  a 
network  of  delegation~ in  capital  and  other cities throughout  the  world,  the 
Parliament's  own  delegations  meet  with  members  of  parliaments  from  third 
countries  to  explain  Community  policies  and  to  hear  about  the  problems  of 
their fellow  parliamentarians  from  many  places  abroad.  Perhaps  the  most 
important  of  these  meetings  occur  within  the  framework  of  the  joint assembly 
with  the  ACP  countries,  the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific territories  for 
whom  the  Community  has  done  and  can  do  so  much. 
Perhaps,  President,  you  might  allow  me  to give one  vivid  illustration of  the 
extent  to  which  Parliament  has  won  and  earned its new  responsibilities.  From 
July  1987  to  the  end  of  October  1988  within the  cooperation-procedure at  first 
reading  the  Commission  adopted  in  whole  or  in  part  72%  of  Parliament's 
amendments,  and  the  Council  42%.  At  the  second  reading  of  the  cooperation 
procedure,  again  in the  same  particular period, the  Commission  accepted  52%  of 
Parliament's  amendments  in  whole  or  in  part  and  the  Council  21%  of  such 
amendments. 
These  are the first  figures  which  the Secretariat  have  been  able to produce 
about  this aspect of the operation of the Single  European  Act.  So  although 
you'll  quickly realize that  I'm  not  satisfied with  the  low  acceptance  rate of 
our  amendments  by  the  Council,  I  think  the figures  represent  a  very  good  start 
and  I  think  they fully  justify the description of  Parliament  as  a  'co-player' 
in  the  institutional game. 
So  finally,  Mr  President,  I  want  to stress the  importance  of  the  relations 
between  the  European  Parliament  and  the national parliaments.  Jean  Monnet  -
whose  birth we've  been  commemorating  during  recent  weeks  and  during this 
particular week  here  in  Strasbourg - saw  the absolute  importance  of  good 
dialogue  and  of good  cooperation between  parliaments.  I  would  like  to  perhaps 
- 70  -remind  you  of  the  warning  given  by  President  Delors  to  this  House  in  July  of 
this  year  that  in  his  view  ten  national  parliaments  appear  to  be  unaware  of 
the  transfer  of  decision-making  to  Community  level  which  would  take  place  over 
the  next  ten  years.  This  awareness,  I  believe,  has  increased  substantially 
since  then,  which  is all  to  the  good,  for  we  need  a  very  high  turnout  indeed 
at  the  next  European  elections. 
So,  Mr  President,  I  again  say  to  you  and  to  all  your  colleagues  in  TEPSA  and 
to  the  Presidents  of national  parliaments  and  all  who  are  assembled  at  this 
particular conference  that  it is  with  the  very  greatest of  pleasure  that  I 
we~come you  to  it.  I  do  believe  that it is  imperative,  as  we  look  ahead  to 
the  future  development,  both  politically and  economically,  of the  European 
Community,  that  we  work  closely together both  at political  and  academic  level. 
Professor  VANDAMME:  Thank  you  very  much  indeed  for  your  keynote  address,  Lord 
Plumb.  I  now  give  the  floor  to  Mr  Konstantopoulos,  who  is  representing  the 
President-in-Office of  the  Council  of  Ministers. 
Mr  Sotirios  KONSTANTOPOULOS,  Greek  Ambassador  to the  Council  of  Europe: 
Thank  you  Mr  President.  Mr  President, it is  a  great  honour  for  me  today  to 
attend this  symposium  in order  to  represent  the  Minister  Mr  Pangalos,  on 
behalf of  the presidency of  Council.  He  has  asked  me  to express  his  regret 
that  he  was  unable  to attend personally and  has  also asked  me  to convey  his 
best  wishes  for  a  successful  symposium. 
There  are  many  points  in  common  between  the different  ways  in which  we 
organize our  constitutional affairs, and  today  I  can  speak  on  behalf of  the 
presidency and  also  from  the  vantage  point of  my  country.  We  too  are well 
placed to understand  the historical origins of pluralist democracy,  because 
this  is  so  much  a  part of the history and  the  heritage of Greece  since the 
earliest days. 
- 71  -In  Europe  we  launched  the  common  market  for  well-known  political  and  economic 
reasons.  We  did  this  in  order  to  break  away  from  the  internecine  struggles 
which  marked  our  history.  We  did  this  in  order  to  ensure  peace,  to  ensure 
democracy  and  to  ensure  prosperity  for  our  peoples.  I  believe  that  we  have 
been  successful  in  attaining  those  early goals,  even  with  all  the  ups  and 
downs  which  the  process  has  experienced,  and  we  now  look  towards  future  stages 
in  this  development  in  terms  of  stabilizing what  we  have  attained  and  making 
further  headway. 
A prerequisite for  taking  stock  is  a  recognition of the  important  part  which 
the  European  Parliament  can  play  in  that  process.  This  I  believe  is  the 
proper  basis  on  which  to  base  European  union.  Reinforcing  the  function  and 
the  position of  the  European  Parliament  is of  key  importance  in  this  process. 
We  must  strengthen  the  role of  Parliament  in  its  legislative capacities.  This 
has  to  be  at  the  top  of  our  list of priorities.  Given  the  way  in  which 
Parliament  is  changing  as  the  Communities  move  towards  Europe-wide 
unification,  perhaps  there is a  slight difference between  the national 
parliaments  and  the  European  Parliament.  This  can  cause  difficulties  and 
these  are difficulties which  the  national  parliaments  and  tne  European 
Parliament  must  face  together.  A European  union  will  be  more  than  the  sum  of 
its constituent parts  and  it alone,  I  believe,  can  meet  the  requirement  and 
meet  new  challenges  faced  by  Europe.  So  I  would  simply  conclude  by  wishing 
you  well  in  your  work  and  wishing  you  every  success  in  this symposium. 
Professor  VANDAMME:  Thank  you,  Mr  Ambassador,  for  your  speech.  Mr  Andriessen 
is on  his  way  but  his arrival  is a  little belated and  in the meantime  I  am 
happy  to welcome  the  President of  the Belgian  Parliament,  Mr  Nothomb,  who  will 
now  address the meeting. 
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Belgium: 
Thank  you  President,  for  having  invited  the  President  of  the  Belgian  Chamber. 
I  would  like  to  welcome  the  representatives  from  other national  parliaments 
whom  I  see  here  and  I  would  like  to  thank  you  for  allowing  me  to  make  an 
introductory address.  I  feel  that  my  role  in  this  colloquy  is  to  give  the 
point  of  view  of  one  particular national  parliament,  the  Belgian  Parliament, 
of  which  I  am  Speaker.  I  understand  that  the title of  our  symposium  is 
'Beyond  traditional  forms  of parliamentary activity', so  I'll try to  talk 
about  the  constitutional  realities that  underpin  our  activities and  less 
orthodox  forms  of activity. 
As  a  preliminary comment,  when  I  hear  Members  of  the  European  Parliament 
debating  and  when  I  speak  within  my  European  Potitical movement,  the  European 
People's  Party,  and  take  part  in  debates  on  the  future  of  Europe,  it is often 
said that  if Europe  is to  remain  fully democratic  the  European  Parliament  must 
be  given  greater powers  and  the  same  authority as  a  national  parliament.  We 
received  introductory papers  for  this  colloquy  from  TEPSA  and  we  all  know  what 
the  four  main  activities of  a  national  Parliament  are.  First,  the  Parliament 
has  to  enact  laws;  there  is the  control  function,  whereby  a  Parliament  must 
oversee what  the  government  is doing  and  how  it implements  the  budget  that 
Parliament  has  approved.  The  third task  is that  a  Parliament  is a  forum,  it 
is a  debating chamber  where  ideas are tried out  and  new  ideas  are developed  by 
mean'  of confrontational debate.  The  fourth  role  is an  innovatory  role. 
We  have  to create new  institutions to  meet  new  needs  and  this  is where  the 
European  Parliament  comes  in.  I  would  like  to  look  at  the  four  roles  from  the 
point of view  of the national  parliaments.  I'd like  to ask  whether  each 
national  parliament  is as  wonderful  as  you  think it is, and  also if it would 
be  a  good  thing if the  European  Parliament  were  to  become  more  like a  national 
parliament. 
Obviously  I  can  only  speak  on  behalf of the  Belgian  Parliament  but  I'd like to 
make  clear that  life in the Belgian  Parliament  is not  so  clear-cut, not  so 
wonderful  as  you  might  think.  Of  course one  always  sings  the praises of 
- 73  -parliaments  but  nonetheless  we  do  have  problems  and  parliamentary activities 
run  into all  sorts  of difficulties.  In  a  country  Like  Belgium  the  Parliament 
is becoming  completely  bogged  down  in  its activities  and  people  no  longer 
actually  take  much  notice  of  what  Parliament  does.  In  the  Belgian  press  you 
hear  that  the  Parliament  just  rubber-stamps  Government  decisions,  that  the 
Parliament  is  not  able  to  amend  Government  decisions,  nor  to  reject  them,  and 
that  it works  very  quickly  and  uses  the guillotine procedure  to  push 
Government  decisions  through.  That  is what  people  say  in  our  national  press 
about  our  parliament.  Perhaps  in  other  countries  the  press  doesn't  dare  say 
this  but  our  press  is  very  frank  and  does  say  it. 
If you  analyse  these  accusations  you'll  see  that  this  is  because  of  the 
governmental  role  that  we  play  in  national  parliaments.  How  do  we  get  a 
government  in  Belgium?  We  have  elections under  a  multi-party system.  Then, 
in  order  to  find  if we  can  put  together a  majority,  we  have  a  long  meeting. 
We  go  to  a  castle,  we  shut  ourselves off for three,  four,  six or  even  ten 
weeks  to  see  if we  can  hammer  together  some  sort of parliamentary majority.  A 
document  emerges,  which  is  an  agreement  between  the political parties  to 
create a  parliamentary majority.  On  that  basis  we  establish a  government,  and 
the  government's  programme  is  contained  in  the document,  and  this  programme  is 
then  translated  into  legislative texts  which  are  put  before  Parliament. 
Now  what  can  Parliament  do  but  vote  in  favour  of these  legislative texts 
because  they  have  emerged  from  this very  long  process which  the government, 
that  is  the  Parliam~nt, itself has  trigg~ed off.  And  of  cour~e the 
journalists say that  Parliament  has  no  margin  for  manoeuvre.  The  Parliament 
disappears  really.  It no  longer figures  in  the  public  imagination  because 
government  procedures  are  so  complex  they take up  all their attention.  Of 
course  you  have  to try and  avoid  the drawbacks  that that creates. 
Now  I'm  not  going  to  speak  at great  length  about  the debating  chamber  role of 
Parliament.  Obviously  national  parliaments do  maintain  a  degree  of 
sovereignty but  other associations turn  themselves  into debating  chambers. 
The  mass  media  take over  the debating  chamber  function  as  well.  Obviously  I 
try to  stop the  major  debates  being shifted onto the  TV  screens.  But  on 
- 74  -Sunrlay  mornings  a  few  politicians discuss  topical  events  on  TV,  and  that  means 
that  again  the  wind  is  taken  out  of  our  sails  in  Parliament;  issues  are 
pre-empted  on  the  small  screen  and  that's where  we  Lose  our  innovatory  role. 
In  our  Parliament  we  have  been  in  existence  for  158  years  and  there  are  few 
Parliaments  which  are  older  than  ours,  but  we  have  Lost  almost  entirely our 
function  of  innovation.  All  we  have  done  recently  is  to  approve  the  Single 
European  Act,  which  gives  greater  powers  to  the  European  institutions.  We're 
pleased  to  do  that  because  in  Belgium  we  are  champions  of  Europe,  but  it means 
that  we  are  devolving  our  powers  both  to  the  European  institutions - to  our 
regions,  to our  regional  parliaments.  So  we  are  delegating  some  of our  powers 
to  other  levels:  to  the  European  level  because  that's  important,  and  to  the 
regional  level  because  sometimes  certain decisions  are best  taken  elsewhere. 
That's  what  I  want  to  say  about  our  national  parliament. 
I  shall  not  talk  at  great  length  ahout  the  European  Parliament  because  you  are 
better acquainted with  it than  I  am.  Since  1979,  direct elections to the 
European  Parliament  have  made  it a  real  Community  institution and  it has 
better democratic  credentials  than  the  Commission  which  is hot  elected;  the 
Council  escapes  our  control,  which  is where  the democratic  deficit  comes  in, 
because  the  Members  of the  Council  are  only  controlled by  their national 
parliament.  A lot of  progress  has  been  made  by  the  European  Parliament  since 
,979,  but  you  will  have  to  seek  added  powers.  To  turn  to  the  future:  in the 
introductory papers  for  the symposium  three  scenarios  were  sketched out.  The 
first one  is  a  federal  scenario.  There  have  been  federal  projects around  for 
a  long  time,  but  this is  really wishful  thinking:  what  would  we  do  if we 
could  come  up  with  a  federal  constitution tomorrow?  My  European  political 
group,  the  EPP,  a  week  ago  stated that  its programme  was  to progress  towards  a 
federal  Europe,  but  that  can't be  achieved overnight. 
The  first  scenario is an  optimistic one,  federal  Europe,  then there's the 
inter-governmental  scenario,  but  I  feel  that this would  be  regressive,  this_ 
would  not  represent  progress.  Then  there's the third scenario, which  is the 
one  I  like, which  is  interdependence  between  the  national  Member  States of 
Europe.  I  think  that this better reflects present  realities, especially in 
the  mid-term  perspective which  is the  year  2000  and  that's what  I  will 
concentrate on  today. 
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sovereignty  in  certain  areas  there's one  dimension  that  escapes  us,  whether  it 
is  international  policy  or  food  aid  policy or  what  is  within  the  European 
sphere  of  competence.  We  have  to  realize that  we  have  no  control  really over 
what  our  neighbours  do  but  we  have  to  look  over  our  shoulder  and  see  what  our 
neighbours  and  the  other  European  states are  doing  about  these  major  matters. 
Out  of  this  situation arises this  whole  question of  the  democratic  deficit.  I 
feel  what  we  have  to  do  is  to  strengthen  the  European  Parliament  so  that  it 
has  greater  legal  powers  and  we  have  to  strengthen our  powers  when  it comes  to 
interdependence  between  the  national  parliaments. 
Now  what  about  the  parliamentary  system  for  the  year  2000?  I  think  that  by 
the  year  2000  we  will  have  an  improved  parliamentary  system.  How  can  we  bring 
about  these  improvements?  Well,  first of all - and  I  hardly need  to  say  this 
- Parliament  has  to  enhance  its influence,  improve  its own  decision making 
powers.  The  national  parliaments  must  develop  their political consciousness 
of  what's  happening  at  the  European  level  and  at world  level. 
Here  I'd like to protest  formally,  President,  and  I'm  not  complaining  about 
you,  I'm  complaining  about  President  Delors,  who  said  in  the  European 
Parliament  that  10  national  parliaments  out  of  12  were  unaware  of the  fact 
that  in  ,0 years  time  Eu~opean economic  policy would  be  hammered  out  at  the 
European  levet.  I  wrote  a  strong  letter to  Mr  Oelors  saying  that  this  was  not 
accurate.  I  think  that the majority of  European  parliaments,  including  the 
Betgian parliament,  are aware  of  the  European  dimension.  We  are not  ignoring 
it, we're preparing ourselves  for  this  European  future.  For  several  years,  we 
in  the  Belgian  parliament  have  had  a  joint committee  of  10  MEPs  and  10 
national  MPs,  meeting  regularly to explain what  is  happening  in the two 
parliaments and  to draw  up  joint  reports; the  10  MEPs  can  come  to our 
parliamentary committees  whenever  they want  to do  so.  We  are not  therefore 
one  of  the  Parliaments  which  is  ignoring  Europe;  but  of  course  we  can  all  make 
improvements  within  our  own  national parliaments. 
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colloquy - you  can't  commit  yourself  to  the  mid-term  without  having  an  idea  of 
what  you're  going  to achieve  in  the  long  term.  To  have  a  vision of  the  year 
2000  I  have  to  have  a  vision  of  the  year  2030.  I'm  a  champion  of  a  federal 
Europe  so  I  think  that  this  is  something  we  should  go  into  in  greater depth. 
I  think  that  in  the  long  term  the  Parliament  of  a  federal  Europe  would  have  to 
have  a  two  chamber  system.  At  the  moment  we  have  a  European  Parliament 
directly elected  by  the  people  of  Europe.  Then  there's  the  Council  which  is 
governed  by  the  Member  States  and  acts  as  an  executive  and  as  a  legislative 
body  at  the  same  time.  That's  not  right!  In  a  real  federal  Europe  you  would 
have  a  real  government  and  a  real  Parliament  with  two  chambers.  The  Swiss 
Parliament  has  two  chambers:  the  National  Council,  which  I  would  say  would  be 
equivalent  to  the  European  Parliament,  and  the  Chamber  of  States which 
represents  the various  cantons  of  Switzerland.  The  latter means  that  you 
assure  diversity.  So  if we  want  a  real  federal  system  we  will  have  to  have  a 
dual  chamber. 
Of  course  this  is  a  futuristic  vision but  it does  colour  my  mid-term  vision as 
to  what  should  we  do.  I  think  that  very  gradually the  European  Parliament  on 
the one  hand  and  national  parliaments on  the  other  have  got  to  commit 
themselves  to this.  In  the national  parliaments  we  should  begin  to  consider 
ourselves  as  part of this  lower  chamber.  This  would  mean  that  you  would  have 
a  lower  chamber  with  2000  members,  which  would  be  absolutely  impossible. 
Neither  do  we  want  a  second  chamber  which  is  indirectly appointed,  as  the 
European  Parliament  was  before  1979. 
However  some  things might  be  easy to achieve.  I'm  just going  to throw  out 
three  straightforward ideas, President  Plumb,  and  a  lot depends  on  you  and 
your  colleagues.  When  the  European  Parliament  has  an  important  debate 
scheduled  on·  agriculture,  the  Single  Act,  or tfle  budget  for  example,  why  don't 
you  inform  the  speakers of the national  parliaments?  You  know  a  month  in 
advance  what  is  coming  up  on  the agenda  of the next  part-session,  so  why  don't 
you  write  to  the  12  speakers,  your  12  interlocutors,  informing  them  of a 
keynote  debate on  a  certain subject  in  the  following  month?  You  could  ask  for 
the  opinion  of the  committee  of the national  parliament  responsible  for  this 
particular matter. 
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.... - ------·p·-·-'1'-~ If  I  were  to  get  a  letter of  this nature  next  Monday,  immediately  after a 
part-session,  I  would  send  it to  the  committee  concerned.  I  would  agree  with 
the  President  of  Parliament  that  it was  an  important  topic.  If  the  European 
Parliament  is  not  yet· able  to  pass  laws,  it  is  an  important  debating  chamber 
for  ideas,  which  are  of  concern  to  us  for  the  future,  and  so  it would  be 
useful  for  us  to  deliver  an  opinion.  At  least  in  that  way  the  Belgian 
Parliament  would  have  had  to  deliver  an  opinion  and  to  concern  itself with  the 
matter.  The  MEPs  would  be  aware  of that.  Of  course,  you  have  Belgian  MEPs 
here,  but  they aren't  just  here  to  defend  Belgian  interests.  They  are  Looking 
at  things  from  the  European  point  of  view.  So,  to  follow  the  Swiss  model,  the 
Belgian  canton  would  have  given  its point  of  view  in  the  chamber  of  cantons. 
I  think  we  must  start dovetailing  the  European  Parliament's opinion  with 
national  opinions  on  European  matters  because  they  are of national  concern. 
As  a  second  simple  idea,  perhaps  once  a  year  - at  your  initiative,  Mr 
President, - one  could  hold  a  European  day  in  the  12  national  parliaments  and 
this  year's  subject  could  be  one  thing,  next  year's  another.  There  would  be 
an  agreement  between  the  12  speakers  and  yourself that  there would  be  a  debate 
on  the  same  subject  in  all  12  parliaments  on  the  same  day.·  Of  course  all 
sorts of different  ideas  would  be  thrown  up,  but  never  mind!  The  12  national 
parliaments  would  have  been  playing an  important  role  in  the  European  debate 
on  that  same  day.  Even  if you  don't  yet  have  full  powers,  you  can  still throw 
out  important  ideas. 
The  third  idea  is a  combination  of the first  two.  On  important  subjects,  four 
or five  times  a  year you  could  have  a  joint meeting  of  the  12  parliamentary 
committees  concerned  with  the  European  Parliament  committees  concerned.  They 
would  number  perhaps  240  people  altogether, comprising  20  members  from  each 
committe&  concerned.  Afterwards  you  would  have  to draw  the strings of  the 
different debates together  in  the  European  Parliament.  I  feel  that  your 
debating  chamber  role would  be  strengthened  in this  way.  Our  agricultural 
ministers or  our  foreign affairs ministers  meet  together  in  the Council,  and 
they  know  that their national  parliaments  have  given  certain opinions  on 
certain matters  and  they  take those  into account.  We  need  to  have  a  parallel 
to that next  year  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the national 
parliaments. 
- 78  -As  for  the  European  Parliament's  governmental  role  in  the  future,  national 
parliaments  have  a  governmental  role.  Public  opinion  has  a  very  simplified 
view  of  what  happens  in  a  national  parliament,  and  so  the  political parties 
have  tended  to distort things  and  play  an  excessively  important  role.  They 
simplify debates  in  the  media  and  so  parliamentary debates  end  up  in  the 
shade.  Thus  the  political parties,  the  parties organizing  the  actual 
campaigns,  tend  to  pre-empt  debate  in  the  national  parliament. 
I  think  there  is  a  more  complex  situation  in  the  European  Parliament.  We  have 
political  parties that  belong  to political federations.  I  think  there  are  75 
parties  represented  in  the  European  Parliament  but  they're not  really 
organized outside  the  European  Parliament.  And  so  the  role of  the  political 
groups  is  very  important  in  the  European  Parliament.  Whereas  nationally  there 
is  less  coordination  in  parliaments  between  the parties because  they  have 
strong federations  outside  parliament  that  back  them  up,  that  does  not  exist 
at  the  European  level.  So  you  achieve  more  coordination  sometimes  in  the 
European  Parliament  than  we  do  in  the national  parliaments. 
To  conclude,  with  the  year  2000  in  mind  we  must  together try to benefit  from 
increasing  inter-independence,  but  that  inter-independence  has  to  be 
organized.  We  have  to organize  links,  liaisons  between  the  European 
Parliament  and  national  parliaments  in order to  make  up  for  that democratic 
deficit which  we  all deplore. 
Professor  VANDAMME: 
Thank  you  very much,  President  Nothomb,  for  that  address,  which  included  very 
specific proposals for enhanced  cooperation between  the  European  Parliament 
and  its national  counterparts.  I  now  turn to  Mr  FAlCIAl,  Director of  the 
Private Office of  President  Spadolini,  President of the  Italian Senate,  who  is 
to deliver a  message  from  President  Spadolini. 
- 79  -Mr  FALCIAI,  Director of  the  Private  Office of  the  President  of  the  Italian 
Senate: 
Thank  you.  President  of  the  European  Parliament,  President  of  TEPSA,  Speakers 
of  the  national  parliaments,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
We  are  at  a  political  juncture  when  the  process  of  European  integration  is 
well  underway,  and  so  it is  most  opportune  to  follow  up  this  initiative by  the 
European  Parliament  and  to  reflect  on  the  results of  the  research  carried  out 
by  the  TEPSA.  Over  the  last  10  years,  significant  progress  has  been  made 
towards  the  strengthening of  the  powers  of  the  European  Parliament,  and 
through  the exercise of  those  powers  there  has  been  an  improvement  of  the 
political  representativity of the  Parliament  and  its components.  But  it must 
be  said  that  this  process  of  consolidation is a  long  way.from  reaching  its 
final  destination.  We  still have  a  long  way  to go  before  we  achieve  a 
Community  organism  which  is able  actually to  make  an  incisive  impact  on  the 
legislative procedure  and  on  the  whole  process of  hammering  out  political 
guidelines.  Parliament still does  not  yet  have  sufficient powers  in the  whole 
area  of  the  raising of  revenue  and  the  management  of  revenue. 
I  think it is also desirable with  this  in  mind  to  give  new  life to the  idea  of 
improving  the dissemination of  ideas  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
national  parliaments.  The  idea of achieving  within  4 years  the Internal 
Market  with  over  300  million  consumers  is a  political  idea  of  very  high 
profile.  In  fact it will bring about  the most  significant  change  that  we've 
seen  in the Community  for  the  last half  century.  This  is the backdrop  to the 
present  and  the future of the  Member  States of the  Community  and  it's also 
important for those  countries  which  would  like to  join the  Community. 
There  is a  change· on  the international  scene  which  is of  importance  to the 
Community  as  well.  We  will  be  seeing new  potential  for  dialogue between  the 
EEC  and  COMECON  and  the  Member  States of both  bodies.  These  changes  on  the 
international  scene  increase  the  importance  of  giving  the  European  Parliament 
a  more  incisive political  role.  Parliament  has  to be  given  greater 
representativity in  order  to  have  greater  influence on  international 
relations.  The  enhanced  dialogue between  the  Member  States of the  Community 
- 80  -and  Eastern  European  countries  is  something  that  is  happening  at  the  moment 
and  we  don't  know  where  exactly this  process  will  take  us,  but  it  is 
absolutely  indispensable  that,  in  order  to  face  up  to  future  challenges,  there 
should  be  greater political  integration between  the  countries  of  Western 
Europe. 
Of  course,  this  widening  of  the  international  scene- the  fact  that  we  will 
have  improved  relations  with  Eastern  Europe  - doesn't  mean  that  we  are  going 
to  turn  our  backs  on  our  traditional  and  indispensable  relations  with  the 
United  States  which  have,  since the  Marshall  Plan,  been  of  capital  importance 
for  Europe.  Again,  the  emerging  role of the  Pacific  area  and  the  increasingly 
dominant  role  of  Japan  are  of  significance  for  the  Community,  which  has 
ever-closer and  more  fruitful  links  with  that  part of  the  world. 
In  a  few  months  the  European  elections will  be  taking  place  again  and  when  the 
European  electors  go  to  the  ballot  box  they  will  be  reftecting their social, 
political  and  cultural  interests.  But  whatever  happens,  these elections  will 
be  not  just a  reflection of different party programmes  in  the different 
countries,  but  also an  implicit  judgement  on  what  the  European  Parliament  has 
been  doing  over  the  last  few  years  and  a  judgement  of  the  impact  the  European 
Parliament  has  had  on  the  life of our  citizens.  In  fact,  the  study carried 
out  by  the  Trans-European  Policy  Studies  Association  looks  at  the  links 
between  the  European  Parliament  and  the  people  it represents  and,  in  fact,  the 
area  that  the  European  Parliament  represents  is a  huge  geographical  area  which 
is probably going  to become  even  greater. 
I  have  the  honour  of  representing the  Senate  of the Italian Republic  here  and 
the Senate is fully committed  to bringing about  the  successful  completion  of 
the  Internal  Market.  In  fact,  I  can  say on  behalf of the  Senate  that  we  are 
going  to  do  all we  can  to strengthen democracy  in  the  Community  and  to 
construct political union  in  Europe. 
But  there are institutional  links which  we  still have  to strengthen or  even  in 
some  cases  create.  It's wrong  to think that  the  European  Parliament  will  be 
stronger if it is completely  free of shackles.  I  think it would  be  a  mistaken 
judgement  to  think  that  an  independent  Parliament,  which  is  independent  of 
national  parliaments,  will  have  more  power.  On  the  contrary,  I  think  the 
- 81  -Parliament  can  only  have  full  autonomy  if there  is greater  institutional 
inter-dependence  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the  national  parliaments. 
In  my  view,  the  European  Parliament  and  the  national  parliaments  should  not 
ignore  each  other or  turn  their backs  on  each  other.  On  behalf of  the  Senate 
of  the  Italian  Republic,  I  would  like  to  offer you  my  best  wishes  for  your 
work  on  the  results  of  the  research  project  of  the  TEPSA. 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  I  am  happy  to  welcome  Mr  Andriessen,  Vice-President  of 
the  EEC  Commission,  who  has  just  arrived.  We  are  very  happy,  Mr 
Vice-President,  that  you  could  attend our  Symposium  this morning,  and  I  give 
you  the  floor  for  your  address. 
Mr  Frans  ANDRIESSEN,  Vice-President  of the  European  Commission: 
Europe  today  can  look  forward  to a  period  in  which  the democratic  values  which 
we  share will  find  a  higher degree  of expression  in  our  Community 
institutions.  A series of problems  which,  at  times,  held  up  this  process, 
have  been  overcome.  The  Common  Agricultural  Policy has  been  reformed;  our 
budgetary difficulties have  been  solved, at  least  for  a  considerable  period 
ahead;  the vital  task of  completing  the  internal  market  by  1992  has  captured 
the  imagination  of our  citizens and  consigned  Euro-pessimism  to  the  scrap  heap 
of  history;  the  Single  European  Act  has  provided  a  firm  basis  for  achieving  a 
working  democracy  at  European  level. 
The  Community's  institutions are moving  in  the  right direction but  are  they 
moving  quickly enough?  The  European  Parliament  will play a  key  role  in 
setting the pace  in the years  ahead. 
The  third direct elections to the  European  Parliament  in  June  1989  are 
extremely  important,  more  important  than ever before, because  after 10  years, 
the  electorate is becoming  more  critical and  demanding.  What,  it is asking, 
can  we  expect  from  Parliament  in  the next  few  years? 
Parliament  has  already  strengthened its role  in the  Community's  complex 
institutional arrangements  and  we  in  the  Commission  welcome  this. 
- 82  -New  inter-institutional  relations  are  being  established,  and  the  formal 
amendments  to  the  Treaties  made  by  the  Single  Act  are  being  reinforced  by 
better working  arrangements. 
Three  innovations  can  be  mentioned  in  this  respect.  First,  Parliament  has 
increased  its  influence  in  the  assent  procedure  for  the  Community's  external 
agreements  as  its  'avis  conforme'  is  now  required  for  their  implementation. 
In  several  recent  cases  the  exercise of this  influence  has  led  the  Community 
to  reflect  more  carefully on  its  relations  with  the  countries  concerned  and 
obliged  these  countries  to  take  into  account  the  views  expressed  in 
Parliament. 
Secondly,  Parliament  has  acquired  real  legislative powers  through  the 
cooperation  procedure  introduced  by  the  Single  European  Act.  Thirdly,  the 
inter-institutional  agreement  on  budgetary discipline,  reached  as  a  follow-up 
to  the  Single  Act,  has  strengthened Parliament's  position  in  the budgetary 
process  which  should  now  function  more  smoothly  than  in  the past.  Parliament 
is  thus  gradually becoming  a  political body  exercising certain powers 
comparable  to  those  enjoyed  by  national  parliaments. 
But  these  additional  powers  cannot  yet  be  taken  for  granted.  The  Community 
is  going  through  a  kind  of  running-in  period  in  which  these powers  are  being 
tested.  The  cooperation  procedure  can  function  smoothly  only  if it is 
implemented  by  Parliament  with  considerable discipline.  Our  first 
experiences  in this  regard are  encouraging.  As  far  as  the  Commission  is 
concerned,  its position  in  the  cooperation procedure  is  somewhat  delicate as 
it runs  the  risk  in exercising its right of  initiative of  being  sandwiched 
between  Parliament  and  the  Council. 
The  Commission  and  Parliament  should strive for  the widest  possible agreement 
at  the first  reading  stage  in order to avoid difficulties at  second  reading, 
following  the  Council's adoption  of a  Common  Position. 
There  are other  recurrent  problems  in the functioning of the  Community's 
institutions which  have  not  been  eliminated despite the progress  achieved. 
Parliament's  legislative powers  are still rather restricted and  cannot  always 
overcome  obstructions  encountered  elsewhere  in  the  system. 
- 83  -The  Council  still tends  to  block  the  final  adoption  of  certain proposals  for 
inordinate  periods.  Parliament  should,  together  with  the  Commission,  develop 
n~w techniques  for  overcoming  such  obstructions. 
Parliament  should  establish  its  own  priorities  and  insist  on  them.  It  should 
experiment  with  new  means  for  challenging  the  Council,  especially where  it  is 
responsible  for  delaying  proposals  on  which  Commission  and  Parliament  are 
agreed.  Despite  the  use  which  MEPs  make  of  Question  Time  and  other 
opportunities  to  put  us  on  our  mettle,  Parliament  still has  no  equivalent  of 
the  powers  of  a  national  legislature to  press  Ministers  for  explanations  and 
action. 
Parliament's  identity  in  the  inter-institutional triangle  is still somewhat 
ambiguous.  It is very  much  a  Parliament  sui  generis.  We  cannot  expect 
further  amendments  to  the  Treaties  in  the near  future  and  so  Parliament's 
identity must  be  asserted  in  its daily work  and  through  its relations  with 
other  Community  institutions.  Although  progress  has  been  made  by  Parliament 
in  influencing the decision-making  processes  of the  Commission  and  the 
Council,  the  European  Council,  which  was  given  formal  recognition  in  the 
Single  Act,  still remains  beyond  Parliament's  reach.  We  should  give  careful 
consideration  to  ways  in  which  this gap  can  be  filled so  as  to ensure  that  the 
Heads  of  State  and  Government  can,  in their deliberations,  take  fully  into 
account  Parliament's  views. 
The  European  Parliament  and  its Members  have  built up  a  good  reputation over 
the  last 10  years.  It has  promoted  a  series of initiatives notably  related 
to  the  environment  and  to transport.  If we  have  made  progress  in  these 
fields, it is in no  small  measure  thanks  to Parliament. 
When  direct elections were  introduced, it was  stated that  Parliament  should  be 
granted wider  powers  and  some  progress  has  been  made  in this direction. 
Where  it has  exercised its powers,  Parliament  has  acted  in  a  responsible  way. 
Parliament  has  demonstrated  that it is fully equipped  to participate in the 
legislative and  policy making  process.  There  is therefore  reason  for 
optimism  in  presenting Parliament  to the electorate in 1989. 
- 84  -Nevertheless  the  Community  still suffers  from  a  certain  'democratic  deficit' 
and  Parliament  should  seize every  opportunity  for  overcoming  it during  the 
years  ahead. 
Thank  you  very  much,  Vice-President  of  the  Commission,  for  that  substantial 
contribution  to  our  debate.  I  think  that  you've  really drawn  up  a  balance 
sheet  of  progress  towards  democracy  in  the  European  Communities  and  have  made 
a  fundamental  contribution  to  the  work  done  by  this  symposium.  I  now  call  on 
Professor Grabitz  to  introduce  the  General  report  to  the  session. 
Professor  Eberhard  GRABITZ,  Free  University of Berlin: 
President,  Members  of  Parliament,  Colleagues,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
At  this  colloquium,  our  business  is to  look  at  the  legal  and  political  status 
of  the  European  Parliament  in the triad of  Community  institutions.  Our  main 
concern  is what  contribution the  European  Parliament  can  make  to  help  the 
Communities  to  function  smoothly  and  how  it can  best  send  its message  out  to 
its electorate.  In  this  company,  I  need  not  stress that  the  role of  the 
European  Parliament  can  hardly be  compared  to the  rote discharged  by  the 
national  parliaments,  as  has  been  said this morning.  It would  appear  to  me 
that  insufficient thought  has  gone  into the  role which  the  Parliament  should 
have  in the  Community  system,  in the  Community  scheme  of things.  If a  legal 
expert  were  describing this  in terms  of its constitutional  format,  then  no 
doubt  the phrase,  as  Vice-President  Andriessen  has  said,  would  be  that this 
Parliament  is sui  generis.  The  purpose  of this  symposium  will  be  to  focus  on 
that  concept  and  to try to give it a  clearer form. 
Therefore,  on  behalf of the academic  and  scientific community  represented 
here,  I  would  like to convey  a  word  of thanks  to President  Plumb  for  having 
convoked  this  symposium,  which  brings together academics,  legal  experts,  those 
involved  in  the  media  and  parliamentarians  in order  to  have  an  exchange  of 
views. 
- 85  -In  holding  this  colloquium,  I  think  we  can  look  back  to  past  events.  In  May 
1974,  something  similar took  place  in  Luxembourg,  and  the  subject  then  was 
'European  Integration and  the  Future  of  Parliaments  in  Europe'.  At  the  time 
much  attention  was  paid  to  the  concept  of  European  crisis.  It was  being  said 
that  the  role  of  parliaments  was  diminishing  and  that  the  Nine  at  the  time 
were  unhappy  with  their own  parliaments'  functions;  this  was  the  backdrop 
against  which  we  looked  at  the  future  of  the  European  Parliament. 
14  years  later we  have,  I  think,  been  vindicated  by  the  way  things  have  gone 
since  then.  Some  of  the  demands  which  were  made  in  1974  have  now 
materialized.  We've  seen  direct elections,  and  we  have  seen  a  number  of  other 
major  changes  in  the  way  in  which  Parliament  has  been  vested with  extra  powers 
in  the budgetary  process,  for  example,  and  recently  in  the  cooperation 
procedure.  Many  commentators  and,  I  believe, a  majority of  parliamentarians 
themselves  are  not  by  any  stretch of the  imagination  fully satisfied with  the 
way  in  which  things  have  gone.  There  is discontent  with  the  way  in which 
Parliament  has  developed,  because  the  Council,  and  the  governments  and  states 
represented  in  Council,  is still the  legislator in  the  Community  rather  than 
the  Parliament,  and  therefore it is difficult  to describe  t~e European 
Parliament  as  a  legislative body  in  any  real  sense. 
A further  ground  for  discontent  is the poor  coverage  which  Parliament's  work 
receives  in  the press,  on  television and  in the other media.  The  citizens of 
Europe  need  to  understand  the objectives  and  the goals  which  their elected 
representatives are  pursuing.  The  European  elections so  far  have  primarily 
been  conducted  in national  terms  and  this,  I  think, must  give  us  concern  as  we 
look  forward  to the third round  of  European  elections next  June.  Because  in 
this  case too  I  feel  that the elections will  not  be  held  under  exclusively 
European  banners. 
So  this  is the present stat• of affairs, and  this is why  TEPSA,  the 
Trans-European  Policy Studies  Association,  has  been  trying to bring together 
those  who  are  working  in this field  in order to produce  a  new  template which 
will  set  us  thinking  about  research  and  about  where  the  European  Parliament  is 
going.  Now  that this process  is underway  and  has  benefited from  wide  support, 
on  behalf of  TEPSA  we  express our  warm  thanks  that  this  has  been  made 
possible. 
- 86  -We  have  produced  a  comprehensive  report  which  is available  and  which  I  commend 
to  you.  It provides  us  with  a  synopsis  of  the  reflection which  is  underway  in 
the  various  academic  circles.  It  is  a  paper  of  consensus,  for  it contains 
proposals,  suggestions  and  reflections  which  have  been  brought  together  in 
this  text  from  all parts  of  the  spectrum. 
Thi5  is  a  major  research  project  which  can  be  summarized  under  four  chapter 
headings.  First,  we  examine  the  differences  and  the  commonality  between 
national  parliaments  and  the  European  Parliament,  looking  at  the  functions  of 
parliament  and  the  idiosyncrasies  of  the different political systems 
concerned.  Second,  we  look  at  new  concepts  for  the  European  Parliament. 
Third,  we  examine  an  interim assessment  of  the  functioning of  the  European 
Parliament  since  the  first direct  elections  in  1979.  And  the  fourth  chapter 
heading  fulfils a  widely-felt  need,  in  tight of developments,  to  look  at 
options  and  scenarios  and  strategies  for  the  future  of the  European 
Parliament. 
The  first  of  these  four  aspects  concerns  itself with  the differences  and  the 
commonality  between  national  parliaments  and  their European·counterpart.  It 
is  a  question  which  is of  significance because  the political  community  has 
expectations  and  assumed  attitudes ·towards  the  European  Parliament  and  very 
often  they  are  marked  by  national  experience  and  a  national  background.  There 
is not  just one  exclusive monolithic  view  of the  way  a  parliament  works. 
There  are  many  views,  which  will  stem  from  national traditions and  heritage, 
from  different political creeds,  and  from  different day-to-day political 
experience  as  well. 
There  is one  thing which  stems  from  the national  parliamentary heritage which 
all our  Member  States  have  in  common  and  this is  inter-penetration in  terms  of 
the national  parliamentary systems,  even  though  in different  countries  there 
are  constitutional  restrictions placed upon  this, such  as  the constitutional 
prerogatives of the  French  President, or the peculiarities of the federal 
system  in  West  Germany.  In  terms  of political theory, other attributes or 
functions  of parliaments  can  be  enumerated  as  was  done  14  years  ago  in  the 
first colloquium.  There  is the  legislative function,  the  function of  forming 
- 87  -governments,  the  surveillance or  control  function,  the  function  of 
representativeness,  and  the  function  of  recruitment,  in  other words  as  the 
place  where  political  leaders  can  be  trained. 
These  are  different  attributes of  parliaments  and  there are  major  variations 
from  one  parliament  to  another  and  also  over  time  and  through  history.  In 
studies  which  have  been  carried out,  attempts  were  made  to  look  at  those 
traditional  attributes of  parliaments  and  to  try  to  apply  them  in  the  context 
of  the  European  Parliament,  and  very  often  the  result  was  unsatisfactory. 
When  one  tried to  measure  the  European  Parliament  by  those  particular tests 
the  European  Parliament  could  not  elect  a  European  government,  nor  does  it 
have  proper  legislative functions  which  would  be  comparable  to  those  of 
national  parliaments.  Any  analysis  of  the  European  Parliament  which  looks  at 
the  attributes  and  functions  of  national  parliaments  would  by  necessity  lead 
one  to  the  verdict  that  the  European  Parliament  is  capable  of  improvement. 
Therefore  I  think  there  is not  a  great deal  of  mileage  in  this academic 
approach,  and  that  to try to  apply  traditional  national  standards  to  the 
European  Parliament  leads us  to  something  of  a  methodological  impasse.  We 
need  a  template  and  a  model  for  the  European  Parliament  which  would  be 
different  from  national  experience  but  which  would  be  guided  by  that. 
We  believe that  the  correct method  has  been  outlined by  TEPSA  in  its programme 
of  research,  in other words  looking  at  a  real  authentic  programme  and  a  model 
for  the  European  Parliament  which  describes  the  European  Parliament's  present 
attributes and  functions,  and  takes  account  of at  least  two  aspects  of 
European  political realities at the  end  of the  second  millenium.  The  first 
reality to be  built in to the academic  appraisal  of  things  had  to be  the 
expectations which  are vested by  the political community  in the development  of 
the  European  Parliament.  When  I  talk about  the political community  I  mean 
first  and  foremost  the electorate, but  also the politicians, the political 
classes  and  those  in politics and  in  the media  who  communicate  that message 
towards  the  outside world. 
These  expectations  were  considerable  in  the  run-up  to the  1979  direct 
election.  At  that  time  expectations  pursued  three different  avenues.  First, 
the  political  community  and  the public  expected  the  European  direct  elections 
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Second,  there  was  the  hope  that  this  would  have  positive  repercussions  on  the 
future  process  of  unification  within  the  Community  as  a  whole.  And  third, 
there  was  the  hope  that  there  would  be  a  positive effect on  the  efficiency of 
the  decision-making  procedure  within  the  Community,  because  a  Parliament  in 
which  more  poHers  were  vested,  a  Parliament  deciding  by  majorities  would  - it 
was  hoped  by  many  observers  - help  the  Community  to  transcend  its 
decision-making  difficulties.  The  political  community  and  the  public  at  Large 
hoped  and  expected  that  in  the  wake  of direct  elections  we  would  see  an 
institutional  reinforcement  and  consolidation of  the  European  Parliament.  We 
have  seen  that  this  reinforcement,  that this  strengthening of  Parliament's 
position  since  1979  has  really only  taken  place  in  a  very  mitigated  form. 
Now  the  reason  for  this  is, we  would  suggest,  grounded  in  the  structures of 
the political  system  within  which  the  European  Parliament  has  to exist,  has  to 
act  and  has  to operate.  This  is  a  system  which  must  be  viewed  as  a  nexus,  or 
as  an  interpenetration.  This  is  a  concept  which  is very  prevalent  in  the 
German  academic  debate:  the  nexus  position of the  European  Parliament. 
This  introduces  the  second  reality on  which  our  reflections were  based:  the 
Parliament's position  in  the triad of  Community  institutions. 
But  let  me  try to explain  what  I  mean  by  the  concept  of interpenetration or 
nexus.  The  nexus  does  not  simply  encompass  the  Community  with  its treaty 
powers  and  its treaty institutions.  It would  extend  to a  series of  Community 
activities such  as  European  fiscal  cooperation,  the  European  monetary  system, 
or other systems  such  as  the  EUREKA  research activities.  This  nexus  of 
Community  activities is also marked  by  a  close mutual  interdependence between 
the  European  Community  on  the one  hand  and  the  Member  States on  the other. 
This  extends to all  the  areas of political activity. 
As  we  can  now  see the  Community  is not  growing  into a  traditional  federal 
entity, nor  has  it degenerated  into a  kind of group  of  concentric  circles 
where  individual  groups  of  countries pursue different objectives.  It has 
become  something  quite different from  that. 
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recent  ~ast shown  three  trends  which  are  observable.  First  of  all,  looking  at 
the  scope  of  European  activities, clearly the  circle has  been  much  extended. 
More  and  more  important  political  positions  are  being  considered  and  finally 
adopted  at  the  European  Community  level.  In  the  second  place,  part  of  this 
extended  scope  of activities of  the  Communities  does  correspond  to  a  transfer 
of  powers,  although  this  has  been  limited.  Instead  of  clear powers  being 
invested  in  the  Community,  Member  States  have  time  and  again  used  pragmatic 
machinery  to  provide  packages  of  national  desiderata.  One  example  of this  has 
heen  the  EMS,  which  was  put  together  in  that  way.  Thirdly,  decision-making 
procedures  within  that  nexus  of  institutions take  a  long  time  and  have  proved 
cumbersome.  This  is  no  doubt  due  to  the  fact  that  everyone  has  to  be 
consensus-minded  and  that  means  that  both  national  and  Community 
decision-makers  had  to  be  involved  in  that  process.  This  means  in  turn  that 
it is difficult  to  have  an  efficient decision-making  procedure. 
This  is  something  which  has  not  been  fully achieved  and  is  compounded  by  the 
fact  that  the  national  administrations still  loom  very  large  in the  European 
Community  decision-making  procedure.  As  a  result  Parliament  tends  to  be 
eclipsed, despite its representativity and  its  legitimacy  as  a 
directly-elected parliament.  Very  often the process of  building the  Community 
has  led  to  a  diminution of the  role of the  Parliament  in that  process. 
So  within this  nexus  we  have  to  look  at  the  way  in  which  powers  are  allocated 
and  there  is  a  large grey area.  Much  research  remains  to  be  done  and  much 
more  thought  is  required in order to  provide  legal  certainty, because  that  is 
not  just the  sole preserve of the  Court  of Justice  in  Luxembourg;  it has  to be 
achieved as part of a  wider  process. 
As  we  examine  the nexus  of the  institutions  let us  look  at  them  from  the 
vantage  point of the  Parliament  for  the moment.  We  will  see that that 
institution has  real  difficulties in  finding  its place within  the  Triad.  The 
institutional  status of  the  Parliament  extends  to areas  such  as agricultural 
policy, or  commercial  policy, and  the  Parliament still has  much  to  complain 
about  because  of  the  way  in which  it is  consulted.  On  the one  hand,  it has 
budgetary powers  which,  for  example,  give it a  margin  for  manoevure  within  the 
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vote  of  no  confidence;  and  under  the  terms  of  the  Single  European  Act  it can 
give  its assent  to  association  and  accession  treaties  and  agreements. 
In  ter~s of  legislation,  on  the  other  hand,  it has  a  consultative  capacity, 
and  if anything  its  role  is  a  negative  rather  than  a  constructive one.  In  the 
overall  nexus  of  the  Community  system  Parliament  has  to  base  itself on  the 
powers  exercised  by  the  Community,  although  often  these  are  beyond  its direct 
control.  In  regard  to  European  Political  Cooperation  and  EUREKA  the 
Parliament  has  been  effectively taken  out  of the decision-making  circle, and 
until  such  time  as  these  powers  are  transferred  to the  Community  they  will 
continue  to  be  an  extension  of  the  scope  of  the  Communities•  activities, but 
the  Parliament  will  not  make  any  major  headway  in establishing its 
credentials. 
The  Parliament  therefore needs  to  have  a  strategy for  institutional  reform 
which  must  take  into  account  the  following  parameters:  first, enhancing  its 
own  status within  the  interplay of  the  institutions within  the  Community;  and 
second,  further  extensions  and  evolutions  in the  Communities  themselves.  The 
future  role of  the  Parliament  will  depend  on  whether  it can  help  to  strengthen 
the  Communities•  institutions and  whether  it can  better assert  itself within 
the nexus  of  institutions. 
Now  the  second  chapter is concerned  with  new  concepts,  new  projects  for  the 
Parliament  and  I  would  like briefly to  summarise  the  thinking on  this  subject. 
Within  the  Community  nexus,  and  remembering  the expectations which  the 
political community  and  the public at  large  have  vested  in  the  Parliament, 
there are three real  tasks which  are  part  and  parcel  of the political 
functions of the  European  Parliament.  We  believe that the  Parliament  has  a 
function  whereby  it looks  at existing policies  in  the  Community  and  has  its 
say  in  forming  those policies.  It is  involved  in the political process  by 
means  of parliamentary initiatives, by  exerting influence on  the 
decision-making  proeess  itself and  subsequently on  down-stream  surveillance 
and  scrutiny of the decisions  which  are taken. 
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develop  the  Community  system.  This  is  done  by  means  of  its proposals  on 
detailed extensions  and  transfers  of  power,  so  that  areas  of  responsibility 
can  be  transferred  from  national  to  Community  Level,  and  also by  developing 
inter-institutional  relationships  in  order  to  make  its contribution  towards 
democratisation;  this  I  think  is  a  systemic  function  which  the  Parliament  can 
discharge.  The  third area  of  responsibility  is  in  terms  of  interaction 
between  the  European  Parliament  and  the  voters,  the  electorate,  because  the 
Parliament  can  articulate,  can  represent  and  protect  the  interests of  the 
electorate and  certainly pass  on  the  message  of  future  plans  to  the  public  to 
keep  them  informed.  This  is  a  kind  of  inter-active  role,  if you  like. 
As  we  look  at  the past  performance  of  the  Parliament  since  1979  I  think  one 
can  form  an  assessment  of  how  things  have  gone.  I  would  not  intend  to  do  this 
in  detail,  as  you  will  find  this  in  the  documentation  for  this  symposium.  The 
working  groups  will  of  course  also  be  able  to trace the  different  trends,  and 
developments.  Examination  of  the  literature will  also  help  to  form  an 
impression  of  where  Parliament  is, of  how  far Parliament  has  come,  and  whether 
it is  likely to  go  further  in  the  future.  The  papers  will  also  indicate the 
kind  of  strategy which  is  required  to  help  it reach  those objectives  with  the 
passing of  time. 
At  this  time  I  would  like very briefly to offer a  few  thoughts  on  an  inventory 
of  the  Parliament's  progress to date.  Any  overview  of  Parliament's  track 
record  should  stress that  in terms  of formulating  policy, particularly in 
terms  of its initiatives, its new  activities and  also in  surveillance and  the 
control  function,  Parliament's achievements  are  clear and  undisputed.  In 
terms  of Parliament's  powers,  fresh  political ground  is being  opened  up  in 
areas  such  as  research  and  development  and  environment,  and  there  is  room  in 
these  ar~as for a  greater say  for  Parliament  than  in  the  more  traditional 
Community  areas,  such  as  commercial  or  farm  policy. 
Parliament's track  record  in  terms  of systemic  influence  has,  I  believe, 
produced  its greatest  achievements.  Parliament's draft treaty on  European 
Union  was  an  achievement  where  Parliament  pursued  a  twin-pronged  strategy.  It 
first  had  to  produce  the  comprehensive  draft of the  Treaty  founding  the 
European  Union  on  the one  hand,  and  then on  the other it continued  to  pursue 
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improvements.  This  policy of  the  short  steps  has  perhaps  been  more  successful 
thnn  the  gre~t  leap  forward  towards  European  Union. 
However  the  biggest  deficit  has  been  in  the  third  function,  the  interactive 
function  between  the  elected  body  and  the  electorate.  We  must  not  forget  that 
every  member  represents  about  600  000  voters  and  of  course  it  is difficult  to 
keep  up  constant  regular  contacts  with  that  size of  constitutency.  Nor  has  it 
been  possible  for  the  national  parties  really to  function  as  a  conveyor  belt 
for  thinking  coming  from  the  European  Parliament  itself.  So  in  order  to 
improve  that  communication  function  Parliament  will,  I  think,  have  to  enhance 
its presentation of  developments  in  the media  and  through  the  media. 
Let  me  now  move  on  to  the  question of the strategies which  Parliament  can  now 
embark  upon.  In  our  report  we  made  the  case  that  in  future  Parliament  should 
continue  to  pursue  a  twin  policy.  In  the first  place  its draft  treaty 
founding  the  European  Union  must  be  updated  in order to  take  account  of  the 
input  from  national  parliaments,  so  that  the electorate can  have  a  clearer 
picture  of  the  link  between  national  parliaments  and  Parliament.  Second,  the 
policy of  small  steps  must  also be  taken  one  stage  further.  As  things  stand -
and  this  has  been  echoed  in  interventions this morning  - the Parliament  is 
more  than  just a  formal  sounding  board,  which  reflects  Community  policy 
initiatives.  The  government-forming  function  is something  else which  will 
have  to  be  improved  upon,  judging by  Parliament's  past  experience. 
The  present,  and  of  course the  future,  function of the  Parliament  can  I  think 
best  be  described as  a  co-player on  the  institutional board.  This  will 
involve  Parliament's  becoming  a  power  in  the  land  within  the  institutional 
framework  of the  Communities,  asserting itself and  becoming  involved  in  such  a 
way  that it can  exert  political  influence without  wishing  to usurp  the 
functions  of other institutions. 
And  it is  important  in that  sense  that it can  reassert itself vis-a-vis  the 
other institutions.  Vice-President  Andriessen  described  the  role of 
Parliament  and  talked  about  the  institutional triad in  terms  of the nexus 
between  the  institutions.  The  Parliament  will  have  to continue  to be  a  player 
on  the  stage and  will  have  to work  with  the national  parliaments  as  well. 
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It  is vital  that  in  future  no  major  political decisions  can  be  taken  without 
the  Parliament  being  heard  out.  In  this  process  we  must  ensure  that  this 
provides  not  only  democratic  legitimacy but  also efficiency.  The  players  have 
to  cooperate  with  Parliament  and  act  on  the  same  stage  and  they  must  be 
involved  in  such  a  way  that  a  consensus  can  be  arrived at  at  the  end  of  the 
day. 
If  Parliament  is going  to  assert  itself on  the  stage as  a  fully  fledged  player 
then  Parliament  will  have  to  be  involved  in  initiating policies,  in 
decision-making,  in  surveillance,  and  as  a  fully  fledged  player  in  the 
institutional process.  I  am  convinced  that  co-decision must  be  placed  centre 
stage,  because  Parliament  will  have  to be  involved  in  a  very  delicate 
decision-making  process.  It will  have  to establish  its credentials  so  that it 
can  have  its say  on  all  important  matters  of  Community  business;  and  this  is 
not  only  a  legal,  but  a political  imperative  as  well. 
We  have  presented a  number  of  proposals  which  would  also help  to extend  the 
cooperation  procedure  to all the  legislative activities of the  Community, 
extending  to  an  electoral system  which  would  also have  a  bearing on  the  way  in 
which  the  candidates  are selected.  We  believe that  there  is  room  for  the 
Parliament  to assert itself and,  in the process  leading  to the achievement  of 
a  single market  by  1992,  to  strengthen its role  within  the  institutional 
concept. 
Therefore as  a  kind  of synopsis  of our  investigation  we  think that the time 
has  come  for a  new  model  by  which  to guide  the  European  Parliament  which  is 
not  predicated or patterned exclusively on  national  parliaments.  My  own 
personal view,  and  I  think  I  speak  on  behalf of  my  colleagues  who  have  worked 
on  the project, is that a  strong and  effective Parliament  is absolutely 
essential.  However,  a  definition of its role must  take account  of 
devetopments  in the  Community  and  in  the  rest of  Europe  in a  wider  sense. 
This  new  definition is something  to which  we  think  we  can  make  a  contribution, 
and  perhaps  at  the  end  of this  Symposium  we  will  have  acquired a  new 
knowledge,  we  will  have  a  better picture of the  lie of the  land.  Thank  you 
very much. 
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I  would  like  to  express  my  gratitude  to  Professor  Grabitz  for  that  very 
substantial  contribution,  which  has  given  us  a  coherent  picture of  the 
different  results  of  the  studies  which  have  been  carried out  on  this  subject. 
Normally  the  coordination  of  different  types  of  research  studies  is  carried 
out  for  TEPSA  by  one  Institute.  In  this  case,  I  would  therefore  like to  thank 
the  Institut  fur  Europaische  Politik,  led  by  Or.  Wessels  in  collaboration  with 
Dr.  Schmuck  and  Professor  Grabitz,  for  coordinating  this  study. 
I  give  the  floor  now  to  Mr  Fernand  Herman,  Member  of  the  European  Parliament 
and  rapporteur  for  the  Institutional  Committee  of the  European  Parliament. 
Mr  Fernand  HERMAN,  MEP,  General  rapporteur of  the  Committee  for  Institutional 
Affairs: 
Mr  C~airman, colleagues,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  one  of  the  conclusions  drawn  by 
the  Institutional  Committee  in  its first  interim  report  on  the  strategies of 
the  European  Parliament  was  to organise conferences  and  symposia  including on 
the one  hand  scientists and  experts  in this field,  and  on  the other 
representatives of national  parliaments.  We  felt  it was  a  good  thing  to  have 
an  exchange  of views  and  perhaps  at the  end  of the day  we  will  be  able  to put 
some  order  into our  house. 
It is  a  good  thing to see that  the first conclusion  that  has  been  drawn  by  the 
Institutional  Committee  is being  crowned  by  extremely fruitful  work,  and  I 
would  therefore  like to thank  TEPSA  very  much  for  the work  that it has  done. 
Because  in fact  the conclusions  which  earlier speakers  have  put  forward  very 
much  coincide with  just about  all the points  raised  in our  Committee.  In 
addition, their contributions  have  introduced a  series of  new  ideas,  and  I  am 
sure  that  we  will  be  able to benefit  from  all these  ideas. 
We  know  that  the building of  Europe  is not  just something  that  is  sui  generis 
but  something  which  is very  much  evolutionary in its process.  When  we  talk 
about  evolution  we  talk about  the  European  ParliaMent  as  the driving  force  of 
this evolution and  this differentiates the  European  Parliament  considerably 
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less  stable  context,  I  say  more  or  Less  because  their powers  are  relatively 
clearly defined,  and  they  play  a  role  within  a  system  which  already exists  and 
which  has  already  been  defined. 
As  far  as  Europe  is  concerned  however  everything  is  constantly on  the  move. 
It  looks  as  if the  Commission  has  reached  the  limits  of  possibility in 
exercising  its dual  roles  as  originator of  legislation and  as  the  driving 
force  towards  the  development  of  the  Community,  particularly as  the 
achievement  of the  latter will  not  be  easy. 
We  in  the  Parliament  often discuss  its  future  role.  Some  argue  that 
Parliament  should  seek  to  augment  its powers  without  regard  to  the other 
institutions, which  have  sufficient  power  themselves.  I  believe this 
argument  is false.  In  assuming  the  function  of  the driving  force  towards 
integration,  Parliament  should  take  account  of the  other  institutions, as  it 
has  done  in  the  'Committology'  case. 
Here  Parliament  intervened to  protect  the  autonomy  of the  Commission,  but  the 
judgement  of  the  Court  of  Justice provokes  many  questions.  Not  only  does  the 
judgement  appear  to  conflict  with  existing  jurisprudence,  but  it confronts  us 
with  the  question of the exact  function of each  institution  in  seeking  respect 
for  the  Treaties.  Up  to  now  we  had  thought  that  any  institution which 
considered that  the  Treaties  were  being  infringed  could  seek  a  judgement  from 
the  Court. 
Now  it appears  that this is not  so, because  the  Commission  will  have  to defend 
the  interests of Parliament  when  they  are  called  into question  by  a  decision 
taken  by  another institution.  But  in  many  cases  the  interests of the 
Commission  and  of Parliament  are  not  coterminous,  and  can  at  times  be  opposed 
to  each  other, and  the manner  in which  the  Commission  can  defend  Parliament's 
interests when  these  are  in  jeopardy presents  a  serious  problem. 
I  believe that  Parliament  should base  its action on  two  principles.  The 
first  is that  of the double  legitimacy - on  the one  hand  of the States, which 
is  incontrovertible and  substantive, and  on  the other of the citizens of  the 
Community,  which  is greater than  the  sum  of purely national  interests. 
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vital  to  emphasise  its  importance  at  a  moment  when  certain  Member  States  argue 
strongly against  the  creation  of  a  European  'super-state', which  will 
steam-roller national  identities.  The  principle of  common  benefit  and  the 
continued  existence of  national  states  is a  fundamental  one,  which  Parliament 
must  defend  and,  in  so  doing,  exercise self restraint.  Why?  Because  all 
Parliaments  are  tempted- as  are  we  ourselves -to seek  the  greatest  power 
possible  and  to  meddle  in  matters  which  are better dealt  with  by  other  bodies. 
So  we  must  spell  out  these  two  principles, and  continue  to  evolve  them  as  we 
are  already doing. 
A major  step  forward  has  been  achieved  in  regard  to  legislative powers.  As 
Vice  President  ANDRIESSEN  said, if the  Delors-Tindemans  amendment  to  the draft 
Single  Act  had  been  adopted,  we  should  by  now  have  been  well  on  the  way  to 
quasi  co-decision.  In  my  view  the  fact  that  the  Council  is  not  subject  to a 
deadline  for  taki~g a  final  decision  is a  serious drawback  in  the 
decision-making  process.  The  need  for  unanimity  in deciding on  fiscal 
harmonisation  may  prevent  this  1992  objective  from  being  achieved,  and  the 
lack  of  a  deadline  for  Council  decision-making  will  have  the  same  effect.  I 
persist  in  thinking that  the  solution  lies  in  the  proposal  that if the  Council 
does  not  take  a  decision  within  a  certain time,  then  Parliament,  basing  itself 
on  the  principle of double  legitimacy,  could  do  so.  This  would  be  one  way  of 
moving  towards  the final  aim  of  co-decision on  legislation. 
As  regards  the budgetary  role of  Parliament,  we  find  the  same  situation.  We 
have  made  progress despite crises and  difficulties, but  once  again  the  way 
ahead  lies in the difficult art of  compromise,  which  demands  moderation  above 
all.  We  are now  further  ahead  of  some  national  Parliaments  as  regards 
budgetary powers,  particularly in  regard to expenditure.  But  much  remains  to 
be  achieved,  especially in the  important  fields  of  financial  autonomy  and  the 
fiscal  powers  of the  Community  itself, which  should  be  our  aim. 
I  turn  now  to control  of the executive  and  to its legitimation, and  here  some 
useful  small  steps  forward  have  been  taken.  In  the Solemn  Declaration of 
Stuttgart the  Governments  undertook  to  consult  Parliament  before  the 
nomination  of  the  President of  the  Commission.  But  we  must  go  further,  and 
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linked  with  the  vote  of  censure.  For  example  a  Commission,  some  of  whose 
members  were  nominated  by  Governments  in  a  manner  which  infringed the 
Treaties,  or  whose  members  clearly did  not  enjoy  the  confidence  of  the  large 
majority of  Parliament's  Members,  would  be  open  to  a  vote  of  censure,  linked 
with  the  vote  on  its investiture.  This  is  a  path  along  which  Parliament 
should  advance. 
Moving  now  to the  strategy of  Parliament  in  the  longer-term,  I  thought  that 
TEPSA's  ideas  were  interesting,  but  three  further  elements  should  be  added. 
The  first  is  the  conjuncture  of  1992  itself, coupled  with  the  fact  that  the 
internal  market  will  call  both  for  stronger  monetary  integration and  for  a 
quasi  government  of the  Community,  in particular  to  manage  relations  with 
third countries.  This  multiple  conjuncture  gives  Parliament  the 
justification and  opportunity to put  forward  in  1992  a  proposal  for  revision 
of  the  Treaties. 
But  further  elements  exist  in  Parliament's  future  strategy in  the  form  of 
levers usable at  present  by  Parliament.  And  the most  important  is the  assent 
required  from  Parliament  to proposals  for  the  accession  of third countries. 
As  the  internal  market  comes  into being,  pressures  for  enlargement  will 
increase.  If  Parliament  resists the temptation  to  throw  open  the doors  to 
eve-ryone,  and  decides  to  safeguard what  has  been  achieved  in  integration, the 
logical  outcome  is to seek  to strengthen the  institutional  structure. 
Whereas  national  Parliaments  won  their powers  by  wielding  the  instrument  of 
the  power  to tax, the  European  Parliament  now  possesses  a  similar  instrument  -
th  assent  procedure - which  it can  use  to  seek  wider  competences. 
It is not  a  case of hindering the  long-term  process of the enlargement  of the 
Community,  but of ensuring that enlargement  does  not  result  in total dilution 
of the  Community's  coherence  and  of the progress  realised towards  European 
Union.  This  imperative  coincides  in turn with  the  need  to  reform  both  the 
decision-making  procedure  and  Community's  ability to conduct  a  coherent 
monetary  policy and  also a  commercial  policy vis-a-vis major  third countries. 
Thus  the  conjuncture of  the date of 1992,  the policy needs  and  the  instrument 
in  Parliament's  hands  offers  to it an  enormous  opportunity,  which  Parliament 
must  seize,  and  seize  in cooperation with  the national  Parliaments. 
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associated  with  this  strategy of  the  European  Parliament.  And  this  process 
is  already  under  way.  President  NOTHOMB's  proposal  for  meetings  between 
committees  of  the  European  Parliament  and  national  Parliaments  is  in  course  of 
being  realised.  For  example,  our  Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs 
has  met  nine  delegations  from  national  Parliaments  to  discuss  fiscal 
harmonisation,  and  the  Institutional  Committee  has  met  two  or  three 
delegations,  in  order  to discuss  institutional questions.  Without  this  type 
of  collaboration  with  national  Parliaments,  our  strategy will  not  succeed. 
I  would  like  to  conclude  by  recalling one  of  Jean  Monnet's  principles,  which 
was,  'If you  wish  to  bring about  institutional change,  link  it to  an  aim  which 
everyone  can  understand'.  The  Single  Act  and  the  internal market  have  given 
a  new  impetus  to  Europe  because  of  the operation of this principle of  Monnet. 
This  situation creates  the  possibility of setting a  new  objective- that of 
economic  and  monetary  union,  a  consensus  in  favour  of  which  is gradually 
developing.  To  this objective,  therefore  should  be  linked that  of  sufficient 
institutional  reform  to  enable  monetary  union  to  be  achieved.  But  at  the 
same  time  the  principle of  common  benefit  (subsidiarity)  remains  of 
fundamental  importance,  as  does  Parliament's opportunity to use  the  new 
instrument  offered to it by  the assent  procedure. 
In  order to  carry forward  its strategy to a  successful  outcome,  there  are  two 
further  approaches  which  Parliament  must  use, of which  one  is broadly agreed 
and  the other is controversial.  In  a  battle situation, there  are  two  methods 
of overcoming  the  enemy;  to outflank  him,  or to divide  him.  The  outflanking 
tactic  requires  Parliament  to bring pressure on  governments  indirectly, that 
is, by  mobilising opinion  in the  Member  States.  If Parliament  can  explain  to 
the  trad~ unions,  the  employers'  organisations,  the public,  the media  and  to 
academic  and  other circles the need  for  European  integration, the  cost  of 
non-Europe  and  so  on,  these bodies  will  take  the  governments  in  the  rear,  as 
it were,  and  oblige them  to  accept  indirectly changes  which,  put  directly to 
them,  they would  probably  refuse. 
The  second  tactical  approach  is to  face  up  to the  fact  that, of the twelve 
Governments,  some  are  ready  to move  towards  greater integration while  others 
are  not.  The  question  is whether  Parliament  should  not  try to  persuade  those 
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The  experience of  the  DOOGE  Committee  shows  that  this  tactic  can  be  very 
successful,  but  that  it will  only  work  if the  bloc  of  the  'progressives• 
remains  united. 
So,  Mr  President,  I  conclude  these  rather brief  thoughts  on  Parliament's 
strategy  by  thanking  TEPSA,  which  has  shown  that  it has  understood  many  of  our 
problems;  the  solutions  which  it proposes  will  certainly  inspire  many 
discussions  between  us,  and  I  am  grateful  for  that. 
Professor J.  VANDAMME: 
Thank  you  Mr  Herman.  Your  comments  will  most  certainly be  taken  into  account 
in  the  course  of  our  debates  this  afternoon  and  tomorrow  morning  on  the 
strategies  of  the  European  Parliament,  and  you  have  come  up  with  some 
extremely  useful  suggestions  on  this topic.  I  now  give the  floor  to  Mr  Hugh 
DYKES,  who  is  representing the  Speaker  of the House  of  Commons. 
Mr  Hugh  DYKES,  Chairman  of  the  European  Group  of  the  House  of  Co111110ns  and 
House  of Lords: 
Thank  you  very  much  Mr  Chairman.  I  shall  be  very brief because  of the  lack 
of  time  but  I  must  particularly express the greetings  to this  Symposium  of the 
Speaker  of  the  House  of  Commons  who  is  sad  that  he  cannot  be  here  on  this 
occasion.  The  exigencies  of  the  closing of  one  session  and  the  opening  of 
the  new  session  of  Parliament  next  week  prevented  him  from  coming,  but  he 
se-nds  his  very  good  wishes.  I  am  grateful  to  be  here  in  his  place  as  the 
Chairman  of  the  All  Party Europe  Group  of  the  House  of  Commons  and  the  House 
of  Lords.  The  Single  European  Act  introduced  a  new  dimension  into  the 
Community's  development  as  we  know.  The  extension  of  tne  European 
Parliament's  role,  the  new  titles on  economic  and  sociat  cohesion,  research 
and  technological  development  and  the environment,  and  the  formal  introduction 
of  a  framework  of  political  cooperation  are  vital  developments  in  the 
Community.  But  th-ere  is  a  consequent  need  for  the  procedures  of  national 
democratic  accountability and  control  to  keep  pace  with  these developments. 
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~nd to  Germany  as  being  the  only  two  countries  of  the  Twelve  in  the  Community 
that  have  such  scrutiny  arrangements.  Structurally  the  House  of  Commons' 
scrutiny  arrangements,  which  were  Launched  in  1974,  have  proved  to  be 
efficient  in  coping  with  the  changes  in  the  legislative  field.  The  House 
endeavours  to  debate  proposals  before  a  common  position  is  adopted  by  the 
Council  whenever  that  is  feasible,  in  order  to  bring  its  influence  to  bear  at 
a  time  when  it can  be  most  effective.  However  the  cooperation  procedure  has 
in  fact  increased  rather  than  decreased  the  opportunities  for  the  House  of 
Commons,  particularly as  the  House  of  Lords  has  a  somewhat  different  role  of 
examination  and  investigation. 
European  Political  Cooperation  also  falls  within  the  scope  of  the  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee  of  the  House  of  Commons  and  opportunities for  the  Commons  to 
consider  this  arise  both  in  the  regular  debates  held  on  the  White  Paper  on 
developments  in  the  European  Economic  Community  published  by  the  Government 
more  or  less  every  six months,  and  also  in  the  regular monthly  oral  questions 
to  the  F,oreign  Office.  The  remit  and  reference  points  of  the  Select 
Committee  on  European  Legislation,  of  which  I  am  one  of  the  senior 
Conservative  members,  to  report  on  the  legal  importance  of  proposals  also 
provides  it  with  an  oppo~tunity  to  monitor  the  proposed  use  by  the 
institutions  of  the  new  powers  conferred  on  them  by  the  Single  European  Act. 
This  helps  to  ensure  that  Community  legislation  which  will  have  a  binding 
effect  in  the  United  Kingdom  has  a  soun~ and  legitimate treaty basis.  The 
Committee  has  given  particular  attention  in  this  context  to  the  extent  and 
significance of the overlap of various  treaty powers. 
One  area which  has  been  of particular interest to the  Committee  in the  context 
of the  completion  of  the  internal  market  is  the  relationship  between  Article 
100A  and  other  treaty articles.  There  are  of course  those  who  look  beyond 
the  completion  of  the  internal  market·  in  1992  to  closer  European  integration 
and  European  Union,  an  area  in  which  the  Institutional  Affairs  Committee  of 
the  European  Parliament  is  presently  developing  some  very  important 
initiatives.  As  the  European  Parliament  has  recognised,  it is essential  that 
discussion  of  these  issues  involves  National  Parliaments  too.  It  is  the 
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national  electorates  and  their members  who  will  consequently  account  for  them 
to  the  people  of  each  nation. 
These,  Mr  Chairman,  are  the  words  I  wish  to  say  on  behalf  of  Mr  Speaker. 
Concluding  personally,  may  I  also  join  my  remarks  to  the  best  wishes  from  Mr 
Speaker  to  the  Symposium.  I  regard  it  as  a  great  honour  and  privilege  and 
extremely  interesting  to  be  here.  Contrary  to  certain  rumours  that  the 
United  Kingdom  is  not  in  its  parliamentary  form  an  enthusiastic  European 
member  I  think  I  can  speak  on  behalf  of  the  built-in  majority,  and  also  a 
growing  number  of  Labour  MPs  as  well,  and  say that it is  not  true.  In  fact 
there  is  enormous  enthusiasm  for  these developments  in  Britain,  even  although 
there  may  be  understandable  hesitations  in  certain quarters,  hesitations  which 
I  consider  to  be  temporary  rather  than  permanent.  Thank  you  very  much. 
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Mr  ENRIQUE  BARON  CRESPO,  Vice-President  of  the  European  Parliament,  in  the 
Chair. 
Vice-President  BARON:  This  is  the  closing  session of  the  Symposium.  First  I 
would  like  to  give  you  the  apologies  of  Mrs  Veil,  who  owing  to  political  and 
parliamentary  commitments  has  had  to  go  to  Portugal  today.  This  means  that 
she  cannot  unfortunately be  with  us,  in  spite of  the great  interest  that  she 
has  shown  in  the  work  of  the  Symposium. 
We  commence  with  the  reports  by  the  General  Rapporteurs  on  the  three Working 
Groups.  First  I  would  invite  Professor  Jean-Victor  Louis  to  report  on  Working 
Group  2. 
Professor Jean-Victor LOUIS,  Free  University of Brussels:  Chairman,  ladies 
and  gentlemen,  Working  Group  2 was  asked  to  look  more  closely into the 
institutional  role of the  European  Parliament.  There  were  two  specific parts 
to  the working  programme:  we  were  first of all  requested  to  look  into  the 
implications of  the  Single  European  Act  and  its beneficial effects on  the 
European  Parliament,  and  second,  to  look  into  the  strategy for  institutional 
reform.  We  had  to  look  in particular into the  role of  the  European  Parliament 
as  a  permanent  constituent  body.  Although  it was  rather difficult  to draw  a 
distinction between  the various aspects of the present  and  the  future 
situation, I  will try to  retain this distinction  in  my  summary. 
In  regard to the  impact  of  the  Single  European  Act  on  the  European  Parliament, 
I  do  not  intend to  recapitulate the  contents of the papers, such  as  those  of 
Professor Constantinesco,  Mr  Corbett,  Dr  Pinder  and  Dr  Schmuck.  In  Mr 
Corbett's  report,  which  was  written  jointly with  Mr  Jacobs,  a  view  was 
expressed that  was  generally shared  by  all.  As  a  result·of the cooperation 
procedure  and  of its role  as  a  co-decision maker  on  external affairs, the 
European  Parliament  has  succeeded,  in at  least  some  aspects of  Community 
competences,  to manoeuvre  itself several  steps closer,  as  Mr  Corbett  said,  to 
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litmus  test  for  co-decision  making  and  this  term  was  in  fact  used  in  another 
paper  by  Mr  Corbett. 
Several  interventions  were  very  much  along  these  lines,  except  possibly  for 
the  views  voiced  by  an  MEP,  Mr  Hansch.  For  him,  the  problem  with  the 
Parliament  is  that  it has  mostly  negative  powers  and  still doesn't  have  any 
power  of  co-decision.  Whatever  might  have  been  achieved  as  a  result  of  the 
implementation  of  the  Single  European  Act  is  considered  quite  insufficient. 
The  ability of  the  European  Parliament  to give  its opinion  on  association 
agreements  and  accession  agreements  was  considered  by  Mr  Hansch  to  be 
insufficient,  because  a  minority  could  block  an  association  agreement.  In 
fact  it is  important  to  have  an  absolute majority  in  order  to  approve 
important  decisions  as  well  as  to  reject  them. 
So  on  the  whole  Mr  Hansch's  views  were  rather negative  whereas  when 
Mrs  Vayssade,  MEP,  spoke  we  were  given  an  idea  of  the  positive aspects  which 
are  contained  in  the  warp  and  weft  of  the  Single  Act  and  which  could  be  very 
beneficial  to  the  Parliament.  Mrs  Vayssade  explained  that Members  of 
Parliament  were  well  aware  of  the fact  that  the first  reading  was  of decisive 
importance.  All  the details of  the  cooperation  procedure  shoutd  be  re-read, 
picked  through  and  turned over  from  every  angle  so  that  the Treaty would  be  so 
sophisticated as  to  be  perfect.  So  a  lot of emphasis  had  been  put  on  the 
first  reading  which  was  made  wide  use  of  by  the  Parliament  and  enhanced  its 
influence. 
According  to  Mrs  Vayssade  it is clear that parliamentary committees  preparing 
a  first  reading-act  in  a  sort of  inter-governmental  way.  For  instance the 
first  read;ng of the text  on  the structural funds  this year  was  discussed  in a 
way  very  similar to the approach  taken at  inter-governmental  conferences. 
Everyone  expressed their views  but  no-one  was  in  a  position to veto  anything 
because  they all  knew  that at  the  end  of the day  the voting  procedure  in 
Council  was  organised  in  such  a  way  that  no  country would  ever  be  in a 
position to disrupt  the  whole  procedure.  So  the discussion  had  a  strong 
national  overtone,  but  there was  always  a  realistic sense  of  compromise  and 
the necessary  awareness  that it was  important  to  come  to  some  sort of 
consensus  which  was  not  only  acceptable to  the  Council  but  also met  with  the 
views  of the  majority of the  members  of the  House.  Participants  in  Working 
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attitude  was  not  as  negative  as  all  that  or  not  as  exclusively a  negative 
power  as  Mr  Hansch  had  seemed  to  imply,  but  that  there  was  also  quite 
definitely a  positive generating  power  in  the  Parliament. 
There  was  no  direct  dialogue  with  the  Council,  which  is  an  important  point  to 
note.  Any  such  dialogue  always  used  an  intermediary  such  as  the  Commission, 
and  I  think  it was  Professor  Constantinesco  who  pointed out  that  cooperation 
strengthens  the  role  of  the  Commission  because  the  Commission  acts  as  a 
go-between  in  any  indirect  relations  between  the  Council  and  the  Parliament. 
He  thought  it was  important  that  members  of  the  Council  were  directly put  in 
touch  with  leaders of political groups,  chairmen  of  committees  and  on  the 
other side  MEPs  with  members  of  the  permanent  representations  to  the 
Communities,  but  that  this direct  relationship  should  not  replace  any  other 
form  of  closer  cooperation  between  the  Council  and  Parliament.  Mr  Blumenfeld, 
in  his  report  on  the  relations  between  Parliament  and  the  Council,  had  felt 
for  instance  that  Council  representatives  should  be  far  more  active  in  the 
work  of  committees,  because  obviously  an  opinion or  a  first  reading  and 
ultimately  the  whole  cooperation  procedure  would  largely depend  on  this  type 
of  cooperation. 
So  it now  seems  that  the  Parliament's  role  is that  of  a  legislative power 
which  is  slowly  increasing, but  Mr  Hansch  is  right  in  saying that it has  not 
reached  the  extent at  which  one  can  consider Parliament  as  a  co-decision 
maker.  And  it would  of  course  be  important  to  see  that  the  Council  could 
never  over-ride a  vote  cast  by  the  House  with  an  absolute  majority.  The 
benzene  case  has  shown  that the attitude of the Parliament  does  not 
necessarily require the  Council  to  reject  such  a  common  position and  possibly 
one  would  have  to take another example  to see what  could  happen  but  I  do  think 
the most  important  thing  is that  the  threat  looming  large over  the  Council 
should  be  a  realistic threat. 
Various  colleagues  felt that it was  amazing  to see  that  the  cooperation 
procedure  had  so  far worked  so  smoothly.  One  would  like  to  regard  the 
European  Parliament  as  a  trouble-making  institution, a  body  which  really put  a 
spoke  in  the  wheel  and  prevented governments  from  working  out  the decisions 
themselves.  So  far  a  number  of decisions  have  been  taken  which  have  left the 
Parliament  out,  since  the  Parliament  has  agreed,  for  example,  not  to  be 
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observations  can  be  made  as  far  as  international  agreements  are  concerned. 
For  example  there  were  association  agreements  where  the  Parliament  had  been 
left out  in  the  cold or  was  consulted after they'd  already  been  signed  instead 
of  on  a  prior basis  as  has  been  provided  for  in  the  rules  of  procedure  of  the 
Parliament.  So  the  Parliament,  I  think,  is  trying to  play  the  1992  game, 
which  in  most  cases  is  a  good  thing.  On  the  other  hand  some  opportunities  are 
lost  to  develop  the  role  of  the  European  Parliament  as  a  co-legislator or  as 
an  imminent  co-legislator  and  to  have  the  cooperation  procedure  being  a  sort 
of  laboratory test  for  co-decision. 
At  the  same  time,  as  a  debating  forum  the  Parliament  is  losing out,  and  this 
point  was  made  by  several  participants.  Some  colleagues felt  that  it was 
regrettable  that  Parliament  did  have  to  make  a  choice,  that  1992  was  a  too 
demanding  priority and  that  taking  part  in  the  legislative process  seemed  to 
eliminate other tasks.  On  the other  hand  the  Parliament  tried to  be  the  voice 
of  European  conscience  in  the  world  and  at the  same  time  listened to  the  moods 
of  the  nations,  but  the  latter two  functions  seemed  to  be  losing out  in  favour 
of  increasing  legislative powers. 
The  strategy of  the  Parliament  was  also discussed.  The  reports  had  insisted 
on  a  dual  approach:  on  the one  hand,  'to seek  more  juice from  the  Treaty as 
it is'  CJ.  Pinder)  and  on  the other  hand,  to  ask  for  a  reform  of  the 
Community.  I  believe that the  Parliament  has  to conduct  this dual  strategy. 
It has  to try to  make  the most  out of  every  positive  legislative wind  that  is 
blowing  in its direction and  it has  also to try to be  the  instrument  for 
institutional  reform. 
'Permanent  constituent'  seems  to  be  a  concept  that  some  people  have  not 
entirely understood,  the  idea of the Parliament meeting  as  an  assembly  where 
everybody  ~ould debate a  constitution for  the future  European  union.  This  is 
of  course not  at all the  image  and  is not  at all the  idea  of  permanent 
constituent  power.  What  it means,  actually, is that  on  the one  hand  all 
parliamentary powers  should  aim  at developing  the competence  and  the powers  of 
the  Parliament  as  an  institution and  as  a  co-player.  It may  be  an  ambiguous 
word,  and  we  are all aware  of that, but  the  term  •co-player•  shows  at  least 
that  the  role of the Parliament  would  come  closer to  that of,  for  instance, 
the  American  Congress  than that of  a  national  parliament  in  the  Member  States. 
It 
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means  that  all  the  powers  at  its disposal  should  be  used  to  their  fullest 
potential.  But,  on  the other  hand,  institutional  reforms  are  inevitable, 
and  all  this  despite  the  fact  that  one  sometimes  has  the  feeling  that  one 
should  not  overburden  the  Parliament  and  the  Community  itself, given  all  the 
work  that  it has  to  do  to  be  ready  by  the  1992  deadline.  There  are  many 
reasons  indeed  which  will  justify an  institutional  move. 
The  1992  deadline  is  looming  larger  than  life.  If  we  are building a  single 
market  which  is  well  balanced  and  which  has  full  solidarity and  expands  to  a 
true  economic  and  monetary  union,  we  need  a  centre of economic  policy,  both 
efficient  and  democratic.  We  should  bear  in  mind  of  course  that  you  can't 
have  the  Council  taking  its decisions  by  unanimous  vote,  for  the management  of 
a  proper  economic  and  monetary  union,  because,  as  you  know,  on  economic  and 
monetary  questions  a  unanimous  vote  is still the  rule  in  the  Council. 
Another  element  in  the  1992  conjuncture  is  contained  in  Article 30,  paragraph 
12  of  the  Single  Act,  which  stipulates that  five  years after its entry  into 
force  the  political  cooperation procedure  is to  be  reviewed,  and  the 
intervention of  the  Parliament  may  well  be  desirable  in  thi~. 
A further  point  on  conjuncture  relates  to the  Community's  own  resources:  it 
has  been  pointed out  that  the decisions of  February  1988  and  the decisions 
taken  in  June  on  own  resources  and  budgetary discipline will  remain  in  force 
until  1992.  There  will  be  another opportunity to  reflect  on  the  financial 
autonomy  and  the fiscal  power  of the  Community  and  a  possible  increase  in  the 
Parliament's powers. 
There  is another thing to be  borne  in mind.  After  1992  the  Commission  will 
have  seriously to consider any  further  enlargement.  We  can't  keep  the 
requests  from  various  applicant  Member  States on  ice constantly by  saying  that 
we  are  too  busy  with  the  internal  market.  It's an  easy alibi, but  sooner  or 
later we  will  have  to decide  among  ourselves whether  we  want  to enlarge the 
Community  any  further or not.  At  the  moment  we  keep  saying  we  can't afford to 
add  any  further  Member  States because  of the weakness  of an  institutional 
structure,  but  at the  same  time  we  say  we  can't discuss  institutional  reform 
either because  we  have  just  reformed  the  Treaty and  we  now  have  to give 
priority to  the  internal  market. 
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debated  yesterday,  referred  to  the  need  for  a  draft  of  economic  and  monetary 
union  to  be  woven  into  the  whole  Community  institutional  process.  This  is  not 
a  novelty  at  all, because  European  Union  was  after all an  idea  which  aimed 
among  others  at  slotting economic  and  monetary  union  into  the  overall 
Legislative  and  decision-making  process  of  the  Community.  Now  we  mean  to  take 
this  a  lot  further,  for  example  by  the  creation of  a  European  Central  Bank, 
which  is  an  essential  part  of  our  future  monetary  policy.  This  implies  that 
the  European  Parliament  will  most  certainly want  to  have  a  say  in  this.  In 
the  United  States,  the  Board  of Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System 
reports  to  Congress.  It  would  be  interesting to  provide  for  similar 
procedures  within  the  Community.  More  generally,  the  building of  a  European 
monetary  union  would  imply  changes  in  the  institutional  structure  and  that  is 
something  to  which  the  Parliament's attention should  be  constantly drawn. 
I  would  like to  conclude  by  saying  that  the  Parliament  needs  a  few  allies and 
friends  for  the  sake  of progress,  but  who  will  these allies be?  What  about 
the  Court  of Justice?  Is  the  Court  of Justice a  friend of the  Parliament? 
Could  we  still consider the  Court  as  an  ally, because  the  Parliament  might  be 
a  bit shy,  having  been  bitten by  the  Court  of Justice?  This  question  is 
something  that  should  remain  with  us.  It seems  that,  regretfully,  limits 
have  been  put  to the  constructive  interpretation of the  Court. 
The  Commission  is another natural  ally of the Parliament.  It is  in  the 
Parliament's  interests to  keep  a  good  friendship going  with  the  Commission 
because  its role is to act  as  a  sort of screen between  the Parliament  and  the 
Council.  Hence  very close contacts  between  the  Commission  and  the  Parliament 
or  the  Commission  and  members  of  the  Parliament  are definitely called for. 
As  regards  Parliament's  relations with  the  Council,  permanent  cooperation 
would  be  very useful  to  avoid  violent  clashes at  the  stage of  second  readings. 
As  regards  cooperation  with  individual  governments,  the Italian government  was 
the  only one  mentioned  in  the  Pinder  report.  The  Italians have  always  been 
very  pro-European  and  pro-European  Parliament, but  on  the other hand  we  see 
that,  when  meeting  at  Council  level,  that  same  Italian government  joins  hands 
with  the other eleven  unanimously  to  share  in decisions against  the 
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the  Italian government  is  not  the  only  one  playing  a  double  act  in  these 
situations. 
A final  ~ord on  the  Community's  impact  on  the  European  elections.  The  more 
the  Community  gets  involved  somehow  the  more  the  voters  are  turned  away.  The 
major  political parties  have  a  great  responsibility for  that.  They  have  not 
yet  devoted  enough  time  and  energy  and  money  to  European  matters.  Since  the 
Parliament  doesn't  seem  to  have  any  'true-blue'  friends  it is  important  for  it 
to  get  in  close  touch  with  the political parties  so  as  to  be  ready  to  animate 
public  opinion. 
The  public,  whenever  requested  to  express  its views  by  way  of  an  opinion poll, 
always  comes  down  in  favour  of  Europe  and  thinks  that  the  Parliament  should  be 
given  more  powers  for  the  benefit  of  European  Union  and  to  bolster democracy. 
But  is it possible  to  continue  electing an  assembly  by  universal  suffrage  if 
that  assembly  is not  given  sufficiently wide  powers  and  actual  co-decision 
making  functions  in  the  Community's  process? 
Vice-President  BARON:  Thank  you  very much  Professor Louis.  Thank  you  very 
much  indeed  for  having  been  so  concise.  Now  I  will  give  Professor Verges  the 
floor  so  that  he  can  also give  us  a  summary  of  what  was  done  in  Working 
Group  1. 
Professor Jean  VERGES,  University of Paris I  (Pantheon,  Sorbonne>:  Thank  you 
Mr  Chairman.  Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the brief that  was  given  to Working  Group 
1  was  quite a  tricky one.  What  we  had  to do  was  to  look  for  a  successful 
concept  and  measure  the  European  Parliament's  influence  in  main  policy areas. 
This  is a  topic of obvious  importance  because  our task  was  not  merely  to  look 
at  what  had  been  achieved  in the past  by  institutions, nor  to  look  at  intended 
changes  in  institutions, nor  even  at  how  the Parliament  reacts  in its 
environment.  What  we  had  to do  was  to  look  at  this matter  by  considering the 
final  purpose  of all this.  The  actions  taken  by  the  institutions are  not  ends 
in  themselves  but  should  enable  Parliament  to exercise its function  as 
efficiently as  possible by  showing  European  democracy  to  the best of their 
abilities.  We  were  asked  to  assess  the performance  of the  Parliament:  in 
other words  'How  efficient  is Parliament?'  At  the  same  time  we  should  look  at 
how  its performance  could  be  improved. 
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his  preparatory document;  by  Dr  Wessels,  who  spoke  about  the  Parliament's 
Derformance  since  1979  in  terms  of  policy  making  and  Professor  Pelkmans,  who 
considered  the  future,  namely  what  would  Parliament  be  doing  once  the  internal 
market  had  actually  been  completed.  Two  MEPs,  Mr  de  Vries  and  Mr  Prag,  gave 
us  the  benefit  of  their  experience  and  also  spoke  about  their vision  of  how 
the  Parliament  works.  It  was  very  interesting to  hear  their experience  and  to 
hear  it set  out  so  clearly.  It  is  not  an  easy  task  to  present  a  report  of  the 
ensuing  discussion,  in  that  it was  very full,  with  a  high  level  of  debate. 
We  particularly focussed  our  attention on  three  main  topics  in  the  group. 
Firstly, it is  very  difficult  to  assess  the  influence of  an  organisation such 
as  the  Parliament,  to  quantify  that  influence  and  the  way  in  which  it is 
brought  to  bear.  It  is also difficult  to  find  strategies  likely to  enable 
the  Parliament  to  increase  its influence. 
I.  The  first question  is  how  can  the  influence of  the  Parliament  be 
measured.  One  approach  would  be  to adopt  a  quantitative measurement,  such  as 
the  number  of  resolutions or the  number  of oral  and  written questions.  We 
were  told that  these  had  doubled  over  the  last  few  years.  There  are other 
quantitative measurements  that  can  be  attempted.  When  measuring  quantities, 
one  could  perhaps  study  the  relationship between  initiative reports  and 
consultation reports, or,  another possibility,  could  also  consider the 
percentage  of  amendments  which  have  been  accepted  by  the  Commission  or the 
Council  of  Ministers  as  part of the cooperation procedure.  An  interesting 
fact  worthy  of note  is that  from  July  1987  to October  1988,  72%  of all 
amendments  were  accepted by  the  Commission  and  42%  were  accepted  by  the 
Council  at first  reading  in  the  cooperation procedure.  I  think that  these 
are  some  very  important  indicators of  inftuence,  but  that  they  do  not  really 
get  to the  root  of things.  They  do  show  how  activity has  increased, but  this 
increase  in activity does  not  necessarily  result  in a  corresponding  increase 
in  influence. 
Another  matter  for  consideration  could be  the opinion that  its partners  have 
of  the  Parliament.  This  is  really a  long  term  influence which  would  also  be 
shown  by  the  turnout  at  European  elections.  First of all, what  does 
'influence'  actually mean?  How  does  one  define parliamentary  influence? 
There  are  two  aspects  to this.  First there  is the  influence that  a  parliament 
can  exercisa  when  it is  involved  in  ideas  and  debates  with  an  international 
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rights,  Africa,  baby  seals  or  even  babies  themselves.  What  Parliament  is 
trying  to  achieve  here  is  to  become  a  forum  and  thereby  have  a  general 
influence  on  all  these  matters  and  from  there  bring  indirect  influence  to  bear 
on  the  rlecision-m~kers themselves. 
There  is  another  sort  of  influence,  i.e.  the  influence  which  Parliament  brings 
to  bear  when  considering  legislation, when  dealing  with  budgetary  matters, 
when  passing  legislation and  when  exercising its watchdog  function.  In  this 
field one  can  see  what  sort  of  work.has  been  done  on  individual  proposals. 
Once  again  influence  cannot  be  measured  merely  in  terms  of quantity:  one 
can't  just  count  the  number  of  motions,  amendments  and  resolutions  that  have 
been  approved.  Parliament's  influence  here  will  be  measured  in  a  different 
way.  Its  influence  is  felt  even  before  the  resolutions  are  adopted  and  is 
already discernible  when  the  preparatory work  is being  done.  Sometimes  if you 
go  back  up  the  decision-making  chain  you  will  often  find  that it is  Parliament 
that  in  terms  of  ideas  has  been  the  prime  mover,  that  what  the  Commission  says 
has  been  gleaned  from  parliamentary debates  and  that  Parliament  has  been  the 
driving  force  behind  many  main  ideas. 
II.  The  second  general  point  which  came  out  of this discussion  was  the  very 
specific  means  by  which  this  influence  is  expressed  and  the  channels  by  which 
it is  carried.  As  we  said,  the  Parliament  can  be  a  forum  for  discussion,  and 
it has  a  legislative  role not  unlike that of the  US  Congress;  it also has  the 
possibility of  choosing  its executive and  being  involved  in  its composition. 
If one  uses  such  a  model  as  a  yardstick  one  may  be  tempted  to  think  that  the 
Parliament  has  not  been  terribly successful  in any  of these  functions.  It 
does  not  have  all of the  powers  that  its models  have.  The  European  Parliament 
is  by  no  means  the  US  Congress:  it does  not  have  the  latter's functions, 
neither does  it have  the gubernatorial  function of the  Bundestag.  So 
measured  against  those yardsticks it falls  short of expectations.  But 
referring to models  only gives  part of the picture.  The  function  of the 
European  Parliament  is very  sui  generis.  It might  be  rather banal  to  say  so, 
but  I  think  we  do  have  to bear that  in mind,  and  I  will  explain why.  The 
three  functions  that  we  have  already identified are  very  finely balanced,  as 
for  instance between  being  a  forum  and  being  a  legislator.  It is  important 
that  the  Assembly  has  the moral  authority which  will  allow it to participate 
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its  legislative powers  in  budgetary matters,  budgetary  control  and  things  of 
that  nature. 
It  is  of  course  a  great  drawback  that  the  European  Parliament  does  not  enjoy 
gubernatorial  functions.  At  the  moment  it is  not  involved  in  the  appointment 
of  the  Commission.  This  absence  of  gubernatorial  function  means  that  the 
Commission  does  not  need  to  rely  on  majorities  and  that  therefore  there  is  no 
automatic  obligation on  the  Parliament  to  support  a  government  that  it has 
chosen.  This  gives  it a  certain  amount  of  flexibility.  So  the  absence  of 
gubernatorial  function  can  to  some  extent  boost  the  legislative credibility of 
Parliament. 
III.  After  looking  at  how  the  Parliament  could  become  more  effective,  we 
looked  at  certain strategies that  could  be  followed.  We  did  not  come  up  with 
any  original  ideas.  As  I  have  just said,  these  strategies can  simply  be  a 
diversification of  the  bases  of the  various  models  that  have  been  put  forward. 
Its work  as  a  forum  enables  it to  be  an  international tribunal  to  some  extent; 
it can  express  its  ideas  on  the  main  issues  facing  the world  today  a  fact 
which  confers  on  the  Parliament  a  certain degree  of  influence.  It allows  it 
to  figure  in  the media  and  thus  to  have  an  indirect effect on  the  formation  of 
world  public  opinion.  It does  in  fact  permit  Parliament  to  be  something  of  a 
world  conscienee,  thus  helping·it  to bolster its overall  credibility, while  at 
the  same  time  requiring  Parliament  itself to be  credible. 
What  we  are  trying  to  do  here  is to  show  that  the  Parliament  is not  merely 
involved  in the normative  work  of the  Community,  that  is  Community  legislation 
and  the  involvement  with  the budget  where  it does  have  a  decision-making 
power.  Its real  influence  lies  in those areas where  its rapporteurs  have  been 
able  to follow  through  the  implementation  of  a  piece of  legislation over  a 
number  of years.  Useful  though  this is, there are a  lot of .areas  which  still 
have  to  be  covered,  and  in this field Parliament  must  go  beyond  what  it has  so 
far  achieved. 
Let  us  think  about  the  follow-up  to Community  decisions  in  future years. 
There  may  welt  be  a  follow-up  to  regulations  and  directives  and  there  could 
well  be  a  follow-up  to  Court  of  Justice  rulings and  this would  offer 
Parliament  a  role of scrutiny which  it could  easily fulfil.  On  a  personal 
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out  a  study  on  the  participation of  the  European  Parliament  in  the  development 
of  European  legislation.  Now  things  have  changed  over  the  last  25  years, 
mainly  due  to  the  great  increase  in  Parliament•s  power,  now  extended  to 
matters  such  as  cooperation,  conciliation,  and  budgetary  issues.  Parliament 
has  wide  monitoring  powers,  and  enjoys  joint decision-making  powers  in  certain 
areas,  regarding  accession  and  association  status  for  other  countries. 
So  things  have  changed,  but  the  basic  problems  are  still the  same. 
It  is  necessary  to  improve  the  efficiency of  the  work  done  by  Parliament,  and 
here  the  choice  between  an  institutional  role  and  Community  work  has  always 
been  very  tricky indeed.  The  European  Parliament  wants  very  much  to  be  the 
driving  force  behind  the  construction of  Europe.  Members  want  that  to  be 
their  role,  and  they  want  the  other  institutions to  fulfil  that  function  as 
well. 
Perhaps  Members  would  not  be  living up  to their vocation  if they were  not  to 
do  this.  But  if they overdo  it they  may  well  disappoint  and  dash  the  hopes  of 
the  electorate.  The  road  they  have  to tread is not  always  an  easy one: 
there  is a  very  fine  balance between  not  doing  enough  and  doing  too  much.  You 
have  of  course  to  convince  voters,  as  it is not  always  easy  to  get  them  on 
their feet  and  off to the polls. 
We  do  have  to  convince  people  that this  is a  useful  institution, and  that  the 
institution is doing  a  good  job  of  work.  This  has  to be  proven  however,  and  I 
think it is only fair to  say that  the Parliament  has  done  that.  I  think  the 
Parliament  has  certainly done  right  by  Europe,  but  that  is the privilege of 
democracy.  After all, all  those  who  exercise power,  all those  who  ask  for 
power  are accountable:  they  have  to  justify the use  that they  have  made  of 
that  acquired  power.  That  is democracy,  that  is the parliamentary system,  and 
that  is  the  European  parliamentary system.  It is very  important  indeed that 
every  five  years  the  Parliament  is  accountable  to its electorate. 
Vice-President  BARON:  Thank  you  very much.  I  now  give  the floor  to 
Professor  Joseph  Weiler  who  will  give  us  a  summary  of what  was  done  in  Working 
Group  3. 
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Group  3  dealt  with  the  so-called  interaction  function  of  the  European 
Parliament:  how  it  relates  to  voters  and  the  electorate and,  to a  lesser 
extent  how  it  relates  to  national  parliaments. 
I  shall  divide  my  Report  into  three  parts.  I  shall  first  report  on  a  few 
Then  I  shall  survey  briefly the  methodological  observations  made  in  session. 
highlights  of  the  data  presented  in  the  papers.  Finally,  I  shall  report  the 
analysis  of  this data  which  emerged  in discussion. 
I  would  then  like  to  start  with  three methodological  comments  which  were  made 
by  some  of  the  rapporteurs. 
1.  When  we  talk  about  the  European  Parliament,  no  matter  in  which  context, 
we  inevitably utilise a  preconceived  notion of  what  •a  parliament•  is, a 
notion  which  usually will  be  that  of  the parliament  with  which  we  are  most 
familiar.  We  then  set  up  the  European  Parliament  against that preconceived 
notion  and  draw  conclusions.  The  fact  of  the matter is that  there  is  no 
unified  concept  of what  a  parliament  is or  should  be.  There  is a 
multiplicity of  concepts  and  those  concepts  are often defined  vaguely.  It  is 
worth  remembering  that  in  relation to  any  function  which  parliaments  may 
fulfill,  one  can  find  that  the  European  Parliament  performs  'better•  than  at 
least  one  state model.  Its budgetary  powers  are  probably greater than  any 
similar parliament  in  Europe.  Its  legislative powers,  which  are quite  weak, 
are still higher  than  some  national  chambers  and  so  on  and  so  forth. 
2.  The  second  methodological  problem  is not  to get  drawn  into too  much 
discussion of structure and  process.  In  evaluating the  European  Parliament 
one  ought  to  look  at  the substance  as  well:  what  are  the values  that  are 
actually being  taken  up?  What  are the  concrete achievements  and  failures? 
One  can  have  a  perfectly democratic  parliament  in  terms  of  representation 
which  will  do  pretty awful  things. 
3.  The  final  methodological  problem  which  affects what  I  have  to say  is  the 
usual  problem  of the  half empty  -- half  full glass.  I  shall  shortly be 
talking about  voter turnout.  In  relation to the  European  Parliament  it is 
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on  one's  expectations. 
ways  around  it. 
This  is a  dilemma  and  we  shall  have  to  try  and  find 
It  is  possible  to  organise  Group  3  discussion  around  a  basic  paradox.  The 
paradox  of  the  interaction  function  of  Parliament  is  very  simply  stated.  If 
we  look  at  the  situation of  the  Community  (not  of  the  Parliament)  over  the 
last  three  decades  it becomes  clear that  the  so-called democracy  deficit of 
the  Community  has  been  growing.  The  stages  of this growth  are  easy  to 
define.  The  1960s  were  characterised by  the  constitutional  revolution 
whereby  the  norms  of  the  European  Community  were  declared  to  have  direct 
effect,  to  be  supreme,  and  to  have  the backing  of  a  relatively efficient 
judici~l structure behind  them  to give  them  effective force.  This 
constitutional  revolution  paradoxically established the  democratic  deficit. 
When  the  Council  of  Ministers  passes  regulations  which  are binding,  supreme, 
with  effective  judicial  enforcement  and  there  is no  parliamentary check,  it 
accentuates  the  democratic  deficit.  By  contrast if the  Community  were  to 
pass  laws  which  can  then  be  set aside  by  the  Member  States, it would  not 
matter  so  much  that  the  Treaty provided  for  so  little parliamentary control. 
The  1970s,  the  second  phase,  were  characterised by  an  expansion  of  Community 
competencies.  If  we  look  at  a  small  indicator,  the  usage  of  Article  235,  it 
grew  dramatically  from  1973  onwards,  and  this  by  design.  The  Community  went 
into a  whole  range  of activities often not  even  contemplated  in  the  Treaty  and 
only derived  implicitly from  the powers  granted it by  the  Treaty.  Again  that 
enhanced  and  accentuated the problem  of the democracy  deficit  because  this 
legislation was  not  only binding and  supreme  but  was  growing  into areas  with 
great  social  importance,  not  legitimised specifically in  the Treaties,  and  yet 
still with  no  real  parliamentary accountability. 
In  the  1980s,  the  last phase,  the deficit was  yet  again  enhanced  with  the 
increase  in  the  number  of  Member  States of  the  Community.  The  original 
number  of  Member  States was  doubled  with, for want  of a  better term,  more 
difficult social  problems  coming  up  in the  North-South  cleavage,  and  with  an 
intense  institutional debate  on  the  future of the  Community.  And  at  the  same 
time,  if we  look  very  closely we  discover that  in a  large number  of  cases  the 
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takes  away  from  national  parliaments  at  least  some  vestige  of  control  and  thus 
removes  democratic  accountability  even  at  that  level. 
If  we  put  all this  together,  we  come  to  see  the basic  paradox.  One  would 
have  expected  that  this  process  of  growing  deficit  would  be  accompanied  by  a 
corresponding,  growing  increase  in  the  mobilising  power  of  the  European 
Parliament.  One  could  have  expected  that  national  parliaments,  seeing  the 
transfer of  power  to a  Council  of  Ministers  devoid  of  parliamentary control, 
~ould seek  out  some  sort  of  alliance with  the  European  Parliament.  One  could 
have  expected  that  social  groups  in  Member  States,  seeing  the transfer of 
rowers  to  Brussels,  would  seek  alliances  in  Strasbourg.  And,  finally,  one 
would  have  expected  a  growing  interest  by  voters  in their  MEPs  and  in  the 
European  Parliament.  And  yet  the  rapporteurs  tell us,  and  it corresponds  to 
our  general  knowledge,  that  this  is not  happening,  or at  least  has  not 
happened  to  a  degree  which  one  would  have  expected  and  hoped. 
If  we  take  voter  turnout,  we  see  that  it is at  the  SO%  level  on  average,  and 
in  many  States  less.  We  can  argue  if that  is high  or  low;  But  when  we 
learn  that  voter  turnout  is declining,  this  can  only be  negative.  (It  solves 
the  methodological  dilemma  of  an  empty  or full  glass).  If  in  1984  the 
turnout  is  lower  than  in  1979,  and  if people  get  up  here  and,  in  my  view 
credibly,  say  that  unless  something  dramatic  happens  between  now  and  the 
election this year  they predict  the  turnout  - 1992  hype  notwithstanding - to 
be  even  lower,  than  something  is  happening  which  cannot  leave  the  European 
Parliament  complacent. 
Support  for  increase in power  of  the  European  Parliament  is another  issue with 
which  to test the  interactive function  of Parliament.  Does  the electorate, 
do  European  citizens, support  an  increase  in  the power  of the  European 
Parliament?  The  reply we  heard  in Group  3  is that  about  SOX  do  support  an 
increase  in  the powers  of the  Parliament.  And  again one  could  wonder  if this 
figure  is  high  or  low.  But  the  trend  is declining.  Less  and  less people, 
we  heard  in  the session, are  supporting  an  increase in the powers  of the 
Parliament.  That  is a  sign  on  the  wall  that  is not  ambiguous. 
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we  heard  in  our  Working  Group  that  the  quality  is  low  by  comparison  to  the 
quality of  dialogue  between  national  deputies  and  their electorate.  The 
number  of  encounters  is  lower,  the  quality,  by  the  indicators  developed  by  our 
reports,  is  lower,  and  the  ignorance  is greater.  People  frequently  do  not 
know  their  MEPs  nor  do  they  know  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Parliament  - an 
ignorance  greater  than  comparable  national  scenarios. 
The  next  set  of  empirical  data  that  came  to  the  attention of  Working  Group  3 
was  the  quality of  dialogue  with  national  parliaments.  Here  the  picture 
often  varies.  Generalisations  are  suspect.  What  is  true  for  Belgium  is not 
true  for  France  and  so  forth.  In  some  parliaments,  notably the  Belgian 
Parliament,  they  have  explored  new  models  of  cooperation.  But  the  general 
picture  which  emerged  was  one  of  hostility.  A lack  of  confidence  in  MEPs, 
which  even  translates  into treating  MEPs  in  the  party  hierarchy - one 
mediating  instrument  between  the  European  Parliament  and  national  parliaments 
- as  second  rate  citizens. 
This  again  is  not  a  picture which  suggests  a  concern  by  national  parliaments 
to  the  accentuation of the  democratic  deficit, and  not  an  image  which  suggests 
the  mobilisation necessary  for  a  good  inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
So  much  then  for  describing the picture.  How  do  we  analyse it?  Here  I  must 
be  much  less  dramatic  because  the  analysis  is speculative;  the  Group  just 
threw  out  ideas. 
In  discussing and  explaining  low  turnout  the first  explanation  was  the most 
obvious  explanation:  that of the  vicious circle.  If the  European  Parliament 
is  not  an  important  intersection of  power  in  Community  life it is only  to  be 
expected that voter  interest will  be  low.  It is  low  in municipal  elections, 
it is  low  in  any  elections where  the  stakes are  low.  Why  do  I  say  a- vicious 
circle?  If there  is  no  power  there is no  voter turnout,  if there  is no  voter 
turnout  there  is no  power.  One  cannot  get  around  that, and  since it is 
pointed out  that  this  Chamber  does  not  dispose of the  power  it ought  to  have 
it is not  surprising that it is difficult to elicit voter attention.  It 
simply  does  not  matter  to  the  voters  who  is elected. 
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of  the  twelve  Member  States,  the  direct  public  expenditure  of  the  European 
Communities  is  a  mere  2%  of  total  national  public  expenditure. 
Third,  the  Parliament  in  the  eyes  of  the electorate - and  that  again  is proven 
by  empirical  analysis  in  the  Euro-barometer  data  - is often  (and  to  me  this 
was  counter-intuitive>  synonymous  with  'Europe'.  The  questionnaires  asked: 
When  you  think  of  Europe,  what  do  you  think  of  first?  The  answer  was,  the 
European  Parliament.  So  if this  Parliament  means  Europe,  a  low  turnout  means 
possibly  a  low  turnout  for  Europe,  which  means  that  the  interactive  functions 
of  Parliament  suffer  from  a  general  lack  of  interest  in  Europe.  (But  see 
infra.) 
The  final  explanation  which  was  given  was  so-called  rational  voting.  A 
rational  voter  would  say:  Why  should  we  strengthen the  European  Parliament? 
If  I  am  interested in  pursuing  sectoral  interests or  my  specific interest,  is 
the  Parliament  going  to  speak  for  me?  Or  am  I  going  to get  a  strong voice  in 
the  Community  through  my  Minister; or through  some  other  forum?  Maybe  the 
rational  voters  say,  the  real  game  is not  Strasbourg,  why  should  I  enhance  the 
power  of  the  European  Parliament,  and  what  confidence  do  I  really have  that 
through  that  channel  my  sectoral  interest will  be  vindicated?  This 
explanation  provoked  a  very  strong debate,  but  at  least  I  mention  it to give  a 
reflection of  our  discussion. 
Lastly,  very dramatically one  of our  rapporteurs  CDr.  Reif)  said:  I  expect 
that  at  these  coming  elections,  turnout  will  be  less than  SOX  and  the 
headlines will  read  the day  after:  'Vote of no  confidence  in  Europe,  less 
than  SOX  turnout'.  Is that  correct?  Is a  vote of  less than  SOX,  a  turnout 
of  50%,  a  vote of no  confidence  in  Europe?  We  should  be  cautious.  One  of 
the  things that  has  happened,  in  my  view,  over  the  last  several  years  has  been 
an  all too  easy tendency  to equate the notion of the  legitimacy of  the 
European  Community  with  the fortunes  of the  European  Parliament.  As  if 
Parliament  is the only body  that bestows  legitimacy on  the  Community.  That, 
with  respect,  is  not  so:  Parliament  is an  important  legitimator of the 
Community,  but  not  the only  one.  Strangely enough  the  Commission  has 
legitimacy  and  bestows  legitimacy.  The  European  Council  has  legitimacy  and 
bestows  legitima~y.  Legitimacy  is often derived  from  achievement,  from 
success,  from  satisfying welfare  needs  of  individuals,  from  people  saying: 
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direct  reference  to  Parliament.  It  is quite plausible  that  if  1992  is  a 
success,  the  electorate will  find  the  European  Community  quite  legitimate  in 
terms  of  the  welfare  payoff  (welfare  being  a  public  good  in  a  very  broad 
sense,  not  just  pounds  and  pennies).  And  yet  the  European  Parliament  is  not 
at  all  part  of  that  legitimating picture.  So  the  headlines  will  say:  'Vote 
of  no  confidence  in  Europe',  but  that  is  not  necessarily so.  The  Parliament 
is  not  only  fighting  for  the  legitimacy of  Europe  but  also  for  its own 
legitimacy  in  that  pattern. 
t~hat  about  the quality of the  dialogue?  Not  simply  the  turnout, or  support 
for  an  increase  in  the  power  of  the  European  Parliament,  but  this  low  quality 
of  di~Logue between  r~EPs  and  their electorate?  Here  are  some  explanations 
that  were  given.  The  first  is  very  simple:  the  constituencies  are  too  big. 
Instead of  100,000  to  200,000  you  have  100,000  to 600,000  voters  per  MEP. 
There  is  no  getting  round  that:  you  are  not  going  to have  a  high  quality of 
dialogue  if the  specific  gravity of  each  voter  is  lower  in the  European 
context.  It has  nonetheless  been  pointed out  that this  can  only  be  partly 
true.  Senators  in  the  United  States often  have  much  larger constituencies 
and  yet  the quality of  the  dialogue  is still quite high.  Obviously,  it is 
partly their power  to deliver tangible  benefits to their constituents  which 
accounts  for  their high  interaction success,  coupled  with  means  put  at  their 
disposal for  doing  so. 
It was  also argued  that organisation of  constituency work  would  divert  too 
much  of the  time  of  MEPs  from  other important  parliamentary functions,  such  as 
plenary and  committees.  Put  simply  the  ration of work,  the  burden  of  work, 
the distribution of work  in the  timetable of the  MEPs  is such  that, if more 
time  was  dedicated to enhancing  the direct quality of dialogue with  the voter, 
maybe  more  important  things  would  suffer  in  terms  of the  European 
construction;  it is a  possibility that  has  to be  examined  in greater depth. 
Thirdly,  as  I  already mentioned,  MEPs  feature  low  in party hierarchies.  This 
is not  true for  every  party and  it is not  true for  every  Member  State, but 
several  people  from  the  floor  suggested that it is true  in  general, across  the 
board.  They  do  not  get  the  party support  which  their national  counterparts 
get.  This  has  a  detrimental  effect  on  the quality of the dialogue  with  their 
voters. 
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serving  interest groups,  but  in  thinking  about  the  general  European 
nersrP.ctive.  They  do  not  operate  on  the  classical principle of  re-election: 
th~ need  to  satisfy A,  B,  C and  D because  they  are  crucial  to  re-election. 
This  point  was  controversial  because  it plays  both  ways:  what  is better for 
Europe,  to  be  clear  and  realistic  and  serve  local,  often  national  interest, or 
to  take  the  more  high,  moral  principled ground?  One  way  or  another,  if the 
observation  is  true that  MEPs  do  not  act  clientalistically, this  in  some  way 
will  decrease  the  quality of  dialogue  with  their electorate. 
Finally,  bad  media  cover~ge was  given  as  another  explanation.  The  Parliament 
has  not  had  a  big  success  in  mobilising  media.  (This  might,  however,  be  the 
dilemma  of  the  half  full  or  half empty  glass). 
The  Group  ended  by  discussing  future  perspectives.  This  was  a  brainstorming 
session with  some  ideas, quite  frankly  most  of  them  not  new.  If  I  wanted  to 
summarise  the  whole  thrust of the  suggestions  it would  be  that  the  Parliament 
has  to  rethink the  balance  and  the priorities of  its own  self-perception and 
the  way  it orders its attitude towards  parties,  Member  States  and  the  EC  as  a 
whole 
Let  me  explain  by  examples  what  we  meant  by  that, and  here  I  will  be 
deliberately dramatic  in order  to drive the  point  home.  Let  us  first 
slaughter one  holy  cow.  Maybe  it is not  such  a  sin  to  be  nationalistic and 
to protect  vigorously MEP's  national  interests as  a  way  of mobilising public 
opinion.  Of  course one  would  not  suggest  this  was  'the'  remedy,  but  as  part 
of  a  more  complex  strategy, but  it should  not  be  considered,  perhaps,  any 
longer as  a  cardinal  sin.  It could  be  the  sign of maturity for  the 
Parliament. 
Likewise,  one  may  wish  to  rethink the notion of partisanship - another well 
known  point that  comes  up  again  and  again.  The  President of the Belgian 
Chamber  was  in  our  Group.  His  perception  was  that  the  European  Parliament 
emerges  as  unfocused  in  its ideological  cleavages.  When  you  relate to the 
Parliament,  in  his  view,  it is  'for•  or  'against•  Europe.  I  think that  this 
has  been  changing  in  recent  years,  but  his observation  is that  the  change  is 
not  filtering  through.  So  the  second  thing  is that  partisanship  in 
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sharp  as  possible  so  as  to  give  the  notion  that  it matters  whom  you  vote  for, 
it matters  who  your  MEP  will  be,  because  real  choices  are  there  to  be  made. 
The  third  future  perspective  is differentiation  from  other  institutions.  The 
surveys  seem  to  tell us,  we  heard,  that  'Europe'  equals  the  European 
Parliament.  So  it  may  be  important  to  breakdown  and  differentiate  the 
Parliament  from  the  other  institutions.  We  had  a  spell-binding  intervention 
by  Mr  Wijsenbeek,  MEP,  giving  us  a  blow-by-blow  account  of  how  the  previous 
motions  to  censure  the  Commission  had  failed,  and  why  they  had  failed.  In  a 
dramatic  way,  dismissing  the  Commission  is  something  which  will  enhance  the 
differentiation. 
Likewise  I  think  that  the budgetary battle waged  by  Parliament  had  some 
electoral  effect  in this differentiation objective.  The  electorate must 
learn  to  think of the  European  Parliament  as  a  'counterforce', at  least  in 
some  contexts,  to the  European  'bureaucracy'. 
Fourth,  probably  the  biggest  success of the  European  Parliament  in  its entire 
history is the  one  issue which  is most  frustrating,  the  Single  European  Act. 
It is  clear, at  least  to  me  as  an  outside observer,  that  mobilisation  for  the 
Single  Act  would  not  have  happened  without  the  Parliamentary  Draft  Treaty. 
There  is a  lesson  here, and  it came  from  several  people  in our  Group. 
Parliament  must  be  more  active,  and  can  be  more  active  in  setting the 
Community  agenda.  Why,  some  asked,  is the Parliament,  in going  to  the  next 
election, not  championing  the  issue of the  social  impact  of  1992  in big  way? 
So  that it differentiates from  the  Commission  and  carries its own  special 
role?  Likewise,  the proposals  for  a  Declaration of  fundamental  human  rights, 
for  a  Bill of Rights  for  the  Community,  is the  same  kind  of  issue,  a 
mobilising  issue as  Europe  integrates more.  In  these ways,  even  in  the 
absence  of a  qualitative or dramatic  increase  in the existing powers  of 
Parliament,  those  for  whom  the electorate votes,  and  the  reasons  why  the 
electorate should  vote  will  be  enhanced. 
Finally  the  Group  discussed  relations with  national  parliaments.  One  vision 
outlined was  the vision  in  the paper  submitted  by  Roger  Morgan  and  Ghita 
Ionescu,  which  you  have.  It is the  cooperative model  that  says:  'Let's have 
more  dual  mandates,  let's have  more  joint committees,  let's have  more  common 
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other  vision  suggested  that  the  real  game  is  about  power.  When  the  European 
Parliament  says  it wants  to  assert  control  over  the  Council  of  Ministers,  in 
effect  it also  means  taking  power  away  from  national  parliaments.  This  might 
suggest  a  more  confrontational  attitude  towards  national  chambers. 
Does  it have  to  be  a  dichotomous  choice  in  the  relationship  with  national 
parliaments?  Cooperative  or  confrontational?  It  is  probably  a  mixture  of 
both.  But  to  suggest  as  an  ideal  type  of  relationship an  exclusive 
cooperative model  is  a  bit  naive  and  unrealistic.  It  is  not  only  about 
democracy  it is  also  about  power. 
Vice-President  BARON:  Thank  you  very  much.  That  concludes  the  reports  from 
the  working  groups,  and  we  now  turn  to  a  strategy for  the  European  Parliament. 
Professor  Jean-Paul  Jacque  from  Strasbourg  is  going  to  present  his  paper  to us 
now. 
Professor Jean-Paul  JACQUE,  University of Strasbourg:  Thank  you  Mr  Chairman. 
Ladies  and  gentlemen,  it falls  to  me  to  speak  to you  at  the·end of your 
Symposium  so  as  to present  to you  the  basic  lines of  a  strategy for  the 
Parliament.  This  is  a  doubly  difficult task  to the  extent  that  you  have  just 
heard  the  results of the  work  that  has  been  carried out  in  the working  groups 
and  it is very  difficult to try to  intertwine those  ideas  with  mine. 
It is equally difficult  from  another point  of  view,  because  working  out  a 
strategy for  the  Parliament  means  ultimately that  you  have  to assume  that  the 
Parliament  as  an  institution can  have  a  strategy.  I  myself  have  certain 
doubts  about  that being  the case,  the so-called  'strategy'  of the  Parliament 
is  the  result of  reactions  to topical  issues  and  of  the political groups  which 
actually make  up  the Parliament.  Professor Weiler  was  referring to  the 
possibility of making  a  declaration of  social  rights  and  putting a  definite 
focus  in  the next  election on  the social dimension  of the  internal market. 
That  certainly covers  the  views  of  some  of  Parliaments's political groups,  but 
also it  rubs  against - and  sometimes  in  the  wrong  way,  incidentally - the 
ideas  of  some  other political groups  in the  Parliament. 
Thus  it is extremely difficult for  the  Parliament  to define a  long  term  kind 
of  strategy.  This  is something  that  is always  being drawn  into question  once 
it is done  by  short  term  topical  issues.  It is also  something  that  is  very 
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parliaments  are  different  from  this  Parliament  insofar  as  the  latter is  an 
institution.  The  national  system  corresponds  to  a  developing  and  evolving 
kind  of  national  constitutional  form  which  is slightly different  from  the 
European  Parliament.  Thus  here  we  have  specific  interests  to  defend  which 
actually  go  over  and  above  normal,  political distinctions  and  it actually does 
have  a  specific  institutional  rote  to  play  in  the  Community  system  which  is 
subtly different  from  the  constitutional  role  that  national  parliaments  have 
basically  to  play. 
Any  strategy therefore  which  could  be  worked  out, or  any  ideas  that  are 
brought  out  in  the  Parliament  have  a  certain value  in  that  context  because  the 
field  is  wide  open.  Whether  you  are  talking about  the  Parliament  as  an 
institution or  as  a  legislature all  of  the  different  aspects of  the  work  and 
functions  of  Parliament  and  its members  have  some  value.  This  is a  point  that 
you  could  actually agree  with  and  that  I  would  actually agree  with,  subject  to 
one  rider,  which  is  that  the  Parliament  has  to establish certain  kinds  of 
priority.  It  is totally  impossible  to work  on  a  strategy of  a  parliament  as  a 
Forum  and  also as  a  parliament  as  a  factor  of  constitution~l evolution or 
governmental  function.  We  must  therefore  realise that  every  one  of the 
functions  that  you  have  been  discussing  in  your  work  actually costs  quite a 
lot  in  administrative  input.  If therefore you  continue to develop  the  idea  of 
a  forum  - incidentally  running  the  risk that  the  styles that  you  are going  to 
have  to  defend  will  be  difficult to defend  in  line with  your  strategy of  forum 
-you will  actually bring into question  both  the general  nature of  your 
parliament  and  the  value of its image. 
Also  if you  look  at all the  reports,  if you  revise all the  internal  rules  of 
procedure,  if you  take  into consideration this gradual  evolution,  you  risk 
bringing into question  some  of your  reputation and  image  on  a  world-wide  or 
international  level.  So  what  I  want  to  talk about  is whether  you  should 
concentrate on  this  kind  of  strategy or whether  you  should  look  for other 
ideas.  To  a  certain degree  the  Parliament  has  already grown  out  of the strict 
'forum'  age.  If one  were  to  revert  back  to  the  forum  strategy, you  would  be 
actually taking a  backwards  step.  It has  already been  argued  that the 
Parliament  understands  the  impact  of  the  Single  European  Act,  and  it is 
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and  must  therefore  move  forward  rather  than  necessarily accepting  the  status 
quo. 
The  context  of  a  forum  is only  a  base;  the  European  Parliament  has  got  to  try 
and  develop  in  a  different  style,  and  it must  take  into  consideration the 
style of  the  Assembly  of  the  Council  of  Europe.  I  talk  about  this  in  some 
knowledge  of  the  facts,  because  I  have  been  involved  quite often with  that 
Assembly.  This  is a  strategy which  has  a  degree  of  merit  in  an  institutional 
system  which  is very  much  inter-governmental.  That  is one  of  the  ideas  one 
could  actually  look  at, but  I  do  not  really believe  that  that  is  the 
fundamental  objective of  your  parliament.  There  is  in  any  case  going  to  be  a 
style of  discussion  in  the  Chamber- a  forum  style- which  will  be  of value  in 
the  future. 
I  don't  think  necessarily this  is  something  that  you  have  slavishly to defend 
and  develop  in  the  future,  but  you  should  look  at  three  fundamental  areas  in 
which  you  can  move  forward.  One  of  these is something  that  has  been  brought 
up  probably  very  little in your  discussions  and  therefore I·shall concentrate 
on  this first,  and  then  on  the other two.  I  would  cite the gubernatorial  role 
that  the  Parliament  can  actually exercise.  This  actually sets a  certain style 
of election depending  on  the  prevailing style of government  and  governing 
authority within  the  Community.  This  is something  that  is generally  followed 
in all national  elections to  choose  parliamentary  representatives.  The 
general  lines  of  the mandate  of the government,  the  general direction  in which 
the government  will go  and,  apart  from  anything else, the personalities  who 
will be  involved with  that function  are derived  from  participation in a 
national election.  People  have  the  impression,  in taking part  in a  national 
election that they will  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  forms  of their executive 
and  legislative. 
Now,  whether  this is a  reality or possibility in the  European  situation is a 
very  good  question.  It will ultimately be  possible because  the  European 
Parliament  has  some  of the embryonic  capacity of being  able to fulfil that 
function.  There  are difficulties as  to the nomination  of  the  Commission  - the 
Parliament  complains  of not  being  able to nominate  or even  of not  having  any 
- 124  -influence  on  this  subject.  I  think  that  I  as  a  lawyer  would  specifically 
think  that  it would  be  a  good  idea  for  Parliament  to  develop  some  influence  on 
the  nomination  of  the  Commission. 
However,  on  the  strategy side  it is  clear that  the  Parliament  has  a  full  right 
to  g~t  rid of  the  Commission.  The  Council  would  have  to draw  its own 
conclusions  from  any  such  major  action,  but  the  Parliament  can  actually 
threaten  this  and  can  actually make  a  conflict  develop,  which  could  give  rise 
to  a  full  vote  of  confidence  in  the  Commission.  This  is a  function  that 
should  be  used  so  as  to  influence  in  some  sense  the  composition  of  the 
Commission,  to modify  its attitude,  to modify  its  line.  Therefore,  as  we  are 
moving  into a  context  of  working  on  an  inter-governmental  line - which  is  not 
necessarily always  in  line  incidentally with  the  Treaty- and  so  as  to  have 
the  'call  to  order'  take  place,  if you  like,  Parliament  can  certainly have 
some  impact  on  the  Commission,  because  of its no  confidence  vote.  That  exists 
as  a  possibility.  This  would  involve  the  Parliament  freeing  itself from  some 
of  the  trammelling  difficulties of  the  past  so  that  it would  be  able  to get 
out  of  its cul-de-sac. 
I  believe it possible  to establish  a  general  approach  which  could  have  some 
influence  on  the  Commission's  activity rather than  on  just the national 
governmental,  European  Council  level  and  so  on.  If one  accepts  this  idea, 
then  the  Parliament  could  have  an  influence on  the  composition  of the 
Commission  - subject to discussion  with  the  Council  and  the authorities 
involved.  But  you  will  realise that, if that were  to  come  about,  the 
Parliament  would  be  able to  make  up  a  type  of government  majority on  a 
specific programm•.  Then  you  would  be  able  to go  into the  next  phase  - which 
is  certainty the most  difficult - which  is to get  the electors to vote  on  a 
specific mandate,  to  vote  on  a  platform which  would  be  put  up  by  this 
government  majority;  thus it would  no  longer mean  that  people  were  working  on 
strict national  policy  ideas  when  they  voted. 
Now  here  is the  real  problem;  it is clearly the case that national policies 
have  a  major  impact  on  the voting styles of the people  when  they  vote  in  the 
European  elections.  It could  be  the case that one  could  have  one  day  a  real, 
federal  kind  of  party and  another party on  the other side which  would  be  a 
national  rights  party and  that  would  be  a  kind  of distinction to be  drawn 
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national  political  ideas  would  continue  to  work  along  those  lines  in  the 
future. 
It  is  important  to  take  very  carefully into  consideration  the  fact  that  the 
procedure  of  the  Single  Act,  as  it  involves  the  Parliament,  means  that 
coalitions  must  be  established to obtain majorities  which,  if you  like,  are 
federal,  or which  actually  take  into  conside~ation a  much  more  partisan view 
on  the  national  level.  Now  this  can  actually mean  that  you  tend  to  have  a 
less  European  attitude or  a  more  European  attitude,  if you  like to  put  it as 
bluntly as  that.  This  however  is  extremely  topical,  in  as  far  as  the  European 
Parliament  has  actually worked  as  a  little Council  trying  to  indicate national 
demands  and  needs.  To  try and  involve  this  in  the  process  of  trying  to 
achieve  an  absolute  majority  and  allowing  people  to  actually vote  against  but 
not  with  any  real  veto  power  because  of  the  entrenched  national  interest  is 
something  that  is already evolving  in  the  Parliament.  Whether  or not  it 
should  be  set  on  a  more  official  level  so  as  really to establish a 
government-style  approach  - actually to  have  a  majority view  with  a  programme 
linked to  it - is  something  to  be  looked  into. 
People  would  in  several  respects  resist a  Europe  splintered into a  whole 
series of  small  political parties, but  in fact  there  are  national 
administrations  that  have  perpetually to  be  in  a  state of negotiation so  as  to 
win  people  over  to  support  them.  I  don't  know  whether  it is  really the 
strength of the majority which  actually imposes  compromises  on  the  government 
or whether  it is open  discussion that throws  up  the  compromise.  There  could 
be  certain misgivings  about  th~ potential dictatorship of the  Commission.  The 
Commission  could  no  doubt  actually force  people  to take  into consideration the 
kind  of so-called governmental  majority view  without  necessarily having  a  real 
convergence  of consensus  policy. 
But  if you  are going  to  play the government  gam~, a  major  obstacle exists, 
which  is  the  resistance of national political  forces  to that game,  because 
they  see this  as  being  a  loss  of their power,  a  loss  of their sovereignty and 
everything else.  One  of  the perfect examples  of the vicious  circle  in this 
complex  is  something  we  must  escape  from  becaus~ the participation of the 
elector means  that you  must  have  a  clear programme  and  a  clear  impact  on  the 
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programme  to  the electors.  They  have  got  to  know  for  whom  they  are  voting  and 
for  what  ends  they  are  voting. 
Therefore  the  national  political  parties  are  inclined  to  see  the  European 
elections  as  being  a  test of  their  own  national  policies.  It  is  not  a  real 
European  view.  The  idea  of  getting majorities  and  so  on  at  the  government 
Level,  the  use  of the  European  elections as  being  a  test  of  national  attitudes 
and  so  on  can  ultimately give  rise  to  the  difficulty of  having  a  very  low 
turnout  because  there  is  likely to  be  a  lack  of  comprehension  between  the  two. 
I  think  that  the  strategy therefore  for  the  Parliament  would  have  to  be  to 
construct  the  means  and  methods  to  get  out  of this double  stricture and  to  try 
to  make  sure  that  they  move  towards  a  clear  European  government,  a  European 
idea,  a  European  style of politics.  This  will  not  happen  in one  year,  two 
years  or three  years  but  we  must  try to ensure  that  we  do  follow  the 
development  of  the  system  in  Europe.  You  can  see  a  very  good  comparison  in 
the  early years  of  federalism  as  it is established  in  the  United  States. 
The  second  aspect  I  want  to bring up  is the  function  of  the  legislature.  I  am 
sorry not  to  have  heard  anyone  in  the  reports  from  the working  group  talk 
about  certain difficult  issues  which  I  feel  could  have  come  out.  Mr  Hansch 
obviously touched  on  this.  We  are  used  to him  doing  so,  and  he  has  actually 
forced  us  to  make  steps  forward  quite often  in  very  useful  directions.  But 
the whole  idea  of taking up  too  much  time  on  legislation  is quite often a 
trap.  The  whole  idea of  legislation as  it links  up  with  the  Parliament's  own 
strategy is something  that obviously must  be  reinforced.  It should  be  taken 
into account  because  it already exists.  The  external  forces  playing on  the 
Parliament assume  that it will actually intervene  in the  legislative 
procedure.  Professor Weiler  actually talked about  the  interaction of the 
interest groups  and  the  lobbyists,  but  you  can  imagine  t~e kind  of  lobby  that· 
might  be  able to  impose  its point of view  if it used  the  Parliament  as  a 
supporter.  It would  be  extremely difficult if people  were  actually able  to 
force  Members  to vote  in  favour  of baby  seals  rather  than  in  favour  of other 
major  ideas. 
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strength  if  we  do  not  further  get  involved  in  functional  legislative 
programmes.  This  is  something  that  I  have  referred  to  in  the  past  quite 
often,  as  have  others.  In  effect  you  are  embracing  a  number  of political 
ideas  and  trying  to  act  for  the  best  without  having  a  very  clear  idea  of 
Utopia.  Some  people  say  that  Europe  can  be  constructed  without  the 
Parliament,  yet  on  the  other  hand  others  quite often accuse  you  of  being  the 
people  who  have  stood  in  the  way  of  having  satisfactory  European  legislation. 
They  say  that  Community  laws  are  badly drafted because  of  the  work  of 
Parliament  which  has  actually got  things  wrong.  So  Parliament  is criticised 
for  being  utopian  on  the  one  hand  and  for  turning  out  badly  drafted  laws  on 
the  other  hand. 
So  Parliament  should  exploit  its position a  little more  in  two  ways.  You  can 
argue  in  favour  of  small  steps  forward,  the  gradualism  process  and  so  on,  as 
various  people  have  done  in  the  past.  But  I  argue  that it is not  enough  just 
to  take  a  small  step  here  and  a  small  step there.  Parliament  must  fill all 
the  gaps  in  a  grey  zone  which  exists.  For  example,  Parliament  has  some  powers 
as  far  as  the budget  is  concerned.  They  should  be  expanded .and  filled  in  so 
as  to  ensure  that  it realises  its power  to  the full.  It is certainly the  case 
that  the whole  process  of  European  integration would  not  be  the  same  now 
unless  there  had  been  full  exploitation of  the  consultation procedure,  and 
there  is a  lot  more  that  can  be  done  in  this direction.  There  could  be  a 
future  veto  right,  a  veto  power,  and  there  could  be  much  more  complete 
legislative powers  in  the  future.  But  the  Parliament  has  established its 
foundations  and  has  actually made  the  consultation procedure  work.  If this 
process  were  to be  imposed  more  strongly on  the Member  States in the  future 
you  would  make  further  progress  along  this  line. 
On  the other hand,  to  reply to what  Professor Weiler  has  said,  there  is one 
factor which  I  think  is totally absent  from  this process,  and  that  is the 
exploitation of  legislative procedure so  as  to get  the national policy makers 
involved  in  the  Community  legislation procedure.  I  understood  him  to  be 
talking about  the  agriculture policy when  he  talked about  sacred cows. 
Parliament's  new  strategy will  mean  that  we  will  be  able  to undermine  some  of 
these  sacred  cows,  not  to  say  slaughter them.  Parliament  has  to do  what  it 
can,  it must  try to fill  in  the gaps  as  I  have  said.  It must  exploit  to the 
full  the  role it can  actually play  in this process,  and  make  sure that  its 
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European  Parliament  members  actually play  a  necessary  role  as  a  corollary to 
that  of  their national  parliamentary colleagues. 
If  MEPs  move  away  from  the  forum  kind  of  context  they  will  actually be  able  to 
be  real  actors  in  the  socio-economic  sense.  In  certain grass  roots  forms  the 
Parliament  will  become  much  more  national,  but  it should  try to  act  as  a 
corollary to  the  national  systems  and  not  be  taken  over  by  them.  I  think  that 
tha  role  of  the  groups  in  the  European  Parliament  is  to  inform  and  consult  the 
electors.  If this  role  were  to  be  reinforced,  it would  be  more  fruitful  than 
at  present,  when  we  have  these  rather  grand  publicity stunts  which  the groups 
undertake  in  the  media  to  get  their message  across. 
Thus  Parliament  must  be  considered  as  a  partner which  is  really unavoidable 
for  the other  institutions  and  indispensable  for  the  elector.  I  don't  want  to 
dwell  longer  on  this  point  because  I  have  actually written on  the subject  in 
the  past  as  well.  This  is  why  we  talk about  this dual  strategy of  reinforcing 
the  legislative power  so  as  to  make  it more  effective, of  creating closer 
contact  with  the electors and  improving  it by  means  of the procedures  that 
have  been  actually established by  the gradualistic  approach. 
If then  you  wish  to  change  and  reform  the  system  by  making  it evolve,  there 
are  various  specific  steps  that  you  must  take so  as  to make  this  come  about. 
People  have  actually talked about  these  ideas  but  they  are  not  always 
necessarily that  clear.  I  believe that  there  is great potential  in 
establishing a  new  kind  of Single  European  Act,  because  everybody  knows  that 
if you  establish one  such  Act,  there will  be  another one.  Before  1992  we 
cannot  perhaps  do  anything more  about  that,  but  that does  not  necessarily mean 
that  we  shouldn't prepare for a  further  step into the  future.  So  we  must 
therefore work  out  the general  context  in which  we  are  intending to function, 
a  strategy. 
Parliament, using  its committees,  should  revise its Spinelli  Draft  Treaty so 
as  to adapt  its future  to the present  situation as  it develops.  I  think  that 
this  is  a  very good  reference  context  in  which  we  can  work.  There  have  been 
some  national  reactions  to this which  could  be  corrected  in  the  future,  but  I 
believe that  the  Spinelli  idea  is  something  which  is actually useful  in order 
to  make  some  progress.  It is not  a  case of creating a  type  of  European  union 
- 129  -as  a  utopian  idea,  but  to  have  a  functional  written  strategy  for  attaining 
European  union.  Even  if  we  realise  that  we  won't  actually achieve  it 
tomorrow,  it  is  a  horizon  to  which  we  can  work. 
Not  only  should  we  set  this  aim  but  use  it also  as  a  framework  for  thought,  if 
you  like.  There  are  two  or  three  areas  in  which  Parliament's  functions  could 
actually  be  extended  relatively  rapidly.  The  first  of  these  areas  is quite 
clearly the  question  of  a  European  monetary  union,  where  there  is  a  very 
definite and  urgent  call  for  its achievement.  There  are  some  initiatives 
underway  already,  but  certain  institutional  initiatives will  have  to  be 
undertaken  in  this field  to develop  it further. 
Another  domain  which  is  very  important  for  the  extension of  Parliament's 
functions  is  the  opening  under  the  Single  Act  for  European  political 
cooperation.  The  Act  states that  it wil  be  reviewed  in  five  years•  time,  that 
is, three  years  from  now.  We  must  not  start too  late  in  proposing  some 
changes  in  the  existing political  cooperation procedures.  There  is a  great 
opportunity  here.  If you  don't  do  anything  I  am  convinced  that  the 
governments  will  conclude  after a  relatively rapid  and  quitk discussion,  that 
the  time  is not  ripe, etc., etc., to develop  political cooperation.  The 
Spaniards  and  the  Portuguese  are  now  actually in  Western  European  Union  and  we 
must  take  account  of this  and  of  further  developments  in political cooperation 
in  other areas.  If the  Parliament  misses  the  boat  on  this  then  no  one  else 
wilt  try to  develop  political  cooperation. 
Now  what  can  we  say  by  way  of  reply to  P.rofessor  Weiler  on  the  subject of 
fundamental  rights,  a  kind  of Bill of  rights or a  charter being  established? 
This  would  have  to be  done  on  a  social  level  before even  the  Commission  comes 
out  with  its own  proposats  for  a  social  charter.  If that were  to happen, 
obviously Parliament  would  not  be  anything  like in  the vanguard.  But  the 
Parliament  has  got  to be  in  the  vanguard,  and  it must  make  sure that it brings 
out  this  charter first. 
For  these  reasons,  Parliament  should  adopt  this  framework  and  make  it develop 
in  these  two  areas,  monetary  union  and  in the direction of this social 
charter, as  well  as  in  other ways. 
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matters  is  not  very  satisfactory.  What  you  should  present  to  the  electorate 
is  a  general  framework.  The  kind  of  question  you  should  put  to  them  is, 
whether  you  should  endow  Parliament  with  constituent  powers  for  the  purpose  of 
creating  the  European  union.  To  get  the  electorate  to  actually  say  what  they 
think  about  this  constitutent  role  the  Parliament  must  have  a  draft,  a 
framework,  on  the  basis  of  which  you  could  actually put  the  question  to  them. 
So  in  this  context  Parliament  has  obviously  something  to  do.  The  experience 
we  have  gleaned  under  the  Single  Act  is obviously  going  to  be  developed  in  the 
future,  demonstrating  that  the  Parliament  will  not  get  more  than  it asks  for. 
I  feel  that  here  is  the opportunity to ask  for  more,  and  indeed  to  be  very 
ambitious  in  this  area. 
By  way  of  conclusion  I  would  argue  that  Parliament  has  a  three-way  strategy to 
follow.  There  is  the  governmental  strategy that  I  spoke  about,  which  is a 
very  long  term  idea  involving  the  restructuring of  the political  forces  that 
play  in  our  societies; this will  take a  long  time,  but  it is not  impossible. 
There  is  the  second  strategy, which  is that  of  legislative action  which  must 
be  reinforced.  And  there  is also  the  strategy of  the  development  of  the 
system.  A strategy which  already exists, but  which  demands  also a  greater 
degree  of  review  and  a  more  in-depth  review  than  that actually ongoing  at  the 
moment. 
Vice-President  BARON:  Now  as  we  have  some  time  I  would  like to ask  you 
whether  you  have  any  questions  or any  comments  that you  would  like to make. 
We  have  about  ten minutes,  so  we  could  have  a  brief question and  answer 
session. 
Dr  Karlheinz REIF,  European  co ..  ission:  Professor Weiler  has  reported about 
Working  Group  3  and  its results  and  I  should  like to make  a  short  comment. 
When  I  said yesterday, if we  have  less than  SOX  turnout  newspapers  the next 
day  will  write  'vote of no  confidence  in  Europe'  I  did  not  myself  mean  that 
this would  be  a  true statement.  It will be  part of reality but  I  would  not 
myself  as  a  political scientist subscribe to it.  Secondly,  I  do  not  believe 
as  a  political  sci~ntist in opinion  polls being  able to give  legitimacy.  They 
cannot  replace elections  and  referenda - if one  adheres  to the  idea  of 
referenda.  History tells us  that  Al  Rachid  at one  time  went  himself  among  the 
masses  in disguise  and  listened to what  they  were  saying.  President 
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don't  do  it themselves  nowadays,  they  have  opinion  polls  done  instead.  Every 
now  and  then  an  old  custom  that  has  been  practised  in  Persia  a  couple  of 
thousand  years  ago  poses  a  professional  risk  today  to  those  who  do,  or order, 
or  analyse  opinion  polls.  If  the  messenger  arrived  with  bad  news,  he  was 
killed. 
M.  Jacques  MALLET,  MEP,  Chairman  of the  External  Economic  Relations  Co••ittee: 
r wanted  to  say  how  unfortunate  I  have  been  in  not  being  able  to  follow  all of 
your  work.  We  had  a  heavy  agenda  in  the  Parliament  and  I  had  to  intervene  in 
a  debate  this  morning.  But  I  was  able  to  hear  at  least  some  of what  Professor 
Jacque  said. 
I  know  of  his  analyses  in this  field  in  the past, but  still I  would  like to 
put  a  question  as  to  the  real  risk  that  is  involved  (and  I  put  this as  a 
Frenchman)  - the  real  risk of  people  not  participating  in  the  European 
election.  If  you  take  into consideration what  has  happened  recently  in  my 
country you  can  see  this  is a  real  risk.  I  think  that  we  would  be  tempted  to 
say  that  the  best  remedy  for  abstaining  in  the election wou(d  be  to inject  a 
tremendous  amount  of political  heat  into it, even  though  that  is a  risk.  I 
think  that  people  will  talk  a  lot  more  about  Europe  in  the  next  elections  than 
maybe  in  the  past  because  the  approach  of  1992  is something  that actually 
throws  up  a  lot  of  questions.  It will  mean  that  in  the  campaign  we  will 
obviously  have  to play an  educative  role,  for  the  average  citizen is clearly 
not  particularly able to get  to grips  with  the  real  questions  which  come  up  in 
this field. 
The  seeond  comment  I  wanted  to  make  is not  nece~sarily on  a  legislative  level, 
but  rather concerns  external  relations,  for  as  a  member  and  indeed  as  chairman 
of the  REX  committee  I  have  some  experience  in this field.  The  opinions  which 
Parliament  has  to give  on  association  and  accession agreements  mean  that 
Parliament  is  now  ptaying a  major  role  in  foreign  policy.  Some  people  have 
spoken  of this  as  a  kind  of  atomic  bomb. 
You  can  understand this  in  two  different  ways;  the first  way  would  be  that  the 
Parliament  should  not  use  the  strictly political dictates of  its power  in this 
field,  in  which  it would  be  using  ideas  and  exploiting a  situation which  was 
completely different  from  the  matter at  issue.  But  under  the  second  way  it is 
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improvements  in  the  Israeli  financial  protocols  in  regard  to  the  physical 
exports  and  the  amounts  of exports  and  so  on  from  the  Occupied  Territories  to 
the  Community.  So  there  have  been  actually some  improvements  in  the  matters 
strictly within  the  protocol  as  well  as  on  the  political  issue. 
In  the  final  analysis  we  are  quite often  faced  with  a fait  accompli  kind  of 
agreement  - we  just  have  to  take it or  leave  it.  I  believe  that  the  spirit of 
the  Single  European  Act  means  that  we  must  make  some  progress  in  the  quality 
of the  information  that  is  given  to  the  Parliament  at  an  early stage of  this 
kind  of  negotiation.  Clearly there  are  certain  limits  which  would  apply  for 
the  purposes  of  confidentiality,  and  it is obviously the  case  that  the 
Commission  doesn't  want  the  negotiations  to  go  off  at  half-cock  by  having  to 
give  too  much  information  to  Parliament  too  early. 
Nevertheless,  ~e must  strive for  a  major  development  in  this  field, 
particularly as  to  the  assent  procedure.  This  has  actually  recently been 
considered  by  Commissioner  Willy  De  Clercq  in  terms  of  the  improved  dialogue 
with  the  Commission.  In  this  field the dialogue  with  the  Council  certainly 
leaves  someting  to  be  desired at  the  moment  but  we  can  try to  improve  that 
too.  I  would  say  that  the  assent procedure  has  given  us  a  new  power,  which  we 
still do  not  know  specifically how  to exploit.  In  this field  Parliament's 
role  and  its effectiveness  should not  necessarily be  measured  in strict terms 
of  new  power  but  in  the  sense  of  influence that  it can  bring  to bear.  I  think 
it should  therefore use  this  power  with  moderation,  with  a  great  awareness  of 
its responsibilities and  in very  close  cooperation  with  the  Commission  of the 
EEC. 
The  other question  I  would  also  like to have  brought  up  is the development  of 
political cooperation.  I  am  a  substitute member  of the Political Affairs 
Committee  and  I  would  say  that  generally our  quarterly discussions  with  the 
Presidency  have  given  useful  results which  we  have  been  able  to  use  in the 
Press, apart  from  anything else.  But  these  colloquies are  somewhat 
inadequate,  and  a  bit anaemic  at  the  moment.  On  the question of  security and 
defence  the  field is wide  open,  and  I  feel  we  should  try to  think  how  we  can 
view  the  development  of the  Parliament's  role  in  the  fields  of  security and 
defence. 
- 133 -~r Sergio  SEGRE,  ~EP, Chairman  of the  Committee  on  Institutional Affairs:  I 
would  like to  say  that  I  find  the  strategy and  scheme  that  has  been  put 
forward  by  Professor  Jacque  very  convincing.  It  is  broadly,  in  any  case,  the 
same  system  that  the  Institutional  Committee  of  Parliament  has  been  following 
for  the  last  couple  of  years,  to  the  extent  that  we  must  constantly emphasise 
the  potential  of moving  towards  union,  and  keep  this  in  mind.  We  must  also 
analyse  ~ll  the  new  factors  in  this field,  and  how  we  can  develop  aLL  the 
political  ~nd philosophical  principles  and  ideas  that  are  involved.  In  my 
view,  Parliament  has  undervalued  the  dynamic  of  the  Single  European  Act. 
I  would  also  put  a  question  to  Mr  Jacqu~, as  if we  wish  to  move  in this 
direction,  I  would  like to  hear  his  opinion  on  the  subject.  We  think  we  ought 
to  identify  the  existence  in  Europe  of  certain major  problems,  because  what  we 
are  doing  today  wilt  certainly have  a  major  impact  on  all  foreseeable  future 
developments.  In  the context  of  a  democratic  system  the powers  of  the  Council 
and  those  which  the  Parliament  should  have  must  be  looked  at  in  the  context of 
each  other. 
It  is obvious  that  the possibility of developing  in this field will  have  to 
take  into  consideration  much  closer  cooperation  with  national  parliaments  who 
are  in  some  sense  natural allies.  I  believe that  the  European  Parliament  is 
very often  looked  at  as  being  a  kind  of  competitor,  which  is not  necessarily 
the  case.  This  Parliament  is always  regarded  as  encroaching  on  national 
parliaments'  sovereignty and  taking  away  powers  from  them.  I  think  that  is 
not  the  case.  The  European  Parliament will  probably actually take  away  from 
the  Council  the overmighty  powers  which  it has  in  some  fields,  and  therefore 
be  a  natural ally for  the national  parliaments.  I  would  like to have  some 
further  idea of Professor Jacque's  thoughts  on  this point. 
v;ce-President BARON:  I  am  going  to have  to close our  speakers'  list 
otherwise  we  will  run  out  of  time.  I  wonder  whether  the  same  strategy of  the 
small  steps that  has  been  described  by  Professor  Jacque  would  be  possible 
after the number  of failures  that  we  have  suffered.  I  wonder  also whether  we 
could  also  include  resident  foreigners  on  the electoral  rolls  in  the Member 
States.  Could  that  be  part of  a  strategy?  It would  have  symbolic  force,  and 
I  think  that  it would  perhaps  be  a  way  in  which  we  could  launch  our  strategy. 
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Mme  Marie-Claude  VAYSSADE,  "EP,  First Vice-Chairman,  Legal  Affairs  Co••ittee: 
I  must  say  that  I  agree  with  a  Lot  of  what  Professor  Jacque  said  but  I  believe 
that  there  is  one  field which  calls  for  further  argument.  He  said  that  there 
was  a  clear distinction to  be  drawn  between  the  forum  function  and  the 
legislative  function.  Now  there  may  be  a  distinction  to  be  drawn  between  the 
various  powers  of  an  institution but  I  wouldn't  accept  the  forum  function. 
The  most  important  power  we  have  is  our  own  ability to  take  initiatives, but  I 
fear  that  at  the  moment,  since  our  workload  is  so  enormous,  it  is  very 
difficult  to  make  further  progress  in  terms  of  achieving  more  legislative 
power  as  the  work  on  the  Single  Act  takes  up  so  much  time.  It  is all  very 
welt  to  say  that  political  cooperation  problems,  etc., should  be  given  a  fresh 
impetus,  but  the  problem  has  been  that  in  the  Parliament  we  always  had  (and 
even  more  so  since direct  elections)  a  role of  pointing  to problems  in 
society,  of  trying to  slot  them  into a  Community  framework  even  if they are 
not  mentioned  by  name  in  the  Treaty.  Now  that  is a  parliamentary  function  -
at  least  I  think  it is.  You  may  call  that a  forum  function;  I  wouldn't  use 
that  word,  but  I  do  think  that  this  is a  role  which  we  will  always  keep  and  it 
should  not  be  sacrificed entirely. 
Mr  Fernand  HERMAN,  MEP,  General  Rapporteur of the co ..  ittee on  Institutional 
Affairs:  Yes,  I  take  Mr  Jacque's  point  but  there is one  thing which  I  think 
hasn't  been  dealt  a  fair  hand  and  that  is the  fact  that  the  Parliament  does 
now  have  better means  at  its disposal  to make  its voice  heard.  I  think  that 
after 1992  and  even  today,  the  pressure on  the  further  enlargement  of  the 
Community  will  become  enormous.  Pressure is already being  brought  to bear  on 
us  at  the moment,  and  as  a  result  of the need  for  legislation on  future 
enlargement  the  Parliament  has  been  given  a  lot  more  leverage.  Mr  Mallet 
picked this point  up  and  said that  the  Parliament  may  well  decide  to use  its 
powers  in  an  unselfish manner.  It is all very well  to  say that  we  cannot 
olackmail  others with  this power,  but it is totally consistent  to  say  that 
there  is no  point  in having  a  Community  if it is diluted down  from  its present 
institutional model.  That  in  my  view  is the  tool  and  the  leverage that  we 
have,  and  I  think  that this  is something  that  we  should  more  or  less  shout 
about  from  the  rooftops,  rather than giving  in  and  saying  to everyone,  Well, 
join the  club.  It is always  nice to please all  and  sundry,  but  the  Community 
would  be  totally diluted  in  the  end. 
- 135  -Professor  JACQUE:  Very  briefly,  Mr  Chairman,  I  take  Mr  Mallet's  points  and  I 
do  agree  with  him  that  a  leverage  of  future  Community  enlargement  should 
certainly  be  used  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  the  Council  to  change  the 
existing  institutional  structures.  We  agree  totally,  I  think.  With  regard  to 
Mrs  Vayssade's  comments,  the  concept  of  a  forum  is  not  necessarily  the  ideal 
word,  and  one  should  bear  in  mind  that  Parliament  has  a  certain  right  of 
initiative which  is part  of  its  legislative powers.  But  to  go  as  far  as 
forcing  the  Commission  to  enable  Parliament  to  take  full  initiatives would  be 
to  do  what  the  Parliament  is  not  at  the  moment  empowered  to do,  that  is  to 
take  initiatives.  So  one  has  to  be  very  cautious  wheri  opting  for  certain 
debates  in  order to  avoid  problems,  although  it  seems  to  me  that  Members  of 
the  Parliament  tend  to  choose  in  an  intelligent manner  from  among  the  subjects 
they  can  tackle  in  that  field. 
In  regards  to  r.omments  made  on  the  vote  being  given  to  foreign  nationals, 
there  are  various  sides  to this.  I  may  have  overlooked  some  of  them,  but  this 
is  something  that  has  to  do  with  the strategy of  national  governments.  The 
most  important  thing  is  to  come  back  to a  uniform  electoral  law.  At  the 
moment  things  seem  to  be  blocked  to a  certain extent, and  at· the end  of  the 
day  of  course national political parties will  never  have  a  full  grip over 
European  elections unless  the  voting  system  itself has  been  harmonised  and 
standardised throughout  the  EEC.  Because  obviously the  minimum  requirement  is 
that  EC  nationals  can  vote  wherever  they  wish  during  European  elections.  As 
to their rights  to vote  in  local  elections  and  regional  elections  in their 
countries  of  residence,  that  will  have  to  be  debated  in  the future. 
In  reply to Mr  Mallet  I  would  like to say  that what  applies to  Mr  Herman 
applies  to him  as  well.  We  may  not  be  ruled by  those  who  possess all 
knowledge,  but  I  do  remember  the President of the  French  Republic  saying  on 
the  subject of nuclear weapons  that  they would  remain  with  us  in  Europe  for  a 
long  time  because  of their deterrent  role,  and  that  implies that  the  nuclear 
deterrent  is effective.  I  am  sure  that  Parliament  too  has  its own  deterrent 
which  wilt  be  effective provided it is used  at  the most  appropriate moment. 
If it is used  left, right and  centre it is no  longer effective,  and  then  the 
Parliament  really will  look  like the  constant  spanner  in  the works,  trying to 
grind the whole  European  machinery  to  a  halt.  So,  as  I  said, the deterrent 
function  may  be  important  but  it is better possibly to move  from  a  deterrent 
role  to  a  cooperative  role.  It may  in the future  possibly  include security 
- 136  -matters  and  that  would  certainly imply  progress  on  political  cooperation 
through  which  Parliament  might  be  involved  in  more  serious matters.  But  for 
the  time  being  I  don't  see  how  we  could  enhance  the  role  of  the  Parliament  in 
EPC  because  of  its very  nature  compared  to  that of  other  national  parliaments; 
it would  in  my  view  be  better to  concentrate  on  the  Parliament's  present 
efforts  to  be  involved  in  European  political cooperation  and  also  to  be  heard 
in  terms  of  security debates. 
Vice-President  BARON:  Before  closing  I  would  like  to  read  out  a  message  that 
Mrs  Veil  gave  me  before  she  left: 
'I would  ask  you  to  accept  my  apologies  that  I  cannot  be  present  at  the 
closing  session  as  I  would  have  wished.  Unfortunately  I  had  to  go  to  Paris 
yesterday  and  I  have  certain  commitments  in  Portugal  tonight  so  I  can't  come 
back  to  Strasbourg.  I  would  like  to  thank  all of  those  who,  through  the 
studies  and  scholarly papers  presented,  have  been  able  to  help  us  to think 
about  the  matters  that  have  been  on  the  agenda  over  the  last  two  days,  and  I 
trust  that  we  will  be  able  to draw  fruitful  conclusions  from  them.  Not  only 
for  the  future  of  your  work  but  also with  a  view  to creating the  European 
citizen and  enhancing  the prestige of its Parliament.  I  was  certainly 
interested to  hear  what  the  experts  had  to  say  in their  learned papers  and  I 
am  sorry that  I  was  not  able  to be  present at your  working  sessions.  I  know 
that  parliamentarians  have  been  to your  sessions  and  that  you  have  been  able 
to benefit  from  their experience.  They  have  been  able to  guide  the experts 
along  practical  lines  in their approach  to parliamentary matters. 
I  know  too that it is not  always  possible for outsiders to understand  the 
dynamism  of the political groups  within  the  Parliament  and  the  actual  role 
that  they  have  to ptay,  so  as  to  understand  the  richness of our diversity,  and 
the unity  in diversity that exists within the  Parliament. 
We  also have  to consider the  importance  of the  role of the Parliament  which  is 
directly elected.  The  choices  that  have  been  expressed by  the  Parliament  are 
choices  which  are  made  on  behalf of the electorate.  Most  people  would  want  to 
have  greater  European  integration and  therefore as  a  legislator we  cannot 
underestimate  the  importance  of this.  Here  we  are talking about  joint 
legislation and  with  that  view  the Parliament  is going  beyond  what  has  been 
- 137  -suggested  by  the  Commission.  We  will  certainly  look  at  ways  in  which  we  can 
integrate.  It  is  not  just  abstruse  matters  that  we  are  debating  here,  these 
are  precise problems  which  require  a  political  answer.  This  Europe  should  be 
inspired  by  Conservative,  Socialist,  Christian  Democratic  ideas  and  that  is  of 
course  very  much  our  debate  at  the  moment.  We  all  have  our  ideas  that  we  want 
to  put  across.  Behind  these  technical  discussions  we  are  really talking  about 
political  will  and  the  political decisions  that  will  be  taken.  Of  course  we 
will  have  to  look  at  what  the  actual  political  majority is.  Since  the  Single 
Act  we  now  have  the  system  of  a  qualified majority  and  this  is  certainly based 
on  a  considerable  compromise.  We  must  try to  push  Europe  forward,  and  we  have 
also  to  make  sure  that  this  is  in  the minds  of our  citizens  and  we  hope  that 
their  ideas  can  be  expressed  through  the  Parliament  in  all  its actions. 
I  am  sorry  that  I  cannot  be  with  you  this morning,  but  I  did  want  to give  you 
some  ideas  that  had  occured  to  me  when  considering  the activity of  this 
Parliament.'  Signed:  Simone  Veil. 
Vice-President  BARON:  I  am  not  going  to  make  the  speech  which  I  prepared,  but 
I  will  attempt  to  draw  together some  loose  ends  and  reach  some  conclusions  on 
the basis  of  what  we  have  heard  in this very  interesting seminar.  I  think  the 
academics  and  the scientists who  have  been  at this meeting  have  worked  very 
well.  I  remember  during  the  Franco  dictatorship  in  Spain  there  was  an 
anecdote  of  a  journalist  who  went  round  the  country  and  when  he  spoke  with  the 
people  about  the situation he  was  told that everything  was  very bad.  He  told 
this to a  person  in  power,  who  said,  If you  think  thin9s  are  very  bad  you 
should not  travel around  the  country and  you  mustn't  read  the newspapers,  and 
then  you  will  think that everything  in  the  garden  is wonderful. 
So  I  really think that what  you  did  was  a  good  idea.  You  have  travelled 
about,  you  have  been  all ears but  you  have  read  tess  perhaps,  you  have  been 
like St.  Thomas;  you  have  really put  your  finger  into the  wound,  you  have  been 
deliberately doubtful,  you  wanted  to have  it proved  to  you. 
We  discussed this meeting  at  length  in the Bureau  of  Parliament  and  with  our 
friends  from  TEPSA,  and  we  thought  that it would  be  a  very good  idea  for  all 
of  us  to  hold  this brainstorming session  so  that  we  could  have  a  frank  and 
fearless  debate  between  academics,  parliamentarians,  journalists and  all  those 
- 138  -who  are  interested  in  European  affairs.  It  is  interesting to  look  at  the  work 
that  has  been  done  and  particularly that  based  on  what  I  might  call  the 
profits  of  the  past.  It  has  been  very  good. 
It  is of  course  important  that  this  is  being  done,  because  the  European 
process  is  speeding  up  now  and  it is  against  that  backdrop  that  this meeting 
has  been  held.  The  Community  today  is  moving  towards  a  union  of  twelve 
parliamentary democracies,  which  each  possess  democratic  and  institutional 
elements.  But  as  yet  this  process  is  not  really  fully defined  at  European 
level  and  there certainly is  a  democratic  deficit  in  that  sense  which  was 
pinpointed  by  Mr  Toussaint's  recent  report  to  Parliament. 
There  is  also  a  question  of dialectic  here.  The  return  to majority voting 
embodied  in  the  Single  Act  is  certainly different  to  an  inter-governmental 
system  of alliances  between  countries;  this is  going  to  mean  that  the 
Parliament  has  a  greater  role to  play. 
But  we  do  have  to  face  up  to  the  reality of  where  most  decisions  which  are 
taken,  and  we  were  reminded  this morning  that  Jacques  Delors  has  said that  in 
ten  years'  time  BOX  of  social  and  economic  decisions would  be  taken  at 
Community  level.  You  can  certainly discuss  the  actual  percentage  but  you  can 
be  sure  that  basically speaking  there will  be  a  great deal  more  done  at 
Community  level.  Without  claiming that  everything will  be  done  within  the 
Community  and  that  there will  be  a  uniform  Europe,  as  Napoleon  himself  wanted 
to  have  in  his  day,  we  are going  to  have  much  more  give  and  take  and  much  more 
cut  and  thrust  in  the  system. 
Members  of the Parliament  and  political scientists are  here  from  twelve 
countries and  some  of them  are monarchies  and  some  have  a  presidential  system. 
But  we  have  no  difficulty in  agreeing  as  to  how  a  democratic  assembly  should 
actually work  in  spite of the different backgrounds  that  we  come  from.  I 
think  that this  indicates very  clearly  th~t we  do  have  shared  ideas  of the 
concept  of  a  democracy.  I  was  very  interested when  we  discussed the 
Parliament  as  a  forum  or  as  a  legislator and  as  a  governing  body.  On  this 
aspect  I  think  there  has  been  something  of a  metamorphosis  in  the Parliament 
since the  Single  Act  came  into  force  in July 1987.  The  Parliament,  which  was 
a  sort  of  cross  between  the  UN  and  a  student  group  of  May  1968,  has  now  really 
changed.  It has  developed. 
- 139 -In  spite  of  certain misgivings  which  some  of  us  had  at  the  outset,  Parliament 
has  learnt  to  work  with  the  new  system  of  voting  by  a  majority of  Members. 
This  is  subject  to  much  more  stringent  rules  than  voting  in  a  national 
parliament  because  systematically you  require  a  majority of  Members  to  vote 
together,  which  in  the  normal  way  would  only  be  needed  in  national  parliaments 
for  electing a  head  of  government  - the  so-called  'Kampfermehrheit'  in  the 
German  system  - or  for  a  constitutional  change.  So  you  have  to  have  260  votes 
and  all  260  have  to  vote  for  the  same  thing,  which  is of  prime  importance. 
This  means  that  the  Parliament  has  to  work  with  broad  majorities,  and  this 
makes  it very  interesting  in  a  Parliament  where  no  group  has  an  absolute 
majority.  There  are  eight  political groups,  so  to  achieve  260  votes  means 
that  there  has  to  be  agreement  beween  the  Socialists  and  the  Christian 
Democrats  at  least;  then  you  have  to broaden  that  agreement  to  bring  in  other 
groups,  and  this  is often done  with  the  Communists,  particularly the  Italian 
Communists,  or  with  the Liberals or  with  the  Conservatives  or  the  Democratic 
Alliance.  So  I  think it is a  very  good  idea  for  us  to  look  closely at  this 
whole  process  of decision making. 
At  the  same  time  we  still argue  about  things  from  ideological  platforms.  For 
example,  when  the  United  States attacked Libya,  or  when  we  were  debating 
Nicaragua,  or  South  Africa  there  were  very  clear splits along  Left/Right 
lines;  we  also debated  problems  of decolonisation,  such  as  in  New  Caledonia, 
and  often there are  splits within political groups,  along  national  lines or  on 
other bases,  so  we  are  not  mealy-mouthed.  I  think  it is very  important  that 
this  should  continue  in  the next term  of office of the  Parliament. 
I  believe that the  Commission  has  done  its duty  and  the  Parliament  is 
beginning to shoulder its responsibilities, but  the problem  occurs  in  the 
Council.  Certainly certain directives, particularly those  on  plant  and  animal 
health  and  on  the  free movement  of people, are  held  up  in  Council,  and  this  is 
creating a  very  serious  problem.  As  it is the  Council  that  holds  the  whip 
hand  up  to  1992  we  are going  to  have  to make  it very  clear that decisions  will 
have  to  be  taken  every  week  by  the  Council  so  that  they  can  stick to their 
deadlines.  This  will  be  very difficult  indeed,  because  the  Parliament  at  the 
moment  only  has  negative  rights. 
- 140  -I  would  now  like  to  say  something  very  quickly  about  the  main  topics  that  the 
Parliament  is  going  to  have  to  face  and  the  present  line-up of  political 
forces  in  Europe.  I  think  the  essence  of  the  Single  Act  is  that  as  we  want  to 
advance,  as  we  want  to  develop  the  institutions  and  so  on  and  as  we  want  to 
mnk~ security a  priority,  we  have  to  concentrate  on  a  main  theme,  and  try  to 
cre~te the  notion  of  citizenship of  Europe.  Our  citizens  need  a  European 
identity. 
You  can  argue  that  there  could  be  two  parts  in  a  new  constitution for  the 
Community;  first,  the  dogmatic  part  - and  here  I  think  it would  be  difficult 
to  improve  on  the  Convention  on  Human  Rights  of the  Council  of  Europe.  It has 
taken  a  very  long  time  to  get  human  rights  enshrined  in  law,  so  I  don't  think 
we  are  going  to  achieve  many  changes  on  that  front.  But  we  also have  to  Look 
at  the  organic  side  of  a  constitution.  Here  we  often  find  that  the  Community 
institutions don't  work  in  the  same  democratic  way  as  their counterparts  do  in 
their  own  countries.  This  is  something  that  we  Latin  constitutionalists  like 
to  say  and  this  is  the  way  we  think  to  a  certain extent.  You  will  find  this 
approach  in  Spain,  Italy and  Portugal  and  there  are  about  a  half a  dozen 
countries  where  we  think  along  these  lines.  In  other  countries - the 
Commonwealth  countries  and  the  UK  for  example  - there  is a  very different 
approach  to  the  whole  matter. 
But  I  think  that  in  spite of  these differences  and  these different  backgrounds 
it is  important  that  we  agree  as  to  how  the  Commission  can  become  a  democratic 
federal  government  or as  to  how  the  Council  can  actually work  better, so  that 
we  can  progress beyond  the  current  context.  It is vital that this be  taken 
into account.  For  example,  it is  important  that the Minister  who  is 
responsible for  a  certain area, having  taken a  Community  decision  in Brussels 
in  the morning  does  not  put a  nationalistic gloss on  that decision  when  he 
returns  hom@  in the afternoon.  So  there  is some  schizophrenia,  and  it is 
often quite difficult to explain that  to  people.  This  is one  of the most 
important  facets  of the  future  of the  Community,  and  I  think  that it is also 
something  that  is directly related to the creation of  European  political 
forces. 
In  1984  people  said that  European  political  forces  were  at  a  low  point,  a  low 
ebb.  On  the other  hand  the  fundamental  issue  is to  take  into consideration 
the  European  political  forces  which  actualLy did play a  part.  This  is 
- 141  -something  of  very  great  importance.  If  you  reflect  on  the  recent  EPP  Congress 
which  took  place  in  Luxembourg,  for  example,  you  will  realise  that  they 
actually  managed  to  agree  on  the  idea  of  voting  by  majority  in  the  internal 
context  of  the  party.  This  is  very  important  to note,  and  the  same  question 
has  come  up  in  the  Socialist  Group  as  well.  There  is  an  increasing  awareness 
that  it is essential  to  achieve,  at  least  cautiously,  some  kind  of 
relationship between  the  national  party programmes  and  the  Community 
programmes. 
By  way  of  conclusion  I  would  like  to  say  that  the  security and  defence  of  the 
Community  are  really of  major  importance.  We  should  seek  to  make  progress 
towards  Community  security and  defence  policies,  because  they  do  appeal  to  the 
public,  or  they  are  understood  by  the  public  in  the  context  of  the  economic 
policies.  And  again,  the  so-called social  cohesiveness  that  we  are  trying  to 
establish  in  the  Community  must  not  be  forgoten.  I  believe that  gradually 
people  will  behave  less egotistically and  will  become  less  blinkered.  When 
you  take  into  consideration  the  regional  and  social  programmes  you  really do 
see  progress  being  made,  and  people  have  already a  sense of the  Community's 
objectives.  This  can  be  seen  in  France  and  it is coming  in· various  countries 
in  the  Community.  The  Parliament  has  made  a  great  contribution to this 
evolution,  and  will  continue to do  so. 
Professor Jacques  VANDAMRE,  Chairman  of TEPSA:  Mr  Chairman  I  would  like to 
thank  you  very  warmly  for  your  concluding  statement  today  and  also  for  your 
participation  in our work.  You  have  played  the  role of  a  good  partner,  and 
you  have  helped  us  greatly.  We  are very  grateful to you  and  to all  the 
Members  of Parliament  who  have  actually participated  in  our  discussions  during 
the  last two  days.  I  think  we  have  achieved  our objective which  was  to 
organise a  discussion between  the people  who  are on  the political side of the 
Parliament and  those  in the outside world.  With  my  thanks  to the  Members  of 
the  European  Parliament  go  my  thanks  to  the officials  who  have  organised this 
Symposium  so  satisfactorily.  Mr  Neunreither particularly,  Mr  Poehle  and 
Mr  Millar  have  all been  involved  from  the outset  and  I  would  very  much  like to 
thank  them  for  their efforts and  their commitment,  which  made  possible the 
success  of the  Symposium. 
- 142  -I  would  also  like  to  thank  the  representatives  of  the  national  parliaments  who 
stayed  here  until  the bitter end,  if we  can  call it that.  That  is  not  always 
a  very  easy  thing  to  do,  taking  into  consideration their other  commitments, 
but  their presence  has  obviously  made  our  debate  much  more  rich  and  fruitful 
than  would  otherwise  have  been  possible. 
Vice-President  BARON:  The  Symposium  is  concluded. 
* * * * * 
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